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THE NATIONAL GERMAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1901-1918:
CULTURAL POLITICS AND ETHNICITY IN
PEACE AND WAR
Charles Thomas Johnson, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1997
The purpose of this dissertation is to tell the story o f the National GermanAmerican Alliance, an organization of middle to upper-middle class well-educated
professionals formed in 1901 to promote and preserve aspects of German culture in
the United States. Increasingly, however, it found itself drawn into controversial
political and diplomatic issues in the rapid political, social and international change that
marked the first two decades o f the twentieth century.
The dissertation begins with a review of German-America from colonial times
to 1899 and serves as a background for the founding of the Alliance within the context
of the growth of the German-American community. From its founding in 1901 to
1905 the Alliance concerned itself primarily with the preservation of German culture.
By 1906, however, the group expanded its agenda to include the delicate issues of
prohibition of alcohol and foreign affairs, while simultaneously attempting to gamer
the support of other major ethnic organizations. Additional forays into the questions
of woman suffrage and immigration restriction, by 1911 transformed the Alliance from
a group concerned primarily with the preservation of German culture to one that
attempted to exercise influence on a wide range of national and international issues.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

With the outbreak of World War One in Europe the organization came out in favor of
absolute American neutrality and fair-play for Germany—the later an unenviable
position in a nation that increasingly came to sympathize with the Allied cause.
American entry into the conflict against Germany in 1917, coupled with the
subsequent anti-German hysteria, led to the rapid decline and eventual end of the
Alliance in 1918.
The seventeen year history o f the Alliance serves as an example of the
problems faced by ethnic organizations which seek to preserve their cultural heritage
in the volatile environment that can be American democracy. Little, however, has
been written on the Alliance. What exists has focused on either activities of the state
chapters or the work of the national organization during World War One. This study
represents the first attempt to chronicle and critically analyze the history of the
organization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INFORM ATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy.

Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white

photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 9817115

Copyright 1997 by
Johnson, Charles Thomas
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9817115
Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Copyright by
Charles Thomas Johnson
1997

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS

It is impossible to thank everyone who contributed to this project. Without
their help however, this work would never have become a reality. Yet some
individuals deserve to be singled out for special thanks. First, and foremost, is my
advisor Dr. Ross Gregory. Over the years he has become more than an advisor and
mentor—he has become a friend who has guided me through my years of graduate
study. Without his patience and understanding I would never have come this far.
I would also like to thank Dr. Ronald Davis who brought me into the program
and has supported me every step of the way. To the members of my committee: Dr.
Donald Fixico, Dr. John Houdek, and Dr. Manfred Berg, I offer my thanks for their
comments, criticisms and suggestions. Their efforts have made this a better work. To
Dr. Theresa M. Thompson. Professor o f English at Valdosta State University I offer
my gratitude for her encouragement and assistance during the final stages of the
project.
My thanks also go to the German Historical Institute in Washington, D C. and
The Graduate College at Western Michigan University. Their fellowships made it
possible for me to travel and do research.
Most of all I want to thank my mother who always believed in her son’s dream.
Charles Thomas Johnson

ii

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................ii
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................... iv
PREFACE..........................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER
I. GERMAN-AMERICA PRIOR TO

1899................................................. 4

End Notes........................................................................................50
II. PRESERVING A SENSE OF DEUTSCHUM, 1899-1905......................58
End Notes........................................................................................97
III. “HOCHDER D ANBr 1906-1910........................................................... 104
End Notes.......................................................................................141
IV. HIGH TIDE OF THE NGAA, 1910-1914...............................................147
End Notes.......................................................................................180
V. AMERICANS OR GERMAN? THE NGAA AND AMERICAN
NEUTRALITY, 1914-1917...................................................................... 186
End Notes...................................................................................... 231
VI. THE TWILIGHT AND THE END,1917-1918........................................ 237
End Notes...................................................................................... 276
VII.CONCLUSION: ETHNICITY AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY..........................................................................................280
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................ 286
iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF TABLES

1.

German Immigration, 1820-1920.....................................................................1

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PREFACE

By 1900 German-Americans constituted the single largest ethnic group in the
United States as more than twenty-three percent o f the nation’s population could trace
its roots back to Germany. Large German communities existed in such cities as
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, New York, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and
San Francisco. In these urban areas, and in other cities and states, German-Americans
maintained traditional ethnic ties through churches, social and political organizations,
as well as through the German language press which could claim over six hundred
weeklies and dailies across the nation.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, German-Americans also enjoyed the
position of being the nation’s most respected non-English ethnic group. Journalist
Josiah Flynt summed up this sentiment in an article written for the November 1896
issue of Atlantic Monthly. Flynt wrote that German-Americans were a patient people,
whose perseverance and industriousness, coupled with their love of liberty and
freedom contributed greatly to the growth of America and its democratic institutions.
German-Americans indeed could look back proudly to the contributions of Baron
Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, Carl Schurz, Heinrich Steinweg, and others to the
founding o f the nation and the growth of its political, cultural, and economic
institutions.

I
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Less than twenty years later this position will have changed beginning with
declaration o f war by the United States against Germany in April 1917. From April
1917 to November 1918, Americans of German descent found themselves and their
culture under direct assault by “patriotic” Americans who viewed anything German as
a threat to the United States and its institutions. In only nineteen short months a onceflourishing German-American culture in the United States was reduced to little more
than a memory.
Thus, the first two decades of the century were a time of transition and change
for the German-American community. Sharing, and involving itself in the events of
the era—the high times and also the low points—was the National German-American
Alliance. Founded in 1901, the Alliance sought to promote and preserve German
culture in America. As the organization grew in size—eventually claiming over 2.5
million members and chapters in forty-four states—it began to involve itself in some of
the major issues of the day including prohibition, relations between the United States
and Germany, immigration, and woman’s suffrage. With the onset o f World War I the
Alliance shifted its attention to preserving American neutrality and advocating fair play
for Germany in the war. By late 1917 its actions, coupled with the ongoing antiGerman hysteria, had left it a discredited organization—condemned by the public and
government as a potential threat to American security.
Little has been written on the Alliance. What exists focuses on either activities
of the state chapters or the work of the national organization during World War One.
To this date no study has attempted to chronicle the entire history of the organization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

The purpose of this study is to tell the story o f the National German-American
Alliance within the context of the times in which it existed. It also seeks to show how
the Alliance attempted to preserve and protect German-American culture during a time
o f rapid political and social change in the United States. Thus, it is a story of an ethnic
organization that believed deeply in what it was doing but in the end fell victim to its
own passion.
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CHAPTER I

GERMAN-AMERICA PRIOR TO 1899

Americans of German descent have been a part of this nation’s history since the
early part of the seventeenth century. The first three Germans arrived with Captain John
Smith on April 26, 1607 and helped to found the colony o f Jamestown .1 Fifty-six years
later in May 1663 forty-one German Mennonites established a small community in
Delaware. Founded as a communal settlement, this colony was the first in North America
to prohibit slavery or involuntary servitude in any form.
On March 4, 1681, in repayment for money owed to his father, the English
government granted a royal charter to William Penn for lands that became known as
Pennsylvania.2 Two years later Francis Daniel Pastorius, a Frankfurt attorney
influenced by the teachings of Penn, headed a Frankfurt Company which purchased
twenty-five thousand acres of land in Pennsylvania. Pastorius arrived in Philadelphia
on August 20, 1683 to pave the way for the first group o f immigrants from Germany.
Less than two months later on October 6, 1683 thirteen Quaker families from Krefeld
on the Rhine arrived outside of Philadelphia and named their settlement
“Germantown.”3 To this day October 6, 1683 marks the beginning of German
settlement in America and is officially celebrated as “German-American Day.”

4
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As with many early settlers to the New World, this small group of Germans
emigrated to the Americas for religious reasons. The colony of Pennsylvania was
especially known for its toleration o f pietistic and other Protestant religious minorities.
Besides Quakers and Mennonites, Germans representing a wide range of
denominations and sects, including Lutherans, Dunkers, Schwenkfelders and Catholics
settled in North America during this period.
The next great “wave” of German immigration began around 1709 when more
than ten thousand people from the Palatinate region risked the voyage to the New
World. These people came primarily for economic reasons prompted by the War of
the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) and its aftereffects.4 They also were enticed by
an offer made by Queen Anne of England in 1709. Seeking to increase immigration to
British North America, especially in the Carolinas and Georgia, the English
government circulated a pamphlet throughout the Rhine Valley which offered free
passage and support upon arrival to all who would risk the voyage across the
Atlantic. The British purposely targeted this area of Germany, knowing that the recent
wars and agriculture disaster would make such an offer attractive.5 The response was
overwhelming as more than 30,000 Germans swelled the port of Rotterdam, an
amount well beyond the ability of the British authorities to handle. Eventually only
2,400 made the voyage overseas, o f which 650 actually settled in the Carolinas. The
remainder arrived in New York and settled in the Hudson River Valley, while some
moved on to established German settlements in Pennsylvania. By 1714 the majority of
Germans in British North America lived in New York.6
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Between 1720 and 1760 over 62,000 Germans arrived in Britain’s North
American colonies. Emigration from the German lands was not confined to any one
particular region, but occurred throughout a majority o f the German states, although
the largest number came from the western and southwestern areas. While they settled
in all thirteen colonies, the largest German communities were in New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.7 It was also
during this time that a German political culture began to evolve in the New World—
shaped in large part by life in the Old World coupled with recent experiences as
immigrants to the New World. After risking the dangerous overseas voyage in an
effort to escape the religious, political, and economic hardships of Germany, the
immigrants were less willing to accept similar circumstances in the colonies. One
means by which they hoped to overcome adversity in the New World was to gain
naturalization as quickly as possible. O f the total number of immigrants naturalized in
colonial America more than 94% were from the German states.8 In colonies such as
Pennsylvania and New York, where they existed in large numbers, Germans played an
important role in local elections. Their main issues o f concern were defense o f the
frontier against Indian attacks, ownership of land, taxation, and to a lesser extent
religious matters.
An excellent example o f a unified German voting block occurred in the election
for the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1764. Pontiac’s war on the frontier made the Indian
question a key issue for Germans, along with attempts by Benjamin Franklin to turn
Pennsylvania into a royal colony. Both sides realized that in order to win they would
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have to gain the German vote. In the end the desire to remain a proprietary colony
caused the majority of Germans to side against Franklin and his party, costing him and
many o f his followers their seats in the Pennsylvania Assembly.9 The example of
Pennsylvania was not an isolated incident. Germans throughout the colonies acted
collectively at various times as they quickly realized that, as outsiders in a land
dominated by the English, they would have to stick together to preserve what they had
worked so hard to attain. To this end, German political behavior was guided by whom
they thought could best help them achieve their goal of land, prosperity, and security.
By involving themselves in politics the Germans exposed themselves to attacks
by the non-German majority. Franklin did not take his defeat in 1764 lightly, choosing
to vent his frustration on the German population. A one-time supporter of the ethnic
group, he now concluded that Germans represented a potential threat to the existing
Anglo culture. In Observations Concerning the Increase o f Mankind, he called
Germans “boors” who were attempting to establish their language and customs at the
expense of traditional English ways.10 Franklin’s attack, while not overtly hostile, set
the stage for future criticism of Germans along similar lines. During the colonial
period, whether rightly so or not, Germans were looked upon as a group that
maintained a distinct culture outside the English speaking norm, who held church
services in German, spoke German at home and in public, and rarely married outside
the community. Finally, they held on strongly to customs of the Old World.11 Thus,
even before the creation o f the United States, a foundation for “hyphenated” America
had been put into place.
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For Germans in the colonies the outbreak of revolution in 1775 brought the
same questions and concerns being asked by English colonists. Although the majority
of Germans came to the New World for reasons of religious, political and economic
freedom, they did feel a “bond” as citizens of the British Empire. The Germans
reacted to the revolution, not as a united body, but in diverse ways dependent upon
geography, status and prevailing local opinion. In Pennsylvania and New York, where
support was high for the revolution, Germans generally supported the cause of the
colonies. In Georgia most of them became Loyalists, thus mirroring popular opinion
in that colony.12
The average American probably perceives German participation in the
American Revolution in British hiring of German mercenaries called “Hessians.” The
British would use 30,000 of these soldiers in the conflict. After the war 5,000 of them
chose to remain in the United States.13 There also of course was the familiar case of
General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, a former Prussian military officer who joined
the colonists and was credited with turning George Washington’s Continental Army
into an effective fighting force. Few Americans realize that one of the enduring
“legends” of the war, Molly Pitcher, was actually a German immigrant named Maria
Ludwig.14
German participation went beyond traditional school boy stories. Germans
took part in all aspects o f the conflict from common soldiers all the way up to
commanders in the field. Baron John De Kalb, from Bayreuth, Prussia, appointed a
Major General by Washington, became commander of an army in South Carolina.
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DeKalb fell mortally wounded in the Battle of Camden while leading an undermanned
Continental force against British troops commanded by General Horatio Gates. The
Continental Congress, on the recommendation of General Washington, authorized a
monument commemorating DeKalb’s service to the nation.15 General Peter
Muhlenberg led a German regiment in the colonial army that turned the tide at the
Battle of Germantown in 1777. In popular culture the participation of German settlers
is glorified in such films as 20th Century Fox’s 1939 production, Drums Along the
Mohawk. In one scene General Nicholas Herkimer, a German immigrant, leads settlers
of the Mohawk Valley in the Battle of Oriskany. The general was mortally wounded,
but his efforts resulted in victory over the British and cutting off supplies to General
John Burgoyne, action that helped bring about defeat of the British in the West.
The German press in the colonies also participated heavily in the conflict.
Henry Miller trumpeted the cause of independence in his Philadelphia Staatsboote and
for his efforts was named printer for the Continental Congress. Miller issued the first
German translation o f the Declaration of Independence on July 7, 1776.16 From
humble beginnings during the colonial period, the German-American press grew to
become the nation’s largest ethnic press by the end of the nineteenth century.
By the end o f the war German settlers, now known as German-Americans,
could look proudly upon their contributions to the founding o f the new nation. When
the United States conducted its first census in 1790 Germans made up nine percent of
the population.17 The task for them, and every other “American,” turned to creating a
new nation out of thirteen colonies. The German contribution to the subsequent
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growth of the United States has been told many times. German work habits and
efficiency, their foods, beverages, dances, and place-names became no less a legitimate
part o f the American landscape than the more populous Anglo ways. By 1901, a
people once labeled by Benjamin Franklin with the derogatory name “Dutch” had
become the dominant ethnic group in the United States that did not have English, or a
variation of English, as a mother tongue.18
During the late eighteenth and on through the nineteenth century GermanAmericans participated fully in the growth and development of the nation. Their
numbers swelled in the mid-nineteenth century when large-scale emigration from the
German states to America began in earnest. As German-Americans settled in new
areas they established their culture and traditions, in essence creating a series of
individual “kleines Deutschland” across the United States.
During the fifty years after the outbreak of the American Revolution (through
the mid-1820’s) emigration to America from the German states was virtually
nonexistent. Wars on both continents were among the forces that discouraged transAtlantic migration. The end o f the 1820’s produced the start of a steady stream of
German immigration that would last almost the rest of the century. The high point
came in the 1880’s when over 1.4 million Germans, 28% of all immigrants that
decade, came to America. This “golden age” of German immigration reached its end
by 1900. During the next ten years only 175,000 Germans, 3% of the immigrant
population, reached American shores.19 Table 1 gives a break-down of German
immigration to the United States, by decade, during the period 1820-1920.
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Table 1
German Immigration, 1820-192020

Decade

Total Immigration

German

% of
Total

1820-29

128,502

5,753

4.5

1830-39

538,381

124,726

23.2

1840-49

1,427,337

385,434

27.0

1850-59

2,814,554

976,072

34.7

1860-69

2,081,261

723,734

34.8

1870-79

2,742,137

751,769

27.4

1880-89

5,248,568

1,445,181

27.5

1890-99

3,694,294

579,072

15.7

1900-09

8,202,388

328,722

4.0

1910-19

6,347,380

174,227

2.7

As Table 1 illustrates, German immigration to the United States was at its lowest point
of the one-hundred year period during the first two decades of the 20th century, the
period in which the National German-American Alliance (hereafter referred to as
NGAA or Alliance) was operating. Needless to say, one of its objectives was to
prevent immigrant restriction at a time when German immigration, both in absolute
numbers and proportionate to total immigration, was the lowest in nearly a century.
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The Germans who began to arrive in large numbers in the late 1820’s came
largely through such eastern ports as New York and Baltimore. The vast majority of
these people emigrated from west and southwestern Germany, although some did
come from the northern and eastern regions.21 A number of factors after 1820 altered
the patterns o f immigration to the United States. The redemption system, which gave
free passage in exchange for several years of work without pay, came to an end. In its
place potential immigrants had three options. They could pay the passage themselves.
Someone in America could pay for them. Finally, as in the case of Wurttemberg,
Baden, and Hesse, individual German states sponsored immigrants during bad
economic times as a means of taking the pressure off an already-strained economy.22
For the most part, however, the poor did not migrate to the United States. For this
reason a majority o f Germans arriving in America were able to move inland from the
East Coast and purchase land in the Midwest and Plains states. Thus the example of
German immigration stands in sharp contrast to that of Southern and Eastern
Europeans who would arrive later in the century; mostly poor people who became
stuck in eastern cities, often New York. Other factors that influenced emigration
patterns included improved transportation and communications systems, as well as the
creation of the business of emigration in German port cities.
The reasons for coming varied, but prior to 1848 the major factors were
political, social and economic, in large part due to devastation wrought on German
states during the Napoleonic Wars and their aftermath.23 Young German nationalists,
seeing their dream of a united German state destroyed by these wars and the Congress
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of Vienna which further divided the land, saw in the United States a chance to
establish a “New Germany.”24 Economic factors such as inheritance laws motivated
many to emigrate. In southwestern Germany the practice of dividing land between the
children reduced the financial opportunities for all involved since the small plots of
land could not sustain large families. In northwestern Germany the practice of passing
the farm on to the firstborn caused many younger sons to leave.
Religion still played a large part in the immigration process. Even before 1820
German Piests and Zoarists founded communal societies in America. The Piests
established Harmony (1804) and Economy (1825) in Pennsylvania and New Harmony
in Indiana in 1814. The Zoarists established Zoar, Ohio in 1817.25 These communities
eventually failed in their goal to create a communal society, but they remain important
as examples o f the first large scale German immigration to the United States during the
first twenty years of the nineteenth century.
Other German religious groups migrated in search for a better life in the United
States. In 1839 one thousand Old Lutherans left to escape forced unification of the
Lutheran and Reformed churches in Prussia26 They settled in Buffalo, Milwaukee, and
St. Louis, laying the foundation for the large German-American communities that
would develop in these cities by the end of the century. In 1843 the Amanites founded
the city of Amana in Iowa, which today remains one of the few surviving communities
established by Germans for religious reasons.
While the vast majority of Germans arriving in the United States during the
period were Protestant, a sizable number of Catholic Germans also immigrated, some
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165,000 over the twenty years before 1850.27 As with their Protestant counterparts
they arrived for religious as well as social, economic and political reasons.
Upon arrival Germans tended to follow the canals and rivers inland, eventually
settling in the farmlands o f the Midwest and Plains areas. By 1850 a German belt had
developed stretching from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and
Maryland through Pennsylvania to Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin.
Many cities in this region began to take on a distinct German flavor, most notable
being Cincinnati which became the hub of German immigration westward. As early as
1807 the city elected its first German-American mayor, a man named Martin Baum.28
The most interesting example of German settlement during this period,
however, occurred in Texas. After the failure o f establishing a “New Germany” in
Illinois and Missouri some German immigrants turned to Texas. Baron von Bastrop
established the first German settlement in 1823 on the Colorado River outside of
present day Austin.29 German immigrants were also attracted to the region by the
writings of men like Karl Postl (penname, Charles Sealsfield) who traveled and wrote
extensively about Louisiana and Texas. His 1827 publication, Die Vereinigten Staaten
von Nord-Amerika gave a detailed description of Texas, including information on the
quality o f life, climate and soil.30
Other Germans took advantage of the Mexican government’s program to
attract settlers to sparsely-populated areas. In 1831 Friedrich Ernst of Oldenburg
received a sizable grant of land from the Mexican government outside o f Austin. Soon
large numbers of German immigrants began arriving from Oldenburg, Westphalia, and
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Holstein. ' 1 In 1844 German officials founded the Verein znm Schtitze cfeutscher
Eimvanderer in Texas to promote immigration to the region. It became the only
example o f German immigration to the United States that was planned and supported
by the authorities in several German states including Nassau, Saxony-Coburg, Prussia,
and Solms-Braunfels.32 The program proved so successful that by 1850 over 30,000
Germans had settled in Texas.
The second wave of German immigration occured between 1850 and 1890.
During this time 4.5 million Germans came to America, with the peak decade being the
I880’s when 1.5 million arrived. The motivating forces included social and economic
as well as political and religious factors. During this time many Germans fled political
persecution in the aftermath of the failed Revolution of 1848. One “48er,” Carl
Schurz, later became a prominent politician, leader of a liberal Republican movement
in the 1870’s. Another individual was Ernst Hexamer from Baden who became the
father of Dr. Charles J. Hexamer, founder and president of the NGAA/3 After 1871
many German Catholics emigrated to the United States as a response to Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck’s Kulturkampf against the Catholic church/4
Demographically this phase of German immigration sees the immigrants
branching out from established communities east of the Mississippi to the Great Plains
region as far west as Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, and California. The German
community in Texas grew to over 20% o f the population by the time Texas joined the
union. In fact, during the Mexican-American war Germans were some of the first to
volunteer, coming from all over the nation to serve in the United States Army/5
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Germans also began to settle in the region around San Francisco. The California gold
rush in 1848 began when gold turned up at the mill of John Sutter, an immigrant from
Baden. Germans, not to mention other people, were attracted to the region, not
necessarily to find gold, but to exploit the commercial opportunities in San Francisco
and the rich farmlands of the surrounding valleys.36 Germans became prominent in the
birth of the California wine industry, most notably Charles Krug, who established his
winery in 1858. A group of other Germans established the Rhine Farm, known today
as the Gundlach-Bunschu Winery.37
While many German immigrants relocated to the farmlands of the Plains and
West, the vast majority during this time settled in cities in the East and Midwest. By
1880 large German communities existed in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, St.
Louis and Milwaukee. Ten years later, in 1890, 40% of all German-Americans lived in
cities.
The last phase of German immigration extended from 1890 to approximately
1920. During this thirty year period only 1.1 million Germans came to the United
States, Vi million less than in the decade of the 1880’s alone. As in the second phase
these immigrants moved mainly into urban areas, primarily in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan,
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Missouri.
No single factor accounted for this decline in German immigration. Political
stability and economic prosperity of Germany made emigrating to the United States, or
any part of the globe, less attractive. Germany’s rise to a status of world power also
increased the pride o f Germans in a nation that possessed, among other claims to
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prominence, the world’s most powerful army. For Catholics, the end o f the
Kulturkampf and a general acceptance o f the faith in Germany made moving to
America less desirable. At the end o f this period World War One brought about a
virtual end of German emigration to the United States until the early 1920’s.
By 1900 the German population had firmly established itself as an integral part
of American society with communities in all the states, territories, and in the nation’s
thirty-five largest urban areas. According to the census of 1900 Americans o f German
descent comprised 26% of the population, the largest ethnic group in the country.38
The vast majority lived in the North Central region of the United States, with the
second largest concentration living in the North Atlantic states. Almost 50% of ail
German-Americans lived in urban centers. Numerically, the five largest concentrations
were in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Milwaukee. As a percentage
of the population Germans were most numerous in Milwaukee (52%), Cincinnati
(42%), Buffalo (32%), and Cleveland (28%).39 Needless to say, German-American
culture and institutions left their mark across both rural and urban America.
Even though all German-Americans could look back upon a common ancestry
they still were a people with a diverse culture. Many stereotypes of Germans have
existed over the years. The “jack-booted” Prussian with his rigid discipline surfaced in
the early twentieth century, especially after the Kaiser urged his troops to “fight like
Huns” as they departed for Peking to help put down the Boxer Rebellion o f 1900.
The Bavarian, a happy-go-lucky man who drank beer and wore lederhosen
represented a different sort of stereotype. Many people equated Germans with
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Okioberfest. The culture and institutions of German-Americans depended upon the
region of Germany from which they or their ancestors came. This fact helped explain
why there had been no national organization to represent the interests o f GermanAmericans during the nineteenth century, and no effort to establish one. Of course, for
most o f the nineteenth century there was no “Germany.” German-Americans thought
of themselves, not as Germans, but as Bavarians, Swabians, Prussians,
Mecklenburgers, etc. It was not until 1871 that Chancellor Otto von Bismarck forged
a united Germany, and even afterward many immigrants, though joyous over a united
fatherland, still considered themselves from a region rather than a nation. Not until
after Germany’s rise to global power status in the late I880’s did German-Americans
think of themselves as a product o f a united land and common culture.40
The way native Americans and German-Americans had viewed each other also
fluctuated with political and economic circumstances. In times o f prosperity and peace
German-Americans were generally looked upon in a positive light. When economic or
political tensions arose, as in the case o f the 1764 Pennsylvania Assembly election
previously mentioned, the image o f Germans—and other ethnic groups—changed.
The beginnings of large scale German immigration in the 1830’s produced an
emerging, and all-encompassing, stereotype of the German-American. In his visit to
the United States in 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville penned what became the typical
representation of the German in America.
Round them is all the agitation o f a nomadic population, with whom the
desire to get rich knows no limits, who are attached to no place, held
back by no tie, but go off everywhere the prospect o f fortune beckons.
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Immobile in the midst of this general movement, the German limits his
desires to bettering his position and that of his family little by little. He
works unendingly, but leaves nothing to chance. He gets rich surely,
but slowly; he sticks to his domestic hearth, encloses his happiness
within his horizon and shows no curiosity to know what there is beyond
his last furrow.41
Thus the image o f the hard working, prudent German came into being. De
Tocqueville’s description also suggested that many Americans viewed Germans as
clannish, a perception seemingly verified by Germans in America quickly establishing
their own schools, churches and social organizations.
German immigrants, in turn, developed their opinion of native-born Americans.
In 1832 Frances Trollope, an English immigrant who arrived in America in 1827,
published a book entitled, Domestic Manners o f the Americans based upon her travels
through the United States. While on her journey she had a chance to talk with a young
woman newly-arrived from Germany who commented:
They don’t love music. Oh no! and they never amuse themselves - no;
and their hearts are not warm, at least they seem not so to strangers;
and they have no ease, no forgetfulness o f business and o f care - no,
not for a moment.42
Ironically, this German immigrant painted the picture of the American as hard working
and pmdent while the German possessed a love of life sorely lacking in the United
States.
Letters o f German-Americans also revealed much about the way they
perceived their new homeland. German women found their American counterparts
“dull and indolent.” Others viewed American women as modest and possessing of
good practical sense who take charge of their homes43 Wilhelm Stille, a young
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immigrant from Westphalia, had nothing put praise for the “high wages and easy
work” available in America. Yet another immigrant, writing in 1848, tells of his ten
years of hard work in America and how he is getting ahead. He encouraged his
relatives to join him in Canton, Ohio.44 For the most part German immigrants during
the period 1820-1850 maintained a positive view of their new homeland.
During this time the native bom reacted in no pronounced way to the influx of
immigrants from Germany and other European nations. This situation changed in the
1850’s when the nation experienced a surge in new immigration. During this decade
Germans passed the Irish as the largest immigrant group. The rapidly increasing
numbers caused the native-born population to stand up and take notice. By 1850
nativism and the Know Nothing movement produced new views of Germans in the
minds of many Anglo-Americans. Remarks in a local newspaper in 1857 that the
German district of Buffalo constituted “the duchy o f Hesse” reflected suspicion that
the new immigrants desired to establish “little Germanys” throughout the nation.45
The perception by other Americans would fluctuate over the next fifty years depending
upon economic and political conditions in the nation. It would also be influenced by
efforts of German-Americans to maintain their culture and traditions and still
assimilate into American society.
One component of that culture was language. During the colonial period
religion had been the driving force behind the preservation of the German language in
British North America. Catholics and Lutherans both used the language in religious
services, which included teaching German in church schools.46 Ironically, however,
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the first school to teach German had been a public institution. In 1702 settlers in
Germantown established a school which taught German. The institution was
supported by donations from the local citizens, was co-educational and even held night
classes for adults 47 The first public institution to offer German language instruction to
non-German speakers, in Philadelphia in 1743, catered to children of English-speaking
parents who desired that their children understand a second language.48 The Public
Academy of the City of Pennsylvania, founded in 1749 under the influence of
Benjamin Franklin, aspired to teach German at a higher level—a goal achieved when
the institution became the University of Pennsylvania. Language instruction expanded
in 1753 and the first full-time professor of German in North America, William
Creamer, assumed the position which he held until 1775.49
Germans in North America endeavored to keep their language alive, but during
the period from 1775 to 1820 interest in German declined in the United States.50 The
main reason was the sharp drop in immigration due to the American War of
Independence, French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.
A revival in the teaching of German—primarily in regions with a large German
population—in American schools after 1820 corresponded with renewal of German
immigration to the United States. While the major focus was on language instruction
at the elementary level, there was a strong effort to utilize German at the secondary
and higher education levels. The teaching of German became part of the curriculum in
such colleges such as Harvard, Bowdoin College in Maine, Amherst in Massachusetts
and the University of Virginia.51 One of the major motivating factors behind this was
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not the German immigrant, but the revived interest in German literature due to the
influence of such German writers as Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Heinrich Heine, and
Friedrich Schiller on the Romantic and Transcendentalist movements in American
Literature.
German language instruction also continued at many non-denominational
private institutions, such as the Round Hill School established in 1823 in
Northhampton, Massachusetts by a group of German intellectuals. By 1849 GermanAmericans constituted a large enough block in various communities to pressure local
school districts to teach certain core subjects in German.52 The best example of this
move came in Cincinnati where instruction in German was introduced in 1836 after the
school board adopted many reforms based upon the Prussian school system.53
Even so, German language instruction produced opposition, even within the
German-American community. By the late 1840’s many second and third generation
German-Americans no longer utilized the language at home. Fearing that speaking
German would prevent them from getting ahead in English-speaking America, many
parents discouraged their children from learning the language. The growing tide of
nativism at the time also hindered foreign language instruction. Some states even
mandated English as the only language of instruction. Pennsylvania in 1837 rejected
the idea of bilingual education in its public schools.54 Two years later however the
legislature would change its mind and reinstate German language instruction. For the
remainder of the century the popularity of the German language would rise and fall in
direct relation to the waves o f American nativism.
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In states with large German voting blocks, laws passed the legislatures
mandating teaching basic subjects in German in areas that had a high concentration of
German-Americans. The first such law appeared in Pennsylvania in 1839, and by the
1880’s Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana, Maryland, and Michigan had
followed suit.55 This resurgence in the German language, brought about to a large
extent by the large numbers of Germans living in those regions, also fostered a
renaissance in teaching German to English-speaking students. The first major city to
adopt German instruction in the public schools was St. Louis in 1864, followed by
Chicago (1865), Cleveland (1869), and Baltimore (1874).56
A resurgence of nativism in the 1890’s resulted in a movement to ban teaching
basic courses in public schools in any language but English. As the primary foreign
language being taught in the public schools, German came under direct assault. By
the mid-1890’s Illinois and Wisconsin passed laws requiring exclusive use of English in
teaching reading, writing, arithmetic, and United States history. This movement
spread throughout the East and parts o f the Mid-West. By 1900 the teaching o f core
subjects in the German language had all but ceased in many of the nation’s
metropolitan school systems—due primarily to nativism which viewed instruction in
any language other than English as retarding the assimilation process, and to declining
interest within the German-American community itself—while the teaching of German
as a foreign language remained popular at the higher education level.
Use of the German language in education had been a part of a “blending” of
German educational institutions with those of the United States. This combination
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occurred at two levels, the first being the elementary/secondary schools and the second
the colleges/universities. In the 1830’s and 1840’s several American scholars visited
Prussia to examine the system of public education where the government supported
the schools and education was compulsory at the elementary level. Their findings and
recommendations helped to influence the growth of public education in the United
States at a time when Americans began to see the advantages of a more educated
populace.57 The most famous example of German influence on the elementary level
was the kindergarten created by Friedrich Froebel in Blankenburg, Germany, an idea
that found its way to the United States through the efforts of Margaretha Schurz, wife
of Carl Schurz, (both immigrants) who established the first kindergarten in Watertown,
Wisconsin in 185 5.58 Since that time kindergarten has been an integral part in
acclimating young people to the educational process in the United States. The
introduction of physical education in the public schools on a wide-spread basis began
around 1870, due in large part to the German Turnverein or gymnastic clubs which
existed in many of the nation’s cities.59
The most profound example of German influence on American education came
at the highest academic level. American students began to study at German
universities beginning around 1815 and by the end of the nineteenth century more than
100,000 Americans had a German education.60 Notable amongst this group were
George Bancroft, Herbert Baxter Adams, James Harvey Robinson, and W.E.B.
DuBois. Their exposure to German methods of classroom instruction resulted in a
transfer of “educational culture” at a time when the United States was undergoing an
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expansion in its system of higher education. One result of this transfer was the
adoption of the German seminar method of graduate instruction that first appeared in
the United States at the Johns Hopkins University in 1876. The seminar method
became the dominant teaching method by the end of the nineteenth century .61
Not surprisingly, German influence on higher education sparked growth of
German language programs. By 1884 over two hundred colleges and universities
offered German as an area of concentration. The largest department in the nation was
at Harvard which had five faculty members teaching German.62 Johns Hopkins
University in 1887 awarded the first Ph.D. in German language to Marion Dexter
Learned who would later become a member o f the NGAA and assist in that
organization’s campaign to promote German language instruction in America. By the
end of the century German and French formed the core languages for modem
language departments across the nation.
Popularity of the German language and educational system combined with
German work in science and literature to produce respect and admiration among
higher intellectual circles in the United States. The general American population
perceived Germans—and thus German-Americans—as trustworthy, hard-working, and
industrious. There were, however, other aspects of German culture that did not set as
well with the American population, or segments of it.
By the start o f the twentieth century beer commonly had become equated with
German in the American populace. Such was not always the case. Prior to 1840 the
brewing industry in this nation had been largely British. The majority of brewed
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beverages in this country, called “common beer,” were top-fermented brews including
ale, porter, and stout. With the large influx of German immigrants a new style of beer
came to America. This lager beer, a bottom-fermented brew with a distinctive clean,
sharp taste, was originally developed by the Spaten brewery in Munich in the 1830’s.63
Lager beer gained such quick acceptance in the United States outside the German
community that the British influence on brewing had all but died by the 1850’s.
Germans introduced lager beer throughout the nation in the 1840’s—first in
New York by George Gillig, later in St. Louis by Adam Lemp. In Cincinnati
Fortmann and Company began their business in the “Over the Rhine” section of the
city. The Kaltenhaeusser Brewery introduced the product to Pittsburgh. In Chicago
Lill & Diversey dominated the industry and became one of the first breweries to ship
their products to other states. In Milwaukee, a city soon to become synonymous with
beer, the largest brewer o f ale (Milwaukee Brewery) ironically was owned by three
Welshmen who were quick to capitalize on the popularity of the German brew.64 By
the mid nineteenth century these regional brewers, along with others across the
country, helped to make the brewing industry synonymous with German-America.
It would not be until the 1880’s and I890’s that large scale brewing and
distribution would begin in earnest. Advances in production techniques, coupled with
the ever-growing transportation network across the nation made it easier for brewers
to market their product outside a small region. In Milwaukee the Joseph Pabst
brewery sold over one million barrels of beer in 1893, while his competition, Adolph
Schlitz, reached that number by the end of the century. In St. Louis Anheuser-Busch,
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a company formed when Adolphus Busch married Lilly Anheuser in 1861, reached the
900,000 barrel mark by the decade’s end.65 The Mid-West was not the only area in
which Germans established a reputation in brewing. By the end o f the nineteenth
century German-American brewers practiced their craft in the western states, primarily
California, Colorado and Texas.
The 1890’s also produced a resurgence of the temperance movement as
reform-minded citizens sought to cure the evils of society by making the manufacture,
sale, and consumption of alcohol illegal. These people, primarily middle to upper
middle class professionals, targeted the brewers and distillers and an institution that
was at the heart of every German-American community, the comer bar, which they
viewed as a source of evil in urban neighborhoods. Ornately decorated with German
memorabilia, the typical German-American bar catered almost exclusively to men. At
the large wooden bar the men could partake of a free lunch that included roast beef,
fish, potato salad, olives, bread, and blood pudding if they purchased a beer for a
nickel. A large group could buy beer at the discount rate of twenty one glasses for a
dollar.66 Heavy saltation of food encouraged greater consumption o f beer. These
institutions served as an important social outlet for men in the community, a place to
catch up on the local news, or find a job. In many instances the saloon owner was also
the local ward boss. Reformers targeted these institutions as a threat to the
community. They pointed to the widespread growth of local bars in the last years of
the nineteenth century as evidence—in Milwaukee alone there was one bar for every
thirty homes.67. These progressive-minded citizens connected the bar with domestic
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violence and poverty, as men would drink away their earnings and return home, only
to physically abuse their spouse, while their children went hungry.
The saloon was not the only German institution associated with beer that came
under attack. The German tradition of the Sunday beer garden, introduced in the
United States during the 1830’s, came under assault by reformers who viewed such
activities as a threat to the social well being and to an already-established lifestyle.
This Sunday tradition, brought over from the old country, clashed with the established
Yankee tradition of Sunday as a day of rest, church and prayer.
Unlike the saloon, however, the beer garden was more of a family event, an
important social outlet for entire working class families. The gardens could be indoors
or out—with indoor gardens decorated to look like outdoor ones. The largest of
these, found in New York’s Bowery district, accommodated up to twelve hundred
people.68 Admission was free and men brought their wives and children. As the lager
breweries grew in size they installed beer gardens for the comfort and convenience of
their patrons. Food would be served, music played, and the afternoon spent in lively
conversation with friends, both old and new.
While reformers attacked these institutions as a source of vice and decadence
other groups used the beer garden as a means of stereotyping German-Americans. As
early as 1850 newspapers had begun to characterize German men and women with
beer bellies, rosy cheeks and silly grins on their laces. The Milwaukee Daily Sentinel
seemed to characterize an entire ethnic group when it ran a lithograph of a large.
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drunk German saying to a policeman, “I trinks Lager, and I have only trunk tirty
glasses, so you shust go away.”69
Thus a clash of cultures traceable back to the displacement of the Anglodominated beer industry by German immigrants, had begun in earnest by the end of the
nineteenth century. German-Americans interpreted reformist efforts as attacks on
their culture and personal liberties granted to them by the Constitution. Reformers
looked at the brewing industry as a source of German-American corruption of AngloSaxon America during a time when alcohol in general was viewed as the heart of such
social problems as prostitution, spousal abuse, child neglect, and poverty. The stage
was set for a battle that would last through the First World War.
German-American social life in the nineteenth century did not revolve solely
around beer gardens and drinking. Midway through the century most communities
had singing societies which would regularly host Sangerfests (musical festivals). The
largest gathering, in Cincinnati in 1899, attracted 120 societies and 2757 singers.70
These meetings produced a wide variety of German music ranging from traditional
folk songs sung by individuals to full scale symphonies playing Beethoven, Mozart,
and Wagner.
The constitutions of the various singing societies outlined their objectives.
While they utilized both English and German, the main goal was the preservation and
promotion of German cultural institutions in the United States.71 As a rule the press
and the general public greeted the Sangerfests with much enthusiasm. The Chicago
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Tribune, in commenting on a production of 'ITie Magic Flute in 1870 had nothing but
praise:
That there should exist in the midst of all the din of trade and in this
seething, restless struggle for wealth and place, an organization, or
rather, two organizations, possessing such a high degree of musical
culture, and the disposition and enthusiasm to exhibit that culture in
such a successful manner, is in every way creditable to the city, and
especially to the German element of our citizens, which has done so
much for good music in Chicago.72
The Tribune’s review indicates the acceptance that many in America had for German
contributions to the American cultural landscape. The Chicago example is no isolated
incident. Similar events in San Francisco, St. Louis, New York and other cities across
Untied States during the last half of the nineteenth century received an equally warm
response. Americans who accepted German music into their lives did not react
similarly to other aspects of German culture, especially in the area of “radical” political
ideas.
Another important social outlet for the German-American community were the
Turner societies, the origins of which date back to 1811 when Friedrich Ludwig Jahn
founded a Turnerei (gymnastics) society near Berlin. Jahn extolled the benefits of a
healthy mind and body—a blending o f physical fitness and political discussion.73
These societies rapidly spread throughout the German states as young idealist
Germans reacted to the message of political freedom and German unification
expounded by Jahn and his followers. The Prussian government did not agree with that
message, threw Jahn in jail in 1819, and banned Turnerei until 1842 when Frederick
William IV revived the idea. Jahn was eventually released from prison but was kept
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under close watch by the authorities until 1840 when Frederick granted him
unrestricted freedom.74
The first attempt at creating a Turnerei in the United States, at Round Hill
School in Northampton, Massachusetts in 1824, focused on physical fitness with little
in the way of politics.75 The first o f the Turner halls appeared in Cincinnati in 1850,
the work o f the “48ers.” In that year the Turners formed a national body known as the
Vereinigte Tumvereine Nordamerikas.
Starting as fitness clubs, the Turner halls gradually developed into multi
functional societies designed to ease newly-arrived immigrants into their new
environment. They also quickly became a source of political radicalism in the GermanAmerican community, a development reflected in the decision to change the name of
the national body to Sozialistischer Tumerbund'm 1851.76 By the end of the decade
there were over 150 Tumvereine across the United States. The political nature of the
societies, guided to a large extent by socialist thinking, brought them into direct
conflict with native Americans who viewed such beliefs as a threat to democratic
institutions. The Know-Nothing movement of the 1850’s targeted the Turners, and in
such cities as New York, Cincinnati, and Baltimore mob violence broke out between
the two groups.77 The physical training and rigid discipline usually allowed the
Turners to win these encounters, but in doing so they added another element to the
growing stereotype of the iron-willed German. While the Know-Nothing movement
died down before Civil War the impact of this initial political clash between GermanAmericans and native elements was important. The Turners linked German-Americans
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to radical politics in the United States until the end o f the nineteenth century, the highpoint being the anarchist movements of the 1870’s and 1880’s in which GermanAmericans would play a major role.
Turner societies otherwise played an integral part in the social and cultural life
of German-Americans. They helped newly-arrived immigrants find housing, work, and
assisted them in assimilating into American society. Their halls served as gathering
places for festivals and celebrations.78 Turner societies lasted well into the twentieth
century by which time they had abandoned politics to focus on social and cultural
concerns within the German-American community.79 Their significance lies in the fact
that they represented the first attempts to create a national German-American
organization. They established an example of German-Americans banding together to
preserve their culture while helping newly arrived immigrants adjust to life in the
United States. It also set the precedent for the NGAA which in the first seventeen
years of the twentieth century would attempt to carry on and extend the political and
cultural work begun by the Turners.
Yet another major cultural institution of the German-American community was
the German-American press.80 While Benjamin Franklin established the first German
language newspaper in America, The Philadelphia Zeitung in 1732, the recognized
pioneer of German-American journalism was Christopher Sauer who established 'The
Pennsylvanische Berichte in 1739.81
From 1787 to 1830, the German language press in the United States remained
small, confined to Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. For the most part the
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individual papers catered to issues of local concern rather than national and
international events. This began to change around 1830 as an increase in German
immigration caused the press to take on new character and size. With the influx of
“48ers” a new source o f editorial talent broadened the scope o f the German-American
press to include national and international issues.82 From 1848 to 1861 the press
doubled from 70 newspapers to 144. Some of the most influential German-American
dailies appeared during this time, notably the Illinois Staats-Zeitung, New Yorker
Staats-Zeitung, and the St. Louis Westliche Post. All three papers would remain
influential in their regions, with the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung gaining national
prominence.
At this time there also emerged a radical German-American press that acted as
a voice for socialism and labor unrest. Prior to the Civil War it had been dominated by
“48ers” who extolled the concepts of free labor and antislavery. Franz Schmidt’s
Freie Blatter, published in St. Louis during the 1850’s, extolled the virtue of individual
liberty and the belief that history constituted a continuous struggle to free man from
the forces o f oppression.83 After the Civil War the radical press shifted. Many of the
“48ers” had become part of mainstream society, selecting to enjoy the benefits of
American capitalism rather than continually criticizing it. The radical papers now
became associated with labor radicalism, often acting as a lightning rod for labor
agitation. The Arbeiter-Zeiiung published in Chicago and Die Freiheit published in
New York stood as prominent examples of a radical press that reached its peak in
April 1886. With the Haymarket bombing of May 4, and the subsequent trial o f the
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German-Americans involved, the German-American radical press began a slow decline
that corresponded directly with a decline in German-American participation in radical
politics. Even though the vast majority of Americans of German descent did not
participate in or condone the actions of these few radicals, the radical press, as with
the Turner movement caused many Americans to connect radical politics with the
German-American community.
By 1894, the high-water mark for the German language press, there were over
800 dailies and weeklies across the nation. Even though this number dropped to 613
by 1901, the German-American press remained the largest among ethnic groups and
exerted a strong influence both within and outside the German community.84 With
American involvement in the First World War, the German-American press came
under attack as a source of pro-German propaganda in the United States. It also
become a victim of that war, along with many other aspects of German culture, as by
1920 only 278 publications remained and of that total only twenty-nine were dailies.85
As the new century began, German-American culture, while firmly established
throughout the nation, had begun to yield to pressures of the new environment. The
decline in immigration from Germany deprived local communities of new blood. The
booming American nation, with its continental expansion, growing cities, and
technological miracles offered compelling enticements to individuals willing to take the
step. Many German-Americans did, and so assimilation, especially of people once or
twice removed from the old country, reached near crisis proportion in the minds of
those individuals entrusted with keeping German ways alive.
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Prior to 1901, one could see evidence of a united German political movement
only on local and state levels. A major stumbling block had been the fragmentary
nature o f the German community. Unlike the Irish, German-Americans hardly ever
voted in a united block. Their political splintering mirrored the political fragmentation
of their homeland where local issues took precedent over state or “national” ones.
From almost the beginning of the nation’s history German-Americans earned the
reputation as being one of the most politically apathetic of ethnic groups. Only when
they faced a threat to their leisure time consumption o f alcohol or to German language
instruction did Germans vote as a block.86
This is not to say that Americans of German descent did not participate in the
political system. It does mean that Germans at no time exercised political power on
any level o f government commensurate with their numbers. Several distinguished
German-Americans did serve the nation in high office. Most notable were Frederick
Augustus Muhlenberg, the first Speaker of the House o f Representatives; Carl Schurz,
United States Senator from Missouri and later Secretary of the Interior under
President Rutherford B. Hayes; and John P. Atgeld, governor of Illinois from 18931897.87 As a group the most politically active German-Americans were the “48ers,”
many o f whom would take part in the emerging socialist and anarchist movements of
the nineteenth century .88 The most famous example o f this activity was the bombing at
Haymarket Square in 1886 and the subsequent trial and execution of four GermanAmerican “anarchists,” the most notable being August Spies, a “48er.”89
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German-Americans participated in great numbers in the Civil War, primarily on
the Union side. A major reason o f course was that the vast majority o f them lived in
the North. The German-American press also stood solidly behind the cause of the
North. O f the 265 German language newspapers published in 1861 only three
supported secession.90 Even in the South where they existed in large numbers the
majority chose not to support the Confederacy, as in the case o f German militia units
in Texas which were disbanded when they refused to give up the Union flag. A plan
was even proposed, though never carried out, to raise an all-German army to wrest
Texas from the Confederacy.
A number o f factors account for German-American support of the Union.
Many “48ers,” along with the vast majority of other Germans in America, embraced
the Union cause as a fight to set men free. The North was sympathetic to the
immigrant and most immigration came into northern ports while the South
discouraged immigration. Germans viewed the plantation system of the South as
similar to the European nobility system, especially the Prussian Junkers, from which
they had fled. The Southern economy was a closed system in which the wealthy
owned their source of labor. While this was not necessarily the norm in the region,
perceptions held sway and German immigrants saw little chance of employment and
upward mobility in the South.91
German-Americans enlisted in the Union army in proportionally large numbers.
While it is difficult to ascertain the number of soldiers of German descent, we do know
that over 200,000 German-born fought for the Union. Roughly 36,000 served in all
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German units commanded by German-American officers. The state that contributed
the most was New York (36,680). Pennsylvania also contributed large numbers, but
the vast majority of German recruits came from the Midwest states o f Illinois, Indiana,
Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. During the four year conflict more Germans fought
for the Union cause than any other immigrant group, including the Irish.92
German soldiers received both condemnation and praise for their efforts in
battle. At Gettysburg the Eleventh Corps, under the command of Carl Schurz, was
labeled a “band o f cowardly Dutchmen” when they were forced to retreat on second
day of the battle.93 For the most part, however, Nonhem commanders praised the
efforts of the German component of the Union army. In Missouri, where they made
up the bulk of the Union forces, German-Americans played a significant role in
keeping that state in the Union. At the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862, a regiment
under Colonel August Willich helped turn the battle in favor of Ulysses S. Grant’s
Northern forces, thus assisting in saving the future president’s career.94
Americans of German descent also participated in the political battles of the
conflict, especially the hotly contested election of 1864. Four years earlier the German
vote had played a key role in Lincoln’s victory, especially in the states o f the
Midwest.95 Many o f the same reasons that caused the Germans to join the Union
Army motivated them to support the Republican party. Although most Germans
remained in the Republican camp, some individuals disenchanted with Lincoln’s
conservative policies, gathered in Cleveland, Ohio to seek an alternative candidate.
They called for unconditional surrender, a radical program of reconstruction, and
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refusing to support “a weak-headed unprincipled log-splitter,” they voted to support
John C. Fremont’s candidacy for the presidency.96 Lincoln feared that German
support of Fremont would split the Republican vote in the crucial state of New York
and in the Midwest.
Military events helped to bring about the collapse of the Fremont movement.
William T. Sherman’s capture of Atlanta in September 1864 greatly increased the
popularity o f Lincoln’s conduct of the war. Later in that month Fremont announced
the end of his campaign for the presidency. His German-American supporters, who in
no way trusted George B. McClellan, the Democratic candidate, then returned to the
Republican fold and played a key role in Lincoln’s re-election.
In general the experience of the Civil War was a positive one for GermanAmericans. They fought with valor on the right side. The German press often would
point to these contributions to remind the nation of the loyalty of the German
component. The vast majority of German voters backed Lincoln and the Republican
party, thus aligning themselves with the group that would shape the post-Civil War
nation. Finally, German-American military contributions, coupled with Prussia’s
diplomatic support of the Union cause, placed Americans of German descent in the
forefront of immigrant groups in the minds of many Americans.97
After the Civil War the Republican party maintained the support of GermanAmerican farmers, Catholics, conservative Lutherans, and second or third generation
people established in business. But beginning with the resurgence of the temperance
movement in the 1880’s the Democratic party, with its opposition to the Prohibition
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movement, began to win the support of German-American Lutherans, first generation
immigrants, and members of labor unions. From this point on Democrats could
usually count on the majority of German-American votes in large cities. During the
1870’s and 1880’s a small segment joined the anarchist and socialist movements of the
times. Few remained at the end of the century, however, and radicals of the era mostly
came from the ranks of Southern and Eastern European immigrant groups who were
more likely to stand at the bottom of the economic ladder. By 1900 most Americans
o f German descent, whatever generation they represented, were content with working
within the system to achieve their goals.
German-Americans banded together when they felt strongly about an issue, but
during the nineteenth century there had been no attempt to organize Germans on a
broad national basis, with the possible exception o f the Turners. The Catholic Central
Verein, founded in 1855 by representatives from German-American Catholic
organizations in four states and the District of Columbia, had grown out of the nativist
movements of the 1850’s which targeted the Roman church. During this decade the
Know-Nothing movement had targeted German Catholics for abuse, the worst case
being the Louisville riots o f 1855 in which a number o f German immigrants were
murdered by an angry mob.98 By the late 1890’s, however, the Verein shifted its focus
away from culture to one emphasizing social reform as a means of attracting the
progressive-minded elements in the community, thus alienating a large segment of the
German-American community.
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By the end of the nineteenth century German-Americans had gained a
reputation for political apathy. The vast majority had assimilated into American
society and participated in the political process through voting rather than agitation.
H.L. Mencken commented that the lack of political involvement on the part of
German-Americans at the end o f the nineteenth was based upon the fact that “the
Melting Pot had devoured German-Americans as it has no group, not even the Irish.”99
This loss o f ethnic identity concerned some individuals within the community who did
not wish to see their heritage forgotten. By 1900 some German-Americans also began
to voice concern over a number of issues that could potentially have an impact on the
ethnic group. These included the movement for the prohibition of alcohol, the
immigrant restriction movement, the general decline in German cultural institutions,
and a growing estrangement between the United States and Germany over economic
and diplomatic issues as both nations sought global influence by the end of the century.
In combination, these issues would produce a movement to preserve German culture
during the first years of the twentieth century.
American diplomatic relations with Germany, or at least with Germans, began
during the American Revolution. Prussia chose to remain neutral in the war and in
1776 Emperor Frederick the Great went so far as to deny a British request for 20,000
Prussian soldiers to assist the British army in the colonies. Two years later, while
fighting the War of Bavarian Succession, Frederick allowed Britain to hire Hessian
mercenaries to fight in North America. Instead of reacting negatively, the Continental
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Congress was grateful to the Prussian king for keeping the Hessians out for as long as
he did.100
In the years immediately after the war United States relations with the German
states centered almost exclusively on Prussia. The United States had little to do with
the smaller German principalities. On September 10, 1785, Prussia and the United
States signed a Treaty o f Amity and Commerce. Negotiated by John Adams and
Benjamin Franklin, this document served as the cornerstone for a century of peaceful
relations between the two countries. It also served as a model treaty in its provisions
to protect private property and innocent persons during times of conflict.
In November 1797 John Quincy Adams arrived in Berlin to serve as the first
United States Minister to Prussia. In this time of upheaval on the continent and o f
chilly, almost hostile relations between the United States and France due to the Quasi
War, Adams maintained friendly relations with the Prussian monarchy, renegotiating a
treaty and generally building upon the existing foundation of good will between the
two countries. One historian, Manfred Jonas, labeled the period from 1797 to 1877
the “era of good feelings” between the two nations.101 During this period large scale
German emigration to the United States began, the two countries became trading
partners, and American students and teachers traveled to Prussia and other German
states to study at various universities.
The outbreak of the Civil War in the United States held potential ramifications
for Prussian-American relations. King William I quickly announced his nation’s
support for the Union cause. William insisted that Prussia was opposed to all
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revolutionary movements and that it would never recognize any government
representing the states that left the Union.102 The German states proved to be the
heaviest subscribers to United States government bonds, buying over $800,000 worth
of securities to help fund the Northern war effort.103 The United States would not
forget these moves when Prussia went to war with France in 1870.
After the Civil War relations between Prussia and the United States remained
friendly. The American public and government supported Prussia during its war
against Denmark in 1864 and against Austria in 1866. Prussian-American relations
reached their zenith with the appointment of George Bancroft as Minister to Prussia in
1867. Bancroft, an historian trained in Germany, worked hard at promoting friendly
relations between the two nations. He managed to soothe over the one sore spot in
Prussian-American relations by negotiating a series of treaties in 1868 which
recognized five years as the time needed to acquire American citizenship. Prior to this
move, the Prussian government had considered German-Americans returning to
Prussia—or any state in the North German Confederation—for a visit as still being
under military obligation. Bancroft’s efforts put an end to this practice.104 When war
broke out between Prussia and France in August 1870 the United States government
announced a policy of neutrality, but it was clear that public opinion and the
government favored Prussia. In a letter to the Secretary of State Bancroft made his
case for dealing with the new Germany:
If we need the solid, trusty good will of any government in Europe, we
can have it best with Germany: because German institutions and ours
most nearly resemble each other; and because so many millions of
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Germans have become our countrymen. This war will leave Germany
the most powerful state in Europe, and the most free; its friendship is,
therefore, most important to us; and has its foundations in history and
nature.105
Bancroft’s words reflected the opinion of a country that at the time looked upon
Germany as a nation of universities, with a kindred culture whose war for national
unity mirrored America’s own war of independence. The New York Times labeled
France an aggressor and Prussia the victim of an audacious crime. The Chicago
Daily Tribune reminded Americans of Prussia’s support of the Union in the Civil War
and added that it now was time for the United States to believe in the goal of German
unity.106 Americans in general welcomed German unification and looked forward to
continued good relations with that country.
Before German unification, Prussia and the United States had had little contact
around the world. Both were powers confined to spheres separate from the other,
with small navies and little chance for an incident between them. This situation began
to change in the 1880’s as both nations underwent a dramatic economic
transformation. The rapid industrialization of both nations brought with it greater
chances for economic competition and diplomatic incidents as in the 1880’s both
nations began their expansion as global powers.
The first such incidents were the passage of the tariff in Germany, and the
“Pork Controversy,” both in 1879. The former was an attempt by the German
government to protect domestic wheat production against an influx of cheaper
American wheat. The latter was aimed at keeping out American pork products on
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grounds that it was not safe for consumption.107 The controversy subsided for a time
during the mid-1880’s but it remained the first example of a rift in economic issues.
Others would follow in the years to come.
By the 1880’s German and American power had begun to reach into Asia - on
a small scale, to be sure, but occasionally in places where interests of the two nations
collided. The Samoan Crisis of 1887-89 brought the two nations to the brink of war
as both, along with Great Britain, vied for control over the strategic Asian islands. In
the end it was possible to avoid a military confrontation.108 The Samoan Crisis was
significant for a number of reasons. First, it was the first “imperial” action on the part
o f the United States. Second, it marked the beginning o f a transformation in relations
between the United States and Great Britain. Prior to this time America and Germany
were content to periodically “twist the British lion’s tail.” Beginning with the Samoan
Crisis, Great Britain actively sought out the friendship of the United States in the face
of a perceived German threat to British global hegemony.
Disputes over trade issues dominated relations between Germany and the
United States from 1890 to 1897. The pork dispute resurfaced in 1890. For the next
seven years the two countries threatened each other with higher tariffs and import
restrictions. In the end cooler heads prevailed as by 1897 agreements were reached on
all outstanding trade issues. The controversy, however, inflamed public opinion in
both nations. Americans began to perceive Germany as a threat to United States
economic expansion around the globe.
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Germany and the United States soon encountered difficulty over China. In
November 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung province. The
German government landed forces at Kiaochow Bay and occupied the area, an action
that the United States viewed as “bullying” and an effort to gain an upper hand in
China109 Three years later when the Boxer Rebellion broke out the Kaiser viewed the
action as the beginnings of a “yellow peril” that threatened the white race. In a famous
speech William II exhorted his troops as they prepared to depart for China:
You will give no quarter! You will take no prisoners! Whoever falls
into your hands will be your victim! Just as the Huns under their King
Attila made a name for themselves a thousand years ago which still, in
saga and tradition, makes them appear powerful, so may the name
German be impressed by you on China for a thousand years, that no
Chinese will ever dare again look askance at a German.110
Widely reprinted around the world, these words affected the image of Germany in the
eyes many Americans—though the United States also sent troops to put down the
uprising. This nation once regarded as a land of freedom, universities and a kindred
spirit now threatened brutality in China. The Boston Evening Transcript labeled the
emperor’s rantings as, “breathing forth threatening and slaughter,” from a man intent
upon “wreaking vengeance upon the Chinese.”111
The United States also quarreled with Germany during the Spanish-American
War of 1898. Although the Kaiser’s government had been officially neutral, the
German press had been openly pro-Spanish and German military moves in Asia had
cast suspicions on its true motives. A question arose concerning the fate o f the
Philippine Islands, in the aftermath of the American occupation of Manila. The Kaiser
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and the head of the German navy, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, thought that Manila Bay
would make an excellent naval base and the Germans had on hand a more powerful
force than the American squadron that had defeated the Spanish. The Germans further
complicated matters by opening direct communications with the Spanish on the
island.112
The American government objected to these moves and the press in the United
States fueled suspicion by projecting Germany as an aggressor, seeking to claim lands
won by the United States. The New York Herald claimed that Germany was “on the
grab” and desired a foothold in the Philippines. The New York Times questioned why
Germany felt the need to place a naval force, superior to that of the United States,
near the Philippines if it was there only to protect German interests.113
In the end o f course Germany did not attempt to take the Philippines. Yet the
actions outside Manila Bay, coupled with past incidents in Samoa and China and
differences over trade issues caused Americans to begin to change their opinion of
Germany. This transformation was also assisted by a growing friendship between the
United States and Great Britain, as the latter nation began to capitalize on Germany’s
bellicose foreign policy to slowly drive a wedge between that country and the United
States. By 1901 this transformation was well underway. The signing o f the HayPauncefote Treaty of 1901 symbolized England’s recognition of the United States as a
global power with hemispheric and world interests.114 America’s drift into the British
sphere gradually pulled it away from ties with Germany.
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German-Americans could not fully comprehend the implications o f this rift at
the time. They had for the most part remained quiet during these controversies. Some
were embarrassed by the Kaiser’s actions and viewed his policies as a threat to peace.
Others, while sympathetic with Germany’s desire to achieve its place in the sun,
steadfastly supported the policies o f the American government. A smaller group
looked with pride on Germany’s accomplishments since unification, choosing to ignore
the growing strain in German-American relations.115 This group looked at Great
Britain as a main instigator in the transformation in Germany’s relations with the
United States. Others acutely aware of their status as “German” Americans, and
concerned about trouble between their adopted land and the fatherland, pledged
themselves to making the new century also a new era in German-American relations.
By the beginning of the twentieth century the German-American community
was well established in the United States. It was also a community that, while
maintaining much of its cultural heritage, viewed itself as American in every sense of
the word. By 1900 the vast majority of German-Americans were assimilated into
American society. The large majority had English-speaking neighbors, while many
lived in predominantly English-speaking parts of the nation’s cities. Their children
attended public schools where English was the primary language of instruction, and
the majority of the books in use had a decided Anglo-American focus in terms of
literature, culture, and history. Within this community, however, were those who
viewed themselves as Americans but who also sought to maintain Old World
institutions and ties with the fatherland.
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For some Germans then, assimilation mingled with a desire to maintain their
heritage resulted in, as one writer put it, “a cultural schizophrenia within the GermanAmerican community.”116 Taking this point further, the phenomenon existed, not in
the group which had discarded its ethnicity, but within the middle-to-upper-class elite
of German-America that had adopted American ways yet now sought to maintain a
sense of Dentschtum—a sense of community—by preserving the culture and traditions
of Germany. The words of a prominent German-American in Cincinnati, Carl
Ruemelin, summed up this feeling:
We did not wish to establish here a mere New Germany, nor on the
other hand did we wish simply to disappear into America. It is
necessary for us to declare, with a bold consciousness of fact, that we
have succeeded in remaining honorably German without at the same
time being untrue to our new Fatherland.117
Such individuals probably felt secure in their status, both economically and
patriotically, as Americans. They had created a comfort zone of confidence and
acceptance which allowed them to pursue efforts at maintaining their ethnicity. The
dawn of the new century brought new concerns regarding German-America in the
rapidly changing social and cultural landscape o f the United States. By 1900 the flow
of immigrants from Germany had declined precipitously. During the first decade of
the twentieth century Germans accounted for only four percent o f the total immigrant
population, down from twenty-seven percent in the 1880’s. The German-Americans
most interested in maintaining traditional culture understood that new immigration
would best preserve the ties to ethnicity.
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Ethnic institutions within America were increasingly coming under attack by
nativist and progressive movements that called for the complete assimilation of the
nation’s ethnic components. It was the age of Progressivism, a movement that
accepted a belief in the continued ability of mankind to improve the environment and
the conditions of life.118 One of the driving forces behind the movement, evangelical
Protestantism, had little or no tolerance for institutions or attitudes that, in their view,
hindered progress in the United States. America’s love of alcohol, and beer in
particular, was one of these. By 1900 the per capita consumption of beer alone was
twenty-four gallons a year, far and away the alcohol of choice in the United States.119
As prohibition became a national issue it threatened not only the livelihood of many
Americans o f German descent, but also challenged an important social and cultural
aspect of the ethnic community. German-Americans dominated the brewing industry
by 1900. Prominent citizens in their communities, owners of the breweries in many
cases also were strong advocates of German culture in America, notable examples
being Adolphus Busch in St. Louis and Joseph Pabst in Milwaukee.120
The increasing strain in United States relations with Germany held the potential
for future problems for German-American community. As both nations reached for
global influence they also expanded the potential for confrontation. In the worst-case
scenario, war between the two countries, German institutions, already under siege in
America, could face virtual destruction in a nation consumed by war fever.
In combination, these issues created a sense of urgency within a segment of
German-America, individuals who concluded that the only way to meet the challenges,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50

preserve their culture and traditions, would be to organize at the national level. Such
actions had precedent as German-Americans since colonial times had banded together
when they felt aspects o f their livelihood threatened. The building blocks for a
national organization were already in place at the state and local levels by the end of
the nineteenth century. A sense of Deutschum already existed within the GermanAmerican community. The German-American press, German language instruction,
various local German clubs, Catholic Verein and Turner societies stood as
manifestations of a commonality of interest in ethnicity. What was needed was a
unifying force to give outlet to these impulses and consolidate local organizations into
a national group. It was to this end that prominent Germans in Pennsylvania, sharing
the concerns o f many fellow German-Americans, gathered in Philadelphia in 1899 to
explore the concept of an organization that would promote the interests of GermanAmericans throughout the United States.

End Notes

1 Howard B. Furer, The Germans in America, 1607-/970 (New York: Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1973), 1. The names of these three individuals were Unger, KefFer,
and Volday.
2 Albert Bernhardt Faust, The German Element in the United States, vol. 1 (New
York: The Steuben Society of America, 1927), 32.
3 Lucy Forney Bittinger, The Germans in Colonial Times (New York: Russell &
Russell, 1968), 29.
4 Bittinger, The Germans in Colonial Times, 61-64 and Furor, The Germans in
America, 3-4.
5 Aaron Spencer Fogleman, Hopeful Journeys: German Immigration, Settlement, and
Political Culture in Colonial America, 1717-1775 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 5. The pamphlet circulated in 1709 was written by Joshua

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51

Kocherthaler and titled, Aussfuhrlich—und umstcmdlicher Bericht Von der beruhmten
Landschaft Carolina/ In den Engellandischen America gelegen. Translation,
Comprehensive and Detailed Report o f the Famous Region o f Carolina Situated in
English America.
6 Fogleman, Hopefid Journeys, 6.
7 Ibid., 2.
8 Fogleman, Hopefid Journeys, 134.
9 Ibid., 143.
10 Benjamin Franklin, Observations Concerning the Increase o f Mankind (Tarytown,
NY, 1755), 7.
11 Stephanie Grauman Wolf, “Hyphenated America: The Creation of an Eighteenth
Century German-American Culture,” in Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh eds.,
America and the Germans: An Assessment o f a Three Hundred Year History, Vol. I,
Immigration, Language, and Ethnicity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1985), 70.
12 Furer, The Germatis in America, 1607-1970, 15.
13 La Vem Rippley, “German-Americans,” in Gale Encyclopedia o f Multicultural
America, vol. 1, ed. Rudolph J. Vecoli (New York: Gale Research Inc., 1995), 567.
14 Faust, The German Element in the United States, 341-342. Ludwig received the
name Molly Pitcher from soldiers in her husband’s gunnery battalion. After he was
severely wounded in battle she nursed him back to health and stayed with him for the
next seven years of the war. Her husband’s comrades nicknamed her “Molly” when
she came to the front lines with water. The soldiers responded with the cry “Here
comes Molly with her Pitcher.”
15 Don Higginbotham, The War o f American Independence (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1983), 359-360. See also Faust, The German Element in the United
States, 329-330.
16 James M. Bergquest, “The German-American Press,” in The Ethnic Press in the
United States, ed. Sally Miller (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 132-133.
17 Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States: Colonial Times to
1970, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1976), 1168. In 1790
there were 351,000 Germans out of a total population of 3 .9 million. The majority of
Germans lived in Pennsylvania where they made up one-third of the state’s population.
After Pennsylvania, in descending order, came Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and
the Tennessee and Kentucky territories.
18
Roger Daniels, Coming to America: A History o f Immigration and Ethnicity in
American Life (New York: Harper-Collins, 1990), 110. The term “Dutch” is in itself
not derogatory. But when used to describe Germans it is. For Germans “Dutch” is a
slang term for “Deutsch,” the German spelling of German.
19 Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States, 105-106.
20 Ibidi5 105-106.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

21 Frederick Luebke, Germans in the New World: Essays on the History o f
Immigration (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 96.
22 Gunter Moltman, “The Pattern o f German Emigration to the United States in the
Nineteenth Century,” in Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., America and the
Germans: An Assessment o f a Three Hundred Year History, Vol. I, Immigration,
Language, and Ethnicity (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 1618.
23 Willi Paul Adams, The German-Americans: An Ethnic Experience, trans. LaVem J.
Rippley and Eberhard Reichmann (Indianapolis: Max Kade German-American Center,
1993), 6. See also Faust, The German Element in the United States, 583.
24 Theodore Huebner, The Germans in America (Philadelphia: Chilton Company,
1962), 70.
25 Adams, The German-Ameicans: An Ethnic Experience, 7; and Moltman, “The
Patterns o f German Emigration to the United States in the Nineteenth Century,” 15.
26 Adams, The German-Americans: An Ethnic Experience, 7.
27 John Philip Gleason, The Conservative Reformers: German-American Catholics
and the Social Order {Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 18.
28 Furer, The Germans in America, 1607-1970, 20.
Huebener, The Germans in America, 71
30 Ibid., 68.
31 La Vem J. Rippley, The German-Americans (New York: University Press of
America, 1984), 45.
32 Translated “Union for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas.” Jurgen
EichhofF, “The German Language in America,” in Frank Trommler and Joseph
McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans: An Assessment o f a Three Hundred Year
History, Vol. I, Immigration, Language, and Ethnicity, 232. An excellent historical
novel based upon German settlement in Texas is Paula Weber’s, The Brewer’s Star
(Reston, VA: Bavaria Books, 1993).
33 Georg von Bosse, Dr. C. J. Hexamer: Sein Lehen und Wirken (Philadelphia: Graf
& Breuninger, 1922), 5.
34 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development o f Germany: The Period o f
Consolidation, 1871-1880, vol. II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990),
180-202.
35 Huebener, The Germans in America, 78.
36 Rippley, The German-Americans, 47.
37 Albert Faust, The German Element in the United Stales, vol. 1 (New York: The
Steuben Society of America, 1927), 509.
38 This takes into account that the population of the British Isles is broken down into
its English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh components.
39 Bureau o f the Census, Twelfth Census o f the United States, 1900, vol. I, part 1
(Washington D C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 173-174. For census
29

.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

purposes the North Central region included the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, and Kansas. The North Atlantic region comprised the states of Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
40 For a more detailed discussion see James M. Berquist, “German-America in the
1890’s. Illusions and Realities,” in E. Allen McCormick, ed. Germans in America:
Aspects o f German-American Relations in the Nineteenth Century (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983), 1-14; La Vem J. Rippley, The German-Americans
(Boston: University Press of America, 1984); and Adams, The German-Americans:
An Ethnic Experience.
41 Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, J.P. Mayer, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1960), 162.
42 Frances Trollope, Domestic Manners o f the Americans, Donald Smalley, ed. (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 266.
43 Robert Billigmeier, Americans From Germany: A Study in Cultural Diversity
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1974), 67.
44 Walter D. Kamphoefner, Wolfgang Helbich, and Ulrike Sommer, eds., News From
the Land o f Freedom: German Immigrants Write Home (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 69 and 90.
45 Ibid., 17.
46 Heinrich Maurer, “The Lutheran Community and American Society: A Study in
Religion as a Condition o f Social Accommodation,” American Journal o f Sociology
34(1928), 282-295.
47 Louis Viereck, German Ixinguage Instruction in American Schools. 1902 (Reprint
New York: Arno Press, 1978), 540-541.
48 Edwin H. Zeydel, The Teaching o f German in the United States from Colonial
Times to Present (New York: Modem Language Association, 1961), 287.
49 Viereck, German Instruction in American Schools, 543.
50 Ibid., 547.
51 Zeydel, The Teaching o f German in the United Statesfrom Colonial Times to the
Present, 290-291.
52 Ripley, The German-Americans, 118.
53 Zeydel, The Teaching o f German in the United States from Colonial Times to the
Present, 293.
54 Kloss, “German-American Language Maintenance Efforts,” 218.
55 Rippley, The German-Americans, 120.
56 Zeydel, The Teaching o f German in the United States from Colonial Times to the
Present, 293.
57 Karl-Emst Jeismann, “American Observations Concerning the Prussian Educational
System in the Nineteenth Century,” in Henry Getz, Jurgen Heideking, and Jurgen

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

Herbst, eds., German Influences on Education in the United States to 1917 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 24-25.
58 Elizabeth Jenkins, “How Kindergarten Found Its Way to America,” Wisconsin
Magazine o f History 14 (September 1930), 48-62.
59 Viereck, German Instruction in American Schools, 576.
60 Konrad H. Jarausch, “American Students in Germany, 1815-1914: The Structure of
German and U.S. Matriculants at Gottingen University,” in Henry Geitz, Jurgen
Heideking, and Jurgen Herbst, eds., German Influences on Education in the United
States to 1917 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 196.
6lGuide to the German Educational Exhibition in St. Louis in 1904, (Berlin: W.
Buxenstein, 1904), 1-33.
62 Viereck, German Instruction in American Schools, 572-576.
63 Timothy J. Holian, “Cincinnati and Its Brewing Industry: Their Parallel
Development Through the German Community,” Yearbook o f German-American
Studies, vol. 29 (Lawrence, KS: Society for German-American Studies, 1994), 70.
64 Stanley Baron, Brewed in America: A History o f Beer and Ale in the United States
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), 184-187.
65 Ibid., 258-259.
66 Holian, “Cincinnati and Its Brewing Industry: Their Parallel Development Through
the German Community,” 76-77.
67 Adams, The German-Americans: An Ethnic Experience, 21.
68 Baron, Brewed in America: A History o f Beer and Ale in the United States, 180181.
69 Milwaukee Daily Sentinel, 17 June 1861, 5.
70 Mary Jane Corry, “The Role of German Singing Societies in Nineteenth-century
America,” in E. Allen McCormick, ed., Germans in America: Aspects o f GermanAmerican Relations in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983), 155.
71 Ibid., 159.
72 “The Magic Flute,” Chicago Tribune, 5 April 1870, p. 4.
73 Huebener. The Germans in America, 130.
74 Faust, The German Element in the United States, vol. II, 388.
75 Huebener, The Germans in America, 130.
76 Faust, The German Element in the United States, vol. II, 389.
77 Ibid., 393-394.
78 One of the most magnificent Turner halls still exists in Indianapolis and is run by the
Athenaeum Foundation, an organization dedicated to the preservation of German
culture in America.
79 August J. Prahl, “History of the German Gymnastic Movement of Baltimore,”
Society for the History of Germans in Maryland, Twenty-sixth Report (Baltimore:
Society for the History of Germans in Maryland, 1945), 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55

80 Though almost forty years old, the best work on the German language press remains
Carl Wittke’s The German Language Press in America (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1957). A more recent work that focuses strictly on the GermanAmerican radical press is Elliott Shore, ed. The German-American Radical Press
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992).
81 Wittke, The German Language Press in America, 13-15.
82 James M. Berquist, “The German-American Press,” in Sally M. Miller, ed., The
Ethnic Press in the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 134-135.
83 Steven Rowan, “Franz Schmidt and the Freie Blatter of St. Louis, 1851-53,” in
Elliott Shore, Ken Fones-Wolf, and James P. Danky, eds., The German-American
Radical Press: The Shaping o f a Left Political Culture, 1850-1940 (Urbana:
University o f Illinois Press, 1992), 35.
84 James M. Bergquist, “The German-American Press,” 131-159.
85 Berquist, “The German-American Press,” 149.
86 Adams, The German-Americans: An Ethnic Experience, 30.
87 Willi Paul Adams, “Ethnic Leadership and the German-Americans,” in Frank
Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans: An Assessment o f a
Three Hundred Year History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990),
148-159; and La Vem Rippley, “The German-Americans” in Gale Encyclopedia o f
Multiculturalism, vol. I, 574. The first president with a German surname was Dwight
Eisenhower.
88 Charlotte L. Brancaforte ed., The German Forty-Eighters in the United States (New
York: Peter Lang, 1989), 15.
89 The best account of the Haymarket affair is Paul Avrich’s The Haymarket Tragedy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
90 Furer, The Germans in America, 1607-1970, 51; and Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the
Confederacy (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1940), 46.
91 Bruce Levine, The Spirit o f 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the
Coming o f the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 256; and Ripley,
The German-Americans, 59.
92 Faust, The German Element in the United States, vol. 1, 523. Faust took his
statistics from a study done by Benjamin A. Gould titled, Investigations in the M ilitary
and Anthropological Statistics o f American Soldiers (New York. Riverside Press,
1969), 26.
93 Faust, The German Element in the United States, vol. 1, 547; and Furer, The
Germans in America, 1607-1970, 53.
94 Willich rose to the rank of Major-General. Eight other German-Americans reached
that rank including Carl Schurz. On the Confederate side two more notable Germans
were General Lowe Armistead and General James Kemper, both of whom fell during
Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg. Armistead died of his wounds, while Kemper survived
and went on to become the governor of Virginia from 1873-1878.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56

95 Donnal V. Smith, “The Influence of the Foreign-Born of the Northwest in the
Election o f 1860,” in Frederick Luebke, ed., Ethnic Voters and the Election o f Lincoln
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1971), 13-15.
96 Levine, The Spirit o f 1848, 261.
97 Forty-three years later the contributions of German-Americans to the Union cause
were still being recognized as President Theodore Roosevelt praised the ethnic group
in a 1903 speech.
98 Ibid., 19.
99 H.L. Mencken, “Die Deutschamerikaner,” Die neue Rundschau, 39, no. 1(1928),
493.
100 Henry Adams, Prussian-American Relations, 1775-1871 (Cleveland: Western
Reserve University Press, 1960. Repr., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 13.
101 Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1984), 15.
102 Joseph Wright to William Seward, Message o f the President to Congress, 1861
(Washington, D C., 1861), 38-39.
103 Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History, 23.
104 Adams, Prussian-American Relations, 1775-1871, 102-103.
105 George Bancroft to Hamilton Fish, October 18, 1870, in M.A. Howe, The Life and
Letters o f George Bancroft (New York: DaCapo Press, 1970), 246-247.
106New York Times, 28 July 1870, p. 1; and the Chicago Daily Tribune, 20 July 1870,
p. 1.
107 Louis L. Snyder, “The American-German Pork Dispute, 1879-1891” Journal o f
Modem History, 17 (March 1945), 16-28.
108 The most detailed account of this chapter in United States relations with Germany
is Paul Kennedy’s The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German Relations (New
York, 1974).
109 Clara Eve Schieber, The Transformation o f American Sentiment Towards
Germany, 1870-1914 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1923), 90-91.
110 Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History, 63.
111 Schieber, The Transformation o f American Sentiment Toward Germany, 18701914, 98.
112 Ibid., 112; and Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History, 57.
113 Schieber, The Transformation o f American Sentiment Toward Germany, 187-1914,
114 and 119.
114 See David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation o f the Panama
Canal, 1870-1914 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977), 256-259.
115 John A. Hawgood, The Tragedy o f German-America (New York: G.P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1940), 284-285.
116 David Detjens, The Germans in Missouri, 1900-1918: Prohibition, Neutrality,
and Assimilation (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

117 John A. Hawgood, The Tragedy o f German-America, 274, quoting from “Rede des
Herm Carl Ruemlin” in Deutsche Pioneer, I (1869-1870), 22. Rumelin was the first
president of the Pioneer Verein von Cincinnati an organization founded in 1868 to
preserve German culture in America.
118 Arthur S. Link, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1983),
21 .

119 W.J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979), 239. The figures for distilled spirits and wine were
two gallons and one-half gallon respectively.
120 Detjens, The Germans in Missouri, 11. Busch even went so far as to endow a
chair in German at Washington University in St. Louis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II

PRESERVING A SENSE OF DEUTSCHUM, 1899-1905

The representatives who gathered in Philadelphia in April 1899 visualized
establishing a state organization that could serve as a nucleus for a national
association. Delegates came from various local German-American organizations such
as the Pittsburgh Turnverein, Altoona Deutsche Verein, and the Philadelphia Deutsche
Verein. They represented a cross-section of middle to upper-middle class GermanAmericans, many of whom were established professionals: engineers, lawyers,
doctors, educators, and businessmen. An observer would search in vain for
representatives of the farming and working classes. Accounting for this situation was
the fact that delegates came from German-American organizations, made up primarily
of middle and upper middle class citizens, in Pennsylvania’s cities. Workers and
farmers as a rule had neither the time, money, means of communication, nor an
intellectual or emotional interest in something as abstract as a quest for German
culture. The convention mentioned nothing concerning labor or agriculture and the
organizers had no intent to address such concerns.
On April 16, 1899 the delegates created the Deutsch-Amerikanischen ZentralBundes von Pennsylvanien (the German-American Central Alliance of Pennsylvania) .1
For its president they elected Dr. Charles J. Hexamer. Bom in Philadelphia on May 6,
1862, Hexamer was one of five children of Ernst and Marie Hexamer. Ernst Hexamer,
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a “48er,” had emigrated to the United States in 1856 where he pursued his career as a
civil engineer. In 1859 he married Marie Klingel and moved into a house at 716
Wallace Street in Philadelphia.2
The Hexamers, while assimilating well into middle-class American society, also
maintained their German traditions. Ernst and Marie spoke English, but German
remained the primary language of the house. From the beginning his parents fostered
the love of German culture in young Charles through language instruction, exposure to
German art, music, literature, theater, and science. His father insisted that while he
was an American, Charles should never forget his German heritage.3 As he grew older
Charles took up the charge, committing himself to a wide range of organizations and
projects designed to preserve German ways of thought and behavior.
Hexamer’s education was extensive. He spent grade school years at the Schule
der Deutschen Freien Gemeinde (Free German Public School), and later attended the
Eastbum Academy. In 1882 he took a degree in Civil Engineering from the University
of Pennsylvania. Four years later he received both a Ph.D. in Civil Engineering from
the University of Pennsylvania and L.L. D. from the National University in
Philadelphia. At the age of twenty-four he had achieved a level of education possessed
by very few individuals of the time and made the list of “Prominent Successful
Americans of Our Day,” published by the United Press Service Bureau in 1886 4 Yet
his education was not confined to books. In 1886 he left for Europe where he visited
every nation except Spain and Portugal.
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Upon his return to America, Hexamer pursued his career in civil engineering.
In 1891 he married Anna Josephine Hauptner and that same year began involvement in
organizations dedicated to the preservation of German culture. In 1896 he was
elected to the board of directors of the Deutschen Gesellschaft von Pennsylvanien
(German Society of Pennsylvania). Founded on December 26, 1764, the Society
remains the oldest German organization in America. Its original purpose was to
protect German immigrants from unethical shipping agents and assure their fair
treatment upon arrival in the colonies. One year later the colony of Pennsylvania
formally recognized the Society by passing legislation protecting the rights of German
immigrants entering the port of Philadelphia. During the period from 1764 to 1896 the
Society, while still providing assistance to newly-arrived immigrants, expanded its
areas of interest to include preservation of the German language and culture. As its
motto it adopted a quotation from Johann Wolfgang Goethe: “Whatever you have
inherited from your forefathers, earn it so that it will be truly yours.” The Society
worked diligently to live up to the words of the famous German writer. Throughout
the nineteenth century it sponsored contests for high school students studying German
and in mid-century began to provide scholarships to assist German majors in local
colleges and universities. It sponsored concerts, plays in the German language, and
lectures in German on a wide range of issues including science, the arts, literature, and
politics. By 1896, with immigration from Germany on a sharp decline, the Society
began to focus its attention on preserving the memory o f German and GermanAmerican contributions to the United States.5
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Hexamer was the most active member of the board of directors. In a speech
given in October 1898 at Washington Park, Philadelphia he praised past
accomplishments o f German-Americans to the growth of the United States and called
upon all German-Americans to maintain and preserve their culture. According to his
biographer, Georg von Bosse, this speech placed Hexamer among the leading voices
within the German-American community who sought to uphold the traditions of the
fatherland.6 It seemed only fitting that in 1900 he became president of the German
Society of Pennsylvania, a position he held until 1917.7
Another individual in the Zentral-Bund who would later figure prominently in
the NGAA was Adolph Timm. Bom in Germany in 1861, Timm left the homeland to
settle in Philadelphia in 1881. Like Hexamer, Timm’s work in the area o f German
cultural preservation began with election to the board of directors of the Deutschen
Gesellschaft von Pennsylvanien. He was elected Secretary of the Zentral-Bundes in
April 1899 and in 1901 became Secretary of the NGAA, a position he held until break
up of the organization in 1918 .8
From 1899 to 1918 the lives of Hexamer and Timm remained intertwined as
recognized leaders of a united German-American movement in the United States. The
goal for both men, and all the delegates at the initial meeting of the Zentral-Bund, was
to establish a state organization that would eventually expand and unite other state and
local societies into a national German-American organization. To that extent the
constitution of the Zentral-Bundes contained many principles that would later be
incorporated into the NGAA.
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The constitution had two major parts. The first established general governing
principles of the organization. The Zentral-Bundes pledged to not involve itself
directly in politics through the support of a political party or to become involved with
any religious affiliation. While any German-American was free to participate in the
organization, only individuals possessing American citizenship could become members.
The rules banned from the organization any known anarchists or criminals.9 The last
two points are significant. In its citizenship clause the Zentral-Bundes sought to
prevent any suspicion that the organization would adopt a “pan-German” orientation.
By forbidding anarchist or criminal participation it established itself from the beginning
as a law-abiding democratic organization at a time of heightened fear regarding radical
political activity in the United States, especially by people of foreign origin.
The second part o f the constitution listed goals and objectives of the ZentralBundes. First and foremost of course was the preservation and promotion of
traditional German culture. To this end the group pledged to promote the teaching of
the German language in public schools, pointing to the cultural and scientific
achievements of the German people, and to the position of German as the second
(English was first) language of science. Participants also planned to establish a series
of lectures throughout the United States on German art, language, literature and
science.10 The organization viewed active participation in the political process as key
to the preservation of democracy. The group actively pursued citizenship for all
newly-arrived immigrants, especially those from Germany. It also advocated political
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freedom for everyone, that is, except for anarchists who sought violent overthrow o f
the government.
The Zentral-Bundes viewed any restriction on personal liberties, such as the
prohibition of alcohol, as a direct violation of the Constitution of the United States.
The participants considered the German tradition of the Sunday “beer garden” an
integral part of German lifestyle and laws restricting alcohol a direct attack on that
culture. Consequently the group opposed any attempt at prohibition on grounds that it
would restrict the free-choice of an individual to regulate his or her personal life.
Three other components of the constitution suggested that the Zentral-Bundes
was a progressive organization concerned with global issues and the future of the
world. The group sought to preserve good relations between the United States and
Germany as a stepping stone in efforts to prevent a global conflict. By the end of the
nineteenth century a number of international incidents, such as disputes in Samoa,
Venezuela, the Spanish-American war, and the beginning of an arms race between the
European powers threatened the delicate balance of power between the Western
nations. Members of the Zentral-Bundes believed that close cooperation between the
United States and Germany would go a long way in preventing the Great Power
conflict that many people feared and predicted.11
The Zentral-Bundes advocated a healthy mind and body through higher
education and regular exercise. The delegates agreed that they lived in a time of
progress and discovery and that continued progress depended upon an educated and
healthy populace. The organization realized that continued development also rested
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upon conservation and protection of the nation’s valuable resources and endorsed
national legislation to this end.12 In doing so the Zentral-Bundes foreshadowed
emergence o f an activist federal government, especially under Theodore Roosevelt,
which would guard against the excesses o f corporate America.
Delegates at the Pennsylvania convention saw their primary goal as the
preservation of German culture, but they also attempted to position themselves as a
progressive group, in step with social and political issues emerging at the end of the
nineteenth century. Consistent with the spirit of that time, they also realized that they
could not accomplish what they wanted through a state organization. In their last
order of business members of the Zentral-Bundes voted to host a meeting of other
German-American organizations with similar interests and goals.
It was the last piece of business that would receive the most attention. For the
next fourteen months Hexamer, Timm and other members of the Zentral-Bundes
worked to set up a meeting for the establishment of a national organization. During
this time German-American organizations in such states as California, Maryland,
Minnesota, Ohio, and the District of Columbia had formed state alliances along lines
similar to that of the Zentral-Bundes. On June 19, 1900 representatives from GermanAmerican organizations in Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania met in
Philadelphia for a one day meeting which, under the chairmanship o f Hexamer, created
an executive committee to organize a larger gathering to be held in Philadelphia.13
The committee accomplished its task over a year later when, on October 6, 1901,
representatives from twelve states and the District of Columbia gathered in
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Philadelphia at der Halle der Deutschen Gesellschaft von Pennsylvanien (Hall of the
German Society of Pennsylvania).14 The day for the initial gathering was not a random
selection. Ever since 1883 October 6 had been celebrated as “German Day,”
commemorating the founding o f the first German community at Germantown,
Pennsylvania on October 6, 1683.
Thirty-nine delegates, selected by German-American organizations at the state
and local levels attended the gathering. As with the formative meeting o f the ZentralBundes, representatives at this gathering were middle to upper middle class
professionals who represented various German organizations at the local and state
levels. These included men like Simon Wolf who served as a delegate for the ZentralVerein of the District o f Columbia, and Professor of German Carl Brede, who
represented Idaho. The Turnvereins of New Jersey sent Jakob Muller, a businessman.
Professors C. O. Schonrich and Marion Dexter Learned o f the University of
Pennsylvania represented the Deutsch-Amerikanischer Lehrer-Bund. Finally, the only
woman among the delegates, Frau Femande Richter, represented the state of
Missouri.15 The gathering carried elements of both sameness and diversity. The
sameness came from class, educational and organizational background, the diversity in
widely different professional orientation, to include education, business, the art, and
language.
As if to set a tone for the new organization the meeting started off on a note of
patriotism and loyalty to the nation. For their first order o f business the delegates
passed a resolution expressing indignation, horror and deepest regret at the
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assassination of President William McKinley, which had taken place on September 6,
1901. The gathering sent a letter o f condolence to Mrs. McKinley.16 The delegates
next elected officers and a board of directors. As expected, Hexamer was elected
president; William Eltereich o f Washington D.C., first vice-president; H.C. Bloedel of
Pittsburgh, second vice-president; and Timm, secretary.17 The elections o f Hexamer
and Timm were unanimous, not surprising considering their previous efforts over the
past year. The selection o f Eltereich and Bloedel produced some partisan debate. The
convention minutes did not offer detail regarding the controversy, but the New Yorker
Staats Zeitung hinted that delegates from the Midwest and West objected to an
executive committee dominated by officers from the East coast chapters.18 One year
later Eltereich and Bloedl stepped down. Eltereich’s replacement, Dr. Marion Dexter
Learned, a German language professor at the University of Pennsylvania, stayed in
office from 1902 to 1906. Bloedel’s replacement, Joseph Keller, president of the
Indiana branch, served as Second Vice-President from 1902 to 1906 and First VicePresident from 1906 to 1918.19 His appointment appeased the Midwest chapters for
the time being. It would not be until the convention of 1903, however that the
executive committee was enlarged to include officers from the western states.
After the election o f officers the delegates went about the task of adopting the
constitution drafted by the delegates at the June 19, 1900 meeting in Philadelphia. The
primary mission of the organization was stated in the document’s preamble:
The German-American Alliance aims to awaken and strengthen the
sense of unity among the people of German origin in America with a
view to promote the useful and healthy development of the power
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inherent in them as a united body for the mutual energetic protection of
such legitimate desires and interests not inconsistent with the common
good of the country, and the rights and duties o f good citizens; to
check nativistic encroachments; to maintain and safeguard the good
friendly relations existing between America and the old German
fatherland.20
The group was careful to indicate that it sought a commonality of interests of GermanAmericans only if it did not conflict with the welfare o f the nation and could be done
within the parameters of the existing legal system. A sense o f “community” among
German-Americans thus required a need to remain American first and German second.
The preamble stated that since colonial times German-Americans had contributed to
the spiritual and economic development of the nation, and stood by their adopted land
in peace and war. The founders of the Alliance believed strongly that GermanAmericans deserved national recognition and promised to oppose any attempt to
belittle their contributions and the culture that stood behind them.
The constitution of the NGAA contained the same basic principles as the
constitution of the Zentral-Bundes. The Alliance pledged to remain above partisan
politics, yet affirmed its right to work within the political system to accomplish its
goals and defend its principles. The Constitution promised to avoid any involvement
in issues of religion—this clause in deference, at least partly, to the Catholic Central
Verein. While the Alliance was dominated by Protestants, the leadership recognized
that it might want the support of the Verein on future issues. By removing the
question of religion, the Alliance sought to defuse any potential conflict that might
hinder the advancement of German-American interests in the United States.
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In fact the two organizations consistently viewed each other with cautious
regard for several reasons. The Verein viewed itself as Catholic first, American
second, and German third - with its primary focus on the interests of the nation’s
German-American Catholics. The Alliance on the other hand was American first, and
German second with its focus on the interests of all German-Americans.21 The second
factor was the traditional antipathy between the Vereinsdeutsch and the
Kirchendeutsch, in essence the traditional battle between church and state brought
over from the fatherland.22 The Verein viewed the Alliance as an organization that
was secular and free thinking. On the other hand local chapters of the Alliance,
notably the Ohio chapter, were down-right hostile to the church, referring to priests by
the derogatory term Pfaffen (the “Pope’s nose”).23 The third factor preventing
cooperation was that the Verein focused on social reform, while the Alliance was a
political-cultural organization that showed little interest in the social legislation
championed by the Verein.24 The Verein advocated reform based upon the
progressive model—yet never clearly defined its stance on prohibition and immigration
restriction. The Alliance, while agreeing with some aspects of progressive reform,
such as ending poverty, conservation of natural resources, and cleaning up the nation’s
cities, came out solidly against the prohibition of alcohol and immigration restriction.
Finally, there was the economic and intellectual factor. The Alliance was made up of
middle to upper-middle class, well-educated German-Americans—in essence an
intellectual elite. The Central Verein, being a religious organization first, drew its
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membership from all economic classes, many of whom did not possess the educational
level of Alliance members.
While the two groups remained on friendly terms—Hexamer would send
greetings to the CCV at its annual meetings—the two groups never cooperated to any
large extent at the national level. What little collaboration that did exist remained
confined to the local level where some German-Americans maintained membership in
both organizations.
The next section o f the constitution dealt with the preservation of German
culture, the most important aspect of which was maintenance of German language
instruction. The NGAA recommended the teaching of the German language in the
public school system on a widespread basis as both a means of preserving the language
within the German-American community and to expand its usage within the nonGerman population.25 The organization considered German to be the equal of English
as a language of world civilization, trade, commerce and science. A knowledge of
both languages would assist the individual in gaining a clearer understanding of the
world as well as promoting closer relations between nations.
The second aspect o f the NGAA’s plan to preserve German culture involved
the creation of educational societies to teach all aspects of German language, history,
science, literature and the arts. To assist in accomplishing this objective, as well as
heightening an awareness of contributions made by German-Americans to the United
States, the Alliance sanctioned the creation of The German-American Historical
Society.26 The Alliance adopted Americana Gemanica (later known as German-
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American Annals) as the organization’s official journal for the promotion of German
art, music, theater, and literature.27 Edited by Professor Marion Dexter Learned o f the
University of Pennsylvania, Americana Germanica contained the Alliance’s
Mitteilungen (Bulletin) until 1909 when it began to be published as a separate
monthly.
The last principles set forth in the constitution dealt with questions of
immigrant restriction and personal liberty. The Alliance called upon all Germans in
America to acquire citizenship as soon as possible, and to take an active part in the
nation’s political system. Only through exercising the vote could German-Americans
hope to protect their individual liberties.28 The group condemned any laws or actions
on the part of government that placed unnecessary barriers to aliens seeking
citizenship - a reference to citizenship tests that contained questions designed to
confuse the applicant. The NGAA came out against restriction of healthy immigrants
from Europe, but it approved established qualitative measures that prohibited entry of
convicted criminals, anarchists, and individuals with contagious diseases.29
The position on immigrant restriction is traceable to 1898 when 150 German
societies across the nation joined with other nationalities to form the Immigration
Protective League, the purpose of which was to counter efforts by the Immigration
Restriction League to reduce immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe as well
as Asia. Founded in 1894 by young Harvard graduates, the Immigration Restriction
League welcomed immigration from England, Germany, and Scandinavia while
seeking to keep the nation free of other peoples that were “historically down-trodden,
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atavistic, and stagnant.”30 Nonetheless, by the end of the nineteenth century
immigration from Germany had been on a sharp decline and while the Restriction
League had had no objections to German immigrants, German-American leaders
viewed any attempts at restriction as a move that might carry over to Germans and
thus hasten the decline of German culture in America.31 From 1901 until the outbreak
of World War One opposition to quantitative restriction would form the cornerstone
of the Alliance position on immigration/2
The group’s position on personal liberties was of special interest. The NGAA
came out against any law that attempted to “check the free intercourse and restrict the
personal freedom of the citizen.”33 While the document did not go into detail on this
issue one may assume that this principle was aimed, in part, at the growing movement
for the prohibition of alcohol, though it was not mentioned by name at the time.34
The remaining sections of the NGAA’s constitution concerned matters of
organizational structure. These included the official name of the organization
(Deutsch-Amerikanischer National-Bund der Ver. Staaten von Amerika—The
National German-American Alliance o f the United States of America); criteria for
group membership (open to all local and state German-American organizations);
criteria for individual membership (all German-Americans possessing citizenship);
national meetings (every other year); representation at these meetings (all dues paying
local chapters and individuals); administrative structure (president, vice-president,
second-vice president, treasurer, financial secretary, and an executive council of all
state chapter presidents); voting for officers (every other year at the national
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convention); dues, which were collected by local chapters and passed on to the
national organization; publication of convention business; a series of general operating
conditions; and a concluding clause which stated that this constitution could only be
altered at the national convention by a vote of the representatives present.
Despite the precise organizational structure in the constitution, the NGAA
would function primarily as a loose confederation of German-American organizations
that agreed on many issues that had an impact on German-Americans in the United
States. Evidence of this appears in the way in which the organization functioned. The
Alliance met only every two years and in between meetings it conducted much of its
business through the mail or by telegraph. Each local chapter could suggest legislation
to the executive committee, after which the executive committee would vote, by mail,
on the proposal. If the majority voted in favor the legislation became official.35 At the
convention of 1903, the delegates voted to expand the executive council of the
Alliance. It became the job of the vice-presidents to first sound out local branches in
their region prior to casting their ballots. It is important to note, however, that the
local and state chapters were autonomous. As a consequence they were not bound to
follow the orders of the executive committee, and the national leadership did not have
the power to enforce its decisions on the local chapters.
It is impossible to gauge the reaction within the German-American community
to the formation of the Alliance. The first announcement in the national media
appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer on October 7, 1901 in a short statement that
appeared below an advertisement for cemetery plots.36 The reaction of local and state
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German-American organizations and in the German-American press is fairly clear.
The Catholic Verein, at the time occupied with its own reorganization, reacted
“cautiously” favorable to the news.37 Local and state organizations representing
German-America welcomed the creation o f a national organization. Several German
language dailies such as the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, Illinois Siaats Zeitung, and
the Cincinnati Freie Presse reacted positively.38 The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung,
which would remain a long-time supporter of the organization, said that the group
would be a “positive force in promoting German-American culture in the United
States.”39 The Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblatter also applauded the goal of
enhancing German culture in America.40
What is impossible to gauge is the reaction of the individual German-American
during a time when most were content to be Americans and not necessarily concern
themselves with the maintenance of German ways. Interest was surely stronger within
the intellectual elite than among farmers, craftsmen, or factory workers. A larger
percentage of original delegates came from higher social and educational classes.
Albert Faust, a distinguished professor of Germanic Languages at Cornell University,
considered creation of the Alliance as an example of “ the patriotic and progressive
attitude taken by the German element in regards to the nation’s best interests.”41 At
the same time, evidence of a considerable following seemed to be suggested in the fact
that between 1901 and 1916 the Alliance grew to roughly 2.5 million members, at least
on paper, with chapters in forty-five states and the District of Columbia. These
numbers, however, would always be in dispute owing to the way the Alliance counted
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its membership, which depended upon reports from state and local organizations. An
individual might be a member of more than one German organization in a community,
and as a consequence could be counted more than once. The national organization
leveled a tax of five cents per member on local and state branches, yet individual
memberships never appeared in the minutes of the national meetings.
Was there a need for such an organization at the beginning of the Twentieth
century? The founders certainly thought so. To these men German culture in the
United States was on the decline and unless they took steps it might disappear
altogether. Immigration from Germany had decreased markedly; by 1901 Germans
only four percent of the total immigration to America, whereas fifteen years earlier it
had been twenty-seven percent.42 Reduced immigration of course deprived the
community o f fresh new blood, people with close ties to the fatherland. It created a
situation in which most German-Americans were of the second generation or older, far
along in the Americanization process, which while necessary and in some respects
desirable, caused many Germans to forget their roots. Assimilation thus was the
second motivating factor behind the formation of the Alliance. The group did feel that
German-Americans as a whole had become “apathetic” towards their culture and
traditions, and that cracks had appeared in the once solid German-American
community. The German-American press also reflected this trend.
While still the nation’s largest ethnic press in 1900, subscription levels began to
decline as first generation German-Americans died off. The second generation, for the
most part, let the subscriptions run out.43 Another problem was the German-American
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church, which before the late 1890’s had used German almost exclusively. By 1900
more and more churches utilized English, if only because many second and third
generation German-Americans did not understand the German language well enough
to follow the service.44
A revival of interest in German culture amongst the German community
necessitated the need to expand the teaching of the German language, promote
German cultural activities, and foster a renewed interest in German and GermanAmerican history. At the first convention the delegates agreed to support the German
Historical Society, Americana Germanica and to help establish a German-American
Teachers Seminary in Milwaukee, the purpose of which was to train educators in the
German language, culture, and history who could go into the community and instruct
second and third generation students about their heritage.45
A third reason for the group’s founding was that many in the German
community found their institutions coming under attack in the rising tide of
progressivism. Prohibition of alcohol threatened to undermine an aspect of German
culture—and to members of the Alliance prohibition meant more than taking away the
right to have a drink, it threatened to undermine fundamental individual liberties. For
Hexamer, the son of a “48er” who had fought for democratic rule in Germany, such an
action could lead to further curtailment of civil liberties. While skeptics would later
decry this attitude as an attempt to mask the Alliance’s true motives on the issue, their
policy remained consistent—though broadened in scope as the years progressed—on
the topic through 1916.
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A fourth reason involved the growing tensions between Germany and Great
Britain. The Alliance hoped to foster closer relations between the United States and
Germany as a means to counterbalance the rising Anglo-German antagonism. Again,
as with the prohibition question, the Alliance stance on this issue remained consistent
until the outbreak o f war between the United States and Germany in April 1917.
The final reason for the group’s founding, or so some people suggested, was
an existing chauvinism amongst certain segments of the German-American
population.46 Critics of the group, both at the time and in historical retrospect,
suggested that the Alliance represented nothing more than an elitist organization
attempting to mask a personal agenda of elitist German culture—and later lobbying
against prohibition—under a cover of patriotism. It is true that the leadership of the
organization came from the intellectual and professional elite of the German-American
community. Yet these individuals sincerely believed that what they were undertaking
was necessary given what they viewed as the status of the German community in
America at the turn of the century. As with all special interest groups the NGAA’s
actions would be motivated, to a degree, by a private agenda. Yet the key to
understanding the group’s conduct over the next seventeen years is that, at all times,
the members considered themselves first and foremost an “American” organization
working within the accepted system to achieve their goals and objectives.
The Alliance wasted little time in going ahead with its program. In the months
following formation it focused on the preservation of German culture in the United
States. The first foray involved efforts by the German Publication Fund of America
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and the Zentral-Bundes von Pennsylvanien to create a national organization to
promote the history of German-Americans. On December 10, 1901 this new
organization became the German Historical Society.47 O f the elected officials, three
were prominent members in the NGAA. Hexamer was elected chairman, Timm
became secretary, and Marion D. Learned joined the board of directors. Organized to
collect, record and publish material relating to the German-American experience in
America, the Society also encouraged existing local, county, or state organizations to
become members of the national organization and to create societies in areas where
they did not exist. Americana Germanica became its official organ.48
Creation of the German Historical Society was significant in two ways. First
the Alliance, in sanctioning its creation, quickly demonstrated that it truly intended to
act and that it would adhere to its primary goal of fostering German culture. Second,
the Society became the storehouse of German-Americana, and thus a vital resource in
understanding the contribution of German-Americans to the growth of the United
States.49
Next the Alliance turned to fostering the German language. In 1902 it began
its campaign for German instruction in the nation’s public schools. In that year Louis
Viereck published German Instruction in American Schools, a component of the
Bureau of Education’s report on language instruction in American schools, which
analyzed the history of the German language in the United States.50 Viereck’s study
concluded that by 1900 the position of the German language and recognition of
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German methods of instruction were assured in higher education. The goal now was to
assure German language instruction at the elementary and secondary levels.51
Impressed with Viereck’s report, the NGAA justified instruction in German in
public schools by pointing to the position of German in academic and especially
scientific studies. As a rule the Alliance worked through its state chapters in this
campaign.52 It also viewed instruction in German as a means o f promoting closer ties
between the United States and Germany. To bolster its campaign the Alliance joined
forces with the German Publication Fund of America.53 Under the leadership of
Hexamer, the Fund endeavored to promote the publication, in German, of works that
focused on the contribution of German-Americans to the founding and growth of the
United States.54 Language remained a prominent part of the lobbying activities until
the start of the First World War.
During the early part of 1903 the Alliance moved to recruit membership and
expand its network of state and local branches. In the German American Annals,
Timm appealed to German-Americans to become part of the effort to promote
German culture. He discussed the contributions of German-Americans in such areas
as music, education, government, business, and labor. Timm classified GermanAmericans into three groups. The first he called the “Vollblut-Amerikanem” (fullblooded Americans)— people who had been in the United States for generations, and
for the most part had become fully Americanized. While he welcomed support from
this group, Timm believed that only a few at best would join the Alliance. The second
group encompassed the “Nachkommen der Eingewanderten” (descendants of
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immigrants), and finally the “Eingewanderten” (immigrants). While Timm did not
provide figures, he concluded that the last two groups made up the majority of the
German-American population and should be targeted for membership since they were
not yet far removed from the fatherland. Timm reiterated that members should be
Americans first and Germans second.55 The Alliance called upon these people to
become citizens, if they had not done so, for German-Americans could best promote
German culture if they exercised their right to vote in all elections.
The efforts seemed to pay off By the summer of 1903 state organizations
increased from twelve states and the District of Columbia to eighteen states.56
Georgia and Texas became the first southern states to come aboard. Local chapters
also appeared in Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, and Massachusetts. While the core support
remained in the states of the Mid-Atlantic region the Alliance by mid-1903 had truly
established itself as a national organization.
At the fourth convention of the Pennsylvania branch in Johnstown Hexamer
optimistically predicted that expansion would continue in the years to come.57 He also
spoke of immigration legislation pending in Congress, especially the bill that would
eventually become the Immigration Law of 1903—an act which, while aimed primarily
at anarchists, would become the first law since the Alien and Sedition Acts o f 1798 to
penalize newcomers for exercising their right to voice a different opinion.58 Hexamer
argued that while the Alliance supported attempts to prevent anarchists from entering
the country, and deportation of those already here, he worried that this law might
allow the government to keep out anyone it deemed to possess improper political
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opinions. The law violated the First Amendment, he said, and urged the NGAA to
petition Congress and the President to reconsider the measure.
Hexamer’s speech indicated a shift in the focus of the NGAA. While still
concerned primarily with German culture, the Alliance was now prepared to enter the
political realm. Opposition to immigrant restriction of course had been one o f the
goals in the organization’s constitution. By 1903 the leadership of the NGAA felt that
it had grown strong enough to move into more controversial political issues—in this
case the restriction of civil liberties. By openly criticizing the Immigration Law of
1903 the Alliance set the precedent for further involvement in the political issues of the
times. Even in this expanded realm, however, the NGAA concerned itself only with
issues that seemed to threaten German-Americans, thus maintaining the group’s
primary mission.
The second national convention o f the NGAA took place in the Hall of
Tumverein Vorwaerts in Baltimore, Maryland from September 12-15, 1903.59
Chapters in eighteen states and the District of Columbia sent delegates. In his opening
address Hexamer reiterated that while the Alliance would continue to remain out of
party politics it would work within the political system to achieve its goals and that the
time had come to take an active position on issues that affected the German
community. Hexamer referred particularly to immigration restriction and the
movement to prevent production and sale of alcohol .60 Insisting that the prohibition
movement represented a threat to the personal freedoms of all Americans, he called
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upon local chapters to lobby their representatives in Washington against such a
move.61
Hexamer’s call met with mixed reaction from the delegates. The majority of
the state delegations favored taking positions on political issues. The Pennsylvania
branch had already done so in 1902 when it utilized a questionnaire to determine the
position on issues by candidates seeking legislative seats at the state and national
levels. Questions included how candidates stood on German language instruction in
the public schools, immigration restriction, and the prohibition of alcohol.62 The
information was compiled in Harrisburg and then distributed throughout the state
during the state and federal elections.
Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, and Nebraska adopted the “Pennsylvania Model” in
1904.63 By 1914 almost all of the state branches had become similarly involved in
politics, due primarily to the heated debate over the prohibition of alcohol. The
branches carefully avoided endorsing any candidate, and instead provided the
information to allow the voting public to become more “educated” on the issues. One
did not have to read far between the lines to realize that this form of education was an
overt attempt to influence the outcome of elections.
Not all state branches favored such activism in 1903. Indiana and Minnesota
labeled political conditions in their states as “first rate, with nothing to complain
about,” and argued that by following the Pennsylvania example the Alliance would be
drifting away from its original focus.64 As a compromise to these delegations the
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gathering voted to bar from the national executive board anyone elected to a political
office.65
The debate over culture and politics ballooned in a forceful speech given on the
first day by Frau Femande Richter from Missouri. The only female delegate at the
gathering, Frau Richter chastised the Germans of Missouri by declaring that:
...they had lost spirit in the municipal matters in St. Louis; that as
politicians they were utter failures and that they were lacking in spirit
and interest to a lamentable degree. The large enthusiastic celebrations
held under the auspices of Germans in that city years ago are but
memories o f the past.66
Richter criticized the Missouri branch for what she viewed as faltering efforts
at promoting German culture and at working within the political system to achieve
organizational goals. Her words had a strong influence upon the convention, carrying
over to an event planned for the next day when the delegates, along with twenty
thousand other German-Americans in Baltimore, turned out for a “Volksfest” at
Darley Park.67 The event was a family gathering designed to herald German-American
culture and its contributions to the United States. Local Tumverein, as well as various
German-American singing societies entertained the festival goers. The highlight of the
event was a speech given by Hexamer in which in which he lauded, not only the
contributions of German-Americans, but Germans in general:
The characteristic qualities of the German-American are industry,
frugality, thrift, domesticity, conservatism, honesty in public and private
life, and a strong individualism. The German-American is justly proud
of his ancestry as his race defeated the Romans and crushed the oldworld empire and for centuries filled the throne of the Caesars with its
tribal chiefs, and explored the far ends of the then known world.
Through the German race the world received the art of printing; it
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produced a Kant, a Fichte, a Hegel, a Schelling, a Schopenhauer, and
other men who passed their lives pondering over the profound and
abstruse problems of human existence and gave to the world the most
exalted results of modem thought - German philosophy; it gave
humanity a Bach, a Hayden, a Mozart, a Beethoven, and that
“Shakespeare of music drama,” Richard Wagner.68
Hexamer’s forceful acclamation o f German contributions to civilization evoked an
equally forceful response in his audience. The English language press of Baltimore
also reacted favorably. The Baltimore Sun reported that while the gathering was not
as large as in previous years, “Volksfest” produced far more enthusiasm in
demonstrating “just how much German-Americans had contributed to the United
States.”69
While celebrations of German culture enlivened the convention it soon
developed that the top priority of the gathering was the campaign against prohibition .70
For the next three days the delegates worked on a series of resolutions and a petition
against the Hepbum-Doiliver Bill, which sought to restrict movement in interstate
commerce of alcohol, and to a lesser extent the importation of fermented, distilled, or
other intoxicating liquors.71 The resolutions called the Hepbum-Doiliver Bill and all
“Blue Laws” antiquated and out of date, reflective o f a medieval mindset that sought
to restrict the individual liberties of American citizens and to use the sanctity of
Sunday to control the population. The result, so the convention had concluded, was a
rise in illegal drinking establishments and wide-spread corruption in many small towns
and urban centers that already had adopted such measures. The attempt to end
alcohol consumption throughout the nation would in effect create a “forbidden fruit”
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that tempted people to try at all costs. The best means of reducing alcohol
consumption was through education in the home where children could be taught that
moderate consumption o f such beverages was proper in an enlightened society.72
They would also learn that consumption of alcohol did not necessarily lead to social
ills, as claimed by temperance advocates, if consumed in a proper manner. In sum the
Alliance argued that restricting alcohol would worsen not solve social problems, that it
would turn drinking into a daring exercise, tempting people who otherwise would not
drink, opening up a new and lucrative area for criminal activity.
In drafting a petition to Congress opposing the Hepbum-Doiliver Bill the
Alliance took the high ground by supporting a reduction in consumption of alcohol,
but not at the price of individual liberties. Citizens o f a free society had the right to
regulate their homes and lives as long as they did not harm other people; the
Hepbum-Doiliver Bill would bring the government into the homes, violating the
Constitution.73
For the next thirteen years the Alliance maintained this line o f attack; always
careful to assert its loyalty, condemning prohibition laws not solely for selfish reasons,
so it said, but to protect the rights of all Americans. The Baltimore convention voted
to have the resolutions and petition delivered to Congress early in 1904 when members
of the Alliance would testify at the hearings on the Hepbum-Doliver Bill. By taking
this action the Alliance fired its first shot in the war against what it viewed as an
attempt to undermine the legal foundation of the nation and a legitimate segment of
German-American culture. The prohibition issue also provided a first reason for the
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NGAA to attract controversy. Temperance forces attacked this stance as socially and
morally degrading, an outcome of heavy German-American involvement in the
brewing industry, and to what might be perceived as a flaw in an ethnic lifestyle.
At first glance it would appear that the critics had a case. By 1900 GermanAmericans owned thirteen of the sixteen largest breweries in the United States,
including the three largest: Pabst, Anheuser-Busch, and Joseph Schlitz. GermanAmerican brewers accounted for 84% o f the approximately 7.4 million gallons of beer
produced in America.74 No connection between the brewers and NGAA existed in
1903, yet as the Alliance grew in size, and became more involved in the prohibition
debate, it attracted the attention of the brewers who viewed the Alliance as a weapon
in their battle against the dry forces—although it still remained to be seen what the
brewers would do about it.
While the prohibition question dominated proceedings, other issues surfaced at
the convention of 1903. The members voted to fund a statue commemorating the
contribution of Baron von Steuben to the founding of the United States. They
discussed the Alliance’s sponsorship of a Germanic Congress planned for St. Louis in
September 1904, and the establishment o f a Ladies Auxiliary of the NGAA. The
national executive committee expanded to include officers from all sections o f the
country, partly a response to delegates from the South and West who felt they had
little voice in the national organization.75
Of the reports by individual state chapters, most significant were those from
New Jersey, New York, and Ohio which focused on the rise in membership.
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Membership in New Jersey had reached 20,000. In New York more than 148
German-American societies joined the national organization, bringing in 30,000
members. In Ohio, sixty-six societies in the Cleveland area alone joined the national
organization. Reports such as these gave the delegates reason to be optimistic
concerning the future of the young organization and the convention closed in a spirit
of confidence.76
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Baltimore convention in
shaping the future direction of the NGAA. Some state branches made it clear at the
outset that they wished to become far more involved in politics than others. The fact
that the Alliance operated as a loose confederation rather than a highly centralized
body allowed for this independent action to happen with minimal friction between the
chapters. Expanding the size o f the executive committee helped to ease tensions
arising over distribution of power, although for the remainder of its existence some
state branches continued to exercise more influence than others.
Another issue that surfaced was the question of exactly what constituted
German culture in America. For some members it was all encompassing, ranging from
intellectual contributions to beer-drinking. This group, the more radical wing of the
organization best exemplified by the Pennsylvania branch, viewed it as the mission of
the NGAA to act as guardian and watchdog over all aspects of German culture in
America, and to accomplish this task the Alliance should utilize every weapon possible
so long as it remained within the law—even going so far as to influence elections. The
moderate element viewed some aspects of German culture as more important than
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others and argued that the “extreme” measures o f the Pennsylvania branch would draw
unfavorable attention to the organization. The national executive committee tended to
lean more toward the extreme wing, as exhibited in Hexamer’s Volksfest speech, in its
willingness to employ a wide range o f tactics to achieve the organization’s goals.
Consequently, as the Alliance grew in size after 1903 and involved itself in a wide
range of issues, the radical element came to dominate the national agenda.
Finally, the convention of 1903 was significant because the NGAA began to
tackle the alcohol question at the national level. From this point on the fight against
laws prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcoholic beverages
remained a key issue, and by late 1908 it was the main topic o f concern until the onset
of World War One in 1914 forced the Alliance to concentrate on international events.
The year 1904 began with a surprising turn o f events that caused the NGAA to
involve itself in foreign affairs for the first time. The incident that sparked this episode
began with Major General Arthur MacArthur’s remarks in Honolulu regarding the
state of affairs between the United States and Germany. MacArthur announced that
war between the United States and Germany was inevitable and that Americans
needed to be wary of German-Americans in the United States attempting to spread the
doctrine o f Pan-Germanism:
The Pan-German doctrine which is being spread throughout the world,
is being fostered and propagated by the imperial Government in every
possible way. It is strong and getting stronger wherever German
people settle, even among Germans who have been citizens of the
United States for years.77
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The response was swift on the part of the Alliance. In an open letter to the
General the executive council labeled his comments absurd and an insult to GermanAmericans. Pointing to the strong commercial and cultural ties between the two
countries, the letter stressed patriotism and loyalty by Americans of German descent,
referring specifically to the contributions during the Civil War and more recently the
Spanish-American War. Under the signature of Hexamer and Timm, the letter
concluded with a scarcely veiled reprimand:
Trusting that these few lines may enlighten you somewhat on a subject
of which, judging from your remarks, you are totally ignorant, and
believing that, as an officer and a gentleman, your insult to a very
important element in our population was not intentional we are,
Sir:...78
Letters of protest were not confined to the national organization. The state
branch in Minnesota drafted a separate message which it forwarded directly to
President Theodore Roosevelt. The two letters demonstrated that the Alliance not
only considered itself to be a major spokesman for the German-American community,
but also the guardian of the heritage of German-America - even if it meant crossing
swords with a prominent military leader.
Mac Arthur’s comments did suggest troubling developments in GermanAmerican relations: The Venezuelan Crisis o f 1902 threatened peaceful relations as
the United States viewed German military action against Venezuela as a violation of
the Monroe Doctrine. MacArthur’s comments regarding the Pan-German League
echoed a growing fear in western nations that the goal of German militarism was the
expansion o f German culture around the world. This fear was not as great in the
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United States as in Europe, but it would grow until the outbreak of the World War
One which of course would produce even more trouble.79
Small as it was, the episode demonstrated, possibly for the first time, the
group’s willingness to take seriously another of the principles spelled out in its
constitution. Maintenance of friendly relations between Germany and the United
States was a vital part of its objectives. The action also reconfirmed a willingness to
get involved in controversial political and international issues. The incident might even
have constituted a minor first test of the significance of the German-American
Alliance. Neither MacArthur nor the English language press commented on the
NGAA’s rebuke, a hint that the organization had some distance to go before becoming
a force in affairs o f the day.
This situation would begin to change in 1904 as the NGAA took a more active
role in national issues. Between January 20 and March 4, 1904 the House of
Representatives conducted hearings on the Hepbum-Doiliver Bill. Fourteen
individuals from the state branches and the executive council o f the NGAA testified
before the committee. Chief among this group were Hexamer, Timm and Jacob Bieler
from the Indiana branch. The testimonies of other Alliance members largely mirrored
the positions of these three leaders.
Prior to giving his statement, Hexamer distributed copies of the resolutions and
petition passed during the convention of 1903, explaining that the documents had the
backing of the full membership now set at 1.5 million, 6,000 German-American
societies across the nation, and the German language press.80 Hexamer largely
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covered familiar territory: arguing that the bills represented an attack on personal
freedoms and a fanatical outcry of an intolerant minority attempting to force its will on
the American people. He reviewed the failure of prohibition in United States history,
that it had been tried and abolished in eight states and rejected at the polls by
overwhelming numbers in thirteen other states.81 Hexamer requested that due to the
short notice of the hearings, additional hearings be set for a later date so that
representatives from other chapters could appear. The committee agreed to his
request.
When the hearings resumed Bieler testified on behalf of the Indiana branch of
the NGAA. Echoing the sentiment of the other state branches, he reported that he did
not intend to argue legislative merits of the bill, but to discuss questions of morality
and individual liberty.82 He argued that moral reform developed best through
education, not by removing personal liberties. Pointing to the sacrifices made by
Americans of German descent to the growth of the nation, he insisted that such
sacrifices should not be rewarded by the curtailment of individual rights. Beiler
insisted that even if the measure passed, public sentiment would not allow it to remain
law for long.
The last person to testify, Timm reported that since the Alliance had come out
against the pending measures it had received numerous telegrams o f support from
individuals and organizations around the nation, not all of them German-American.
Besides endorsing the arguments put forth by Hexamer and Bieler, Timm argued that
the true danger came from mixing prohibition and politics.8'' Prohibition would create
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a state of lawlessness by allowing organized crime to take over the production and
distribution of alcohol. Instead of solving the drinking problem in America it well
could exacerbate it.
It is impossible to gauge just how much influence the Alliance had on
deliberations over the Hepbum-Dolliver Bill. What is significant is that it again
demonstrated willingness by the Alliance to enter into the political realm in order to
fight a perceived threat to its interests, which it equated with curtailment of individual
liberties. The hearings left the organization convinced that it could be effective in
influencing public and private opinion on issues that concerned the group. The
Alliance now became a force on the political scene in America.
The new interest in politics in 1904 did not mean that the group had abandoned
matters o f German culture, if indeed one could separate the two. It helped organize
and sponsor the Germanic Congress that took place from September 16-17, 1905 in
St. Louis, concurrently with the World’s Fair, also in that city. Bringing together
scholars, writers, poets, teachers, musicians, artists and representatives from other
fields of German culture, the Congress met to stimulate interest in history, language,
and literature while simultaneously advancing the interests of all German-speaking
people.84 In his opening remarks, Hexamer stressed the need for gatherings that
promoted an awareness of German-American contributions to the nation’s culture.85
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch had a different view. While acknowledging the
intellectual importance of the gathering, it sarcastically remarked that the Congress
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was merely a chance for Germans and German-Americans to “give three cheers for the
Kaiser.”85
The Congress featured twenty-five papers on a wide variety of topics ranging
from Professor A.B. Faust’s (University of Wisconsin) paper on “Schools Founded By
the Forty-Eighters,” Professor Herman Schoenfeld’s (Columbia University) work
“Bismarck, Man of Blood and Iron and Prince of Peace,” to Frau Femande Richter’s
topic, “The German Woman in America.”87 Besides being significant as a scholarly
gathering, the event demonstrated that the Alliance was willing to take a leadership
role in promoting German culture. It represented a “high water mark” in this area.
While the Alliance would continue to take an active role in the promotion of German
culture, by 1905 it found itself increasingly drawn to political and international issues.
The first half of 1905 was dominated by preparations for the third national
convention and the construction of the German Theatre in Philadelphia. Designed to
promote a stronger interest in the stage and arts, especially in the German language,
Hexamer heralded this step as a way to promote the “intellectual improvement of our
people,” and help make the United States a world leader in culture and education.88
Needless to say, Hexamer had in mind a strong emphasis on German culture. In itself
this position was not objectionable, but in combination with other recent activities in
promoting German issues, and the recent stand on immigration restriction and
prohibition, the Alliance left itself open to charges that it was more German than
American.
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From October 4 to 7, 1905 ninety five delegates, including many women,
gathered at the Deutschen Haus in Indianapolis for the NGAA’s third national
convention.89 As with the first two gatherings, the state chapters chose the delegates
to represent them. By this time the organization had grown from chapters in 18 states
to 33 and the District of Columbia.90 Reported total membership now approached 1.5
million.
The featured speaker of the gathering was Vice President of the United States
Charles W. Fairbanks who had nothing but praise for the German people:
They are a conservative people, ever ready to do those things that
make stronger and better a people; that make stronger and better a
home; that make stronger and better a republic. They build not only for
today, but they build for the future.91
The Vice President’s speech lended an air o f status and credibility to the Alliance,
suggesting at least at this time, that the organization had contributed, not merely to
German-Americans, but to the nation in general and was generally looked upon with
favor by the government.
Hexamer’s opening speech generously thanked the vice-president and then
went on to discuss what one might consider an agenda for the future: such issues as
membership, a proposed Steuben monument, German schools, German churches,
immigration, Germany’s relationship with the United States, and of course
prohibition.92 Despite its general optimism the speech contained a hint o f concern:
“The question is, how can we best preserve and spread our beloved and valuable
German culture - that we ourselves are so indebted to - throughout this entire
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land?”93 If Hexamer considered the issue legitimate—indeed the original reason for
forming the Alliance—an outside observer not familiar with the organization’s goals
and objectives might have found in the statement an overt expression o f German
cultural nationalism. There is no evidence that Hexamer meant to promote “panGermanism,” but the casual observer, taking the words out of context might have
reached that conclusion. Other Alliance speakers followed the same pattern—all were
optimistic about the future of the organization, but concerned that more needed to be
done.
What was driving this deep concern? For the most part Americans of German
descent were held in high esteem by their fellow citizens in 1905. Germans had a
reputation as being hard working contributors to the growth and development of the
nation. Earlier fears o f a German menace, to a large degree brought on by anarchist
agitation of the 1880’s, had vanished. Nativist attacks focused mostly on immigrants
from eastern and southern Europe and the Far East.
The best prospect for trouble probably had to do with foreign affairs. Despite
the Kaiser’s overt attempts at courting the Roosevelt administration, German foreign
policy decisions had placed a strain on relations between the two nations. During the
Venezuelan dispute of 1903, Roosevelt became convinced that Germany had designs
in the Caribbean. In a letter to Secretary o f State John Hay the President stated that
Germany would always desire the Danish and Dutch possessions in the Caribbean
unless “we take them first.”94 The first Moroccan Crisis of 1905 also made Roosevelt
begin to question the true motives of Germany’s global foreign policy. He began to
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suspect that Germany sought war with France. A German victory would upset the
global balance of power. Roosevelt in fact became involved in the Moroccan
question, not to assist Germany as the Germans had thought but to preserve peace.93
Such incidents, added to the Kaiser’s numerous public statements, began to convince
Roosevelt and other Americans that Germany needed to be watched.
Even so the minutes of the Indianapolis convention made little mention of
foreign affairs—a fact that suggested not ignorance o f world affairs, but that the focus
still was directed towards domestic concerns involving German-Americans. The
Alliance was content to believe that all was well between Germany and the United
States, when in reality the basis for future trouble was beginning to surface under their
noses.
Another explanation for concern about German culture in America had to do
with the German community itself. While Americans of German descent made up the
nation’s largest ethnic group, less than 10% were dues-paying members of the
Alliance. Were German-Americans truly concerned about preserving ways of the
fatherland? By 1905 Americans of German descent were by far the most “assimilated”
of all the non-English ethnic groups.96 Perhaps the threat to German culture was not
external but within the German-American community itself. For this reason the
Alliance placed heavy emphasis on membership drives, and in stirring up enthusiasm
through celebrations of German-Americana at the local, state and national levels.
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The question o f prohibition once again surfaced at the convention in
Indianapolis. Speakers, such as Timm, sharply criticized the temperance movement
for its efforts to force the opinion of the few upon the many:
The reasons for our opposition to prohibitive and repressive
temperance legislation from the standpoint of civil and individual liberty
are so well known that we deem their repetition unnecessary. We
cannot, however, refrain from giving expression to our sorrow and
regret at the renewed, ill-advised efforts of temperance reformers
towards forcing their peculiar views on the people of the country. With
a feeling of shame do we behold the humiliating spectacle of
submissiveness o f politicians and legislators, and the willingness with
which, for political reasons and against their better knowledge and
convictions, they come to aid such would-be reformers by reprehensible
and injurious legislation.97
This scathing attack on both the temperance movement and its supporters in
government would not endear the group to either faction. The harsh tone suggests
that the group felt confident in its strength of purpose, and was now willing meet the
dry forces head on. As it had done before, the NGAA challenged would-be reformers
to strike at the heart of the liquor problem in America, not through legislation but with
education, and passed resolutions to this purpose.98 The nation needed to look to the
family and the example set by parents, as a means of bringing an end to the problems
caused by excessive drink.99 The Alliance’s argument also contained a clear social and
economic component: that the causes of alcohol abuse included poverty, poor living
conditions, and unemployment. By broadening the scope of its argument the NGAA
sought to place itself in step with progressive changes underway at the time and to
classify prohibition—and thus alcohol—as an American, not simply a German issue.
As with progressive reformers, the Alliance acknowledged the social problems brought
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about by rapid industrialization and the need to solve them for the good o f the
country. Unlike the progressives, however, the NGAA did not see the prohibition of
alcohol as a means of bringing about social reform in the United States.
The delegates best expressed their unity and growing confidence on the last
day when they raised their voices in unison regarding the future of the organization.
The Alliance looked back upon accomplishments of its first four years in increasing
membership, promoting German culture and other issues. As 1906 approached,
membership continued to grow as did the potential for more state branches; interest in
the organization seemed stronger than ever. Yet one had to wonder how in touch the
group was with popular sentiment in the nation both inside and outside the German
community, as well as the rapidly changing international scene. During the next nine
years the Alliance would become the single largest German organization outside o f
Germany, willing and able to become even more in domestic and international issues.
Its actions would bring it to national attention and not in all cases in a positive way.
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CHAPTER III

‘HOCH DER DANB! ” 1906-1910

The four year period between 1906 and 1910 was a time o f consolidation for
the National German-American Alliance. After a year-long debate the group received
a national charter from Congress. The NGAA continued to grow and expand and by
the end of 1909 it claimed more than two million members in forty states and the
District of Columbia. During this time the executive committee was enlarged to meet
the demands of the growing organization. While the state and local branches still
acted autonomously, more and more the national officers, through a hierarchy of
committees, came to formulate policy for the national organization as the Alliance
moved into a wide range of issues. These activities included the by-now familiar battle
against the prohibition of alcohol, continued efforts at maintaining German culture in
the United States, as well as attempts to promote close ties between GermanAmericans and the fatherland. The Alliance also made overtures to such other ethnic
organizations as the Catholic Central Verein and the Ancient Order of Hiberians, an
Irish-American organization. By the end of the period the NGAA had positioned itself
to act on a number of issues, although the battle against prohibition would remain its
top priority.
During the convention at Indianapolis in 1905 the executive committee had
discussed the possibility of obtaining a national charter from the United States
104
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Congress. The idea grew out of a belief that a charter would provide a greater sense
of legitimacy in the eyes of the nation and within the German-American community.
Congressional recognition also would affirm that the goals and objectives of the
Alliance were patriotic and motivated by a sense of national pride and loyalty to the
principles laid down in the Constitution. The NGAA would achieve its goal, but only
after a debate that would last more than a year.
The first step occurred on January 10, 1906 when Representative Richard
Bartholdt o f Missouri—a German-American—introduced into the House of
Representatives a bill calling for the incorporation o f the NGAA. One month later
Senator Boies Penrose o f Pennsylvania introduced a similar resolution in the Senate.1
Both bills were referred to the respective Committees on the Judiciary for further
review. On March 28 Representative Henry Palmer of Pennsylvania brought the
report o f the House Judiciary Committee to the floor. The document explained the
purpose of the organization as follows:
That this corporation, composed of the individuals aforesaid and their
associates, under the name and style aforesaid, is formed for the
purposes as follows: The conservation o f the principles of
representative government and the protection and maintenance of all
civil and political rights; the protection o f German immigrants against
imposition and deception and to assist in their naturalization; the study
o f American institutions and the publication of American history; the
cultivation of the German language, literature, and drama and the
perpetuation o f the memory and deeds o f those early German pioneers
whose influence has been of incalculable benefit to the intellectual and
economic development of this country, and whose loyalty in times of
stress and strife is a matter of history.2
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The report proposed incorporation o f the NGAA only as an educational and patriotic
organization. These purposes differed somewhat from the guidelines set forth in the
NGAA’s constitution o f 1901, which had emphasized “Germanness” through its desire
to unite the German element in America, preserve German culture and foster better
relations between the United States and Germany. The Congressional statement
emphasized “Americanness” through the conservation o f representative government
and protection of civil and political rights.3 The preservation o f German culture
became a secondary purpose, while there was no mention of relations between the
United States and Germany.
To understand this shift in emphasis, it is necessary to place the debates over
incorporation within the context of domestic and world events. By 1906 the Alliance
was a national organization already talcing an active part in domestic issues of the day.4
The leadership felt compelled to portray the Alliance as an organization that had only
the best interests of all Americans in mind. The emphasis on conservative government,
protection of political and civil liberties, and patriotism would help to accomplish this
goal and, of course, help move the charter through Congress.
Another factor could have been recent nativism in the land and immigration
legislation, most notably the Immigration Act of 1903, which for the first time since
the Alien & Sedition Acts of 1798 penalized immigrants for voicing their political
opinions.5 While the law targeted anarchists, it gave the federal government the right
to deport any alien - within a three year period after arrival - who publicly condemned
the government or sought its overthrow.6 The Alliance supported government
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attempts to keep out undesirables, but it feared that such acts, which also doubled the
head tax on immigrants to four dollars, would have an adverse affect on desirable
immigrants. The NGAA feared that it would further reduce German immigration to
the United States which had been on a steady decline since the beginning of the
twentieth century. The Alliance wanted immigrants as potential new recruits and for
keeping alive and fresh the linkage with the fatherland.
A strain in relations between the United States and Germany due to the
Venezeulan Affair of 1902 and the growing crisis in Morocco probably influenced the
Alliance leadership to leave out any statement that might infer involvement in foreign
policy. Fostering better relations between the two countries, no small objective of the
group, would have to wait until it secured a charter. Whatever the strategy, it worked,
for the charter passed the House Subcommittee and on March 28, 1906 the
Committee on the Judiciary favorably reported the measure to the House floor for final
approval.
Debate began on April 4 when Bartholdt brought the bill to the floor.
Representative William Hepburn of Iowa voiced the strongest objections.7 Opposed
to the precedent of incorporating a national organization based on nationality, he
argued that the rights of immigrants were not being violated, and even if they were
such matters fell within the jurisdiction of Congress and the courts. His greatest
objection was that the Alliance was in reality a political group acting under the guise of
a social organization.8 Hepburn surely had in mind the Alliance’s recent lobbying
efforts against his own Hepbum-Dolliver bill. While he might be using the opportunity

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108

to “get-back” at the NGAA, his observations did have some justification. Although
the Alliance had carefully avoided identification with a party, its involvement at the
hearings did constitute pursuing a special interest on a political issue. Charles
Grosvenor o f Ohio then brought up the “hyphen” question. While he praised
Americans of German descent for their contributions to the United States, he objected
to a hyphenated American in any form on grounds that it constituted a qualification to
an individual's Americanism.
The leading spokesman for the Alliance and the charter, Bartholdt, replied that
the NGAA was an American organization open only to individuals possessing United
States citizenship, a major goal of which was to assist German immigrants in becoming
Americans by helping them understand the laws and institutions of the nation. He
insisted that the term German-American had no political connotations but referred to
an ethnological designation. Noting that another immigration bill had required
applicants for naturalization to read and write in English, he argued that German
immigrants could learn English only from individuals who could speak the language.
Thus one of the main goals of the Alliance was to turn Germans into Americans.9 The
debate ended with Hepburn still objecting to the measure and commenting that the
House had more pressing matters to attend to.
The House tabled the question o f incorporation until December 5, 1906 when
it renewed debate on the issue. As in the previous session, opposition continued to
focus on chartering an ethnic organization, and the need for such a charter in general.
Hepburn, joined by James Mann of Illinois, asked if the Alliance participated in any
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activities that required incorporation. They also asked that the word “German” be
removed from the name on grounds that it was not needed if the NGAA was a
patriotic organization.

Bartholdt replied that incorporation under the laws of the

District o f Columbia would give the group prestige and the opportunity to set up a
headquarters and conduct business in the District.10 As to the group’s title, he
explained that the organization had requested that name and he had no authority to
alter it.
The debate then shifted to the question of patriotism. Mann asked if the group
existed for purely patriotic reasons. Representative William Stafford of Wisconsin
replied that both the national organization and its branches in Wisconsin were patriotic
in nature and that the uplifting o f American citizenship was one o f their main goals.11
Listing the contributions of German-Americans to the nation’s development, he argued
that preserving the memory of this activity represented a preservation of United States
history. Stafford concluded by stating that there existed in America no ethnic group
more loyal than the German-Americans. The speech ended the debate and the
resolution passed.
In the Senate the bill provoked little debate. Philander Knox of Pennsylvania
brought the measure to the floor on February 18, 1907 and the only objections—from
Eugene Hale o f Maine and Porter McCumber of North Dakota - had nothing to do
with content, but were based on other more pressing business in the Senate. The
motion to incorporate the NGAA passed on that same day.

17
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The bill became law on February 21, 1907. The final act of incorporation
contained the group’s rights and obligations. The Alliance had the right to amend its
Constitution at any time. It could hold meetings anywhere in the United States. The
NGAA must not take part in any activities that were not of a purely patriotic and
educational nature. Finally, Congress had the authority to revoke the group’s charter
at any time if it found that the Alliance had gone beyond the scope of its activities as
outlined in the charter.13
With the granting of a national charter the Alliance had achieved national
recognition, one of its main goals. It made possible a headquarters in the District of
Columbia that would facilitate the group’s lobbying efforts. Yet the debate and the
charter itself suggested the potential for trouble in the future. Supporters in Congress
came from states with high concentrations of German-Americans and active Alliance
chapters, most notably Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Ironically the sharpest
critics also came from states with large German-American populations such as Illinois,
Iowa, and Ohio; of course, they could have represented areas that had low
concentrations of German-Americans. These critics suggested that the Alliance was
merely a political organization masking itself in the guise of culture and ethnicity.
Such charges, of course, were not based upon fact since the Alliance had focused
almost exclusively on cultural issues prior to 1907—the only exception being efforts
against the Hepbum-Dolliver bill. Despite Congressional critics, the debate over
incorporation gained little attention outside Washington. Neither the English or
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German language press gave much attention to the matter, suggesting that it seemed
to be of no consequence for national issues.
Objections to the charter did, however, reflect continuing nativist sentiment in
the nation. German-Americans in the early twentieth century usually were not direct
targets of these views. But the voice of nativism called also for one-hundred percent
Americanism, at least in some quarters. Any organization based upon ethnicity with a
hyphen suggested something less and thus invited suspicion. Thus in gaining national
recognition the Alliance would also find itself quickly under the national microscope.
The fact is the charter contained clauses restricting activities to certain areas as well as
giving Congress the right to revoke the charter at any time are evidence of this.
During the years 1907-1914 the Alliance participated in many activities technically
beyond those outlined in the charter, with little, if any, objection. The onset of war in
1914 and the difficult years that followed would place the Alliance in a different, albeit
difficult, situation.
Efforts for a national charter notwithstanding, the Alliance focused its main
efforts in 1906 on the fight against the prohibition of alcohol. During the
Congressional hearings that year, and in subsequent years on the prohibition question,
the Alliance was the most prominent voice of objection from within the GermanAmerican community. It was not alone in articulating its disapproval of any legislation
that regulated the manufacture, sale and consumption of alcohol. On various
occasions representatives from the brewing and liquor interests, bottle manufacturers,
and private citizens would testify. On the other side at these hearings, representatives
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from the Anti-Saloon League, Women’s Christian Temperance Union, various church
groups, and private citizens spoke o f the need to pass prohibition legislation. Both
sides represented a cross-section o f upper-to-middle class America. Their arguments,
both for and against, demonstrated the complex nature o f the debate as they raised the
moral, social, cultural, economic, and constitutional issues involved—with each side
steadfastly believing that it was right.
From February to March 1906 Alliance members from the national executive
council and eight state organizations testified before the House Judiciary Committee
against the Hepbum-Dolliver Bill.14 Hexamer, who spoke first, restated early
arguments that such a bill would be a blow to individual liberties and likely would
promote intemperance, encourage organized crime and political corruption in the
nation’s cities.15 Hexamer concluded with a veiled threat, his organization possessed
1.5 million members, each of which was opposed to this measure and was willing to:
stand together as one man, and do everything in their power to crush
every Congressman and to prevent his return who will vote for this bill.
I do not say this as a threat. I say it because I, as an American citizen,
American bom, deeply deplore it. But I think it would be an
exceedingly unwise measure for even this committee to allow this
measure to get before Congress.16
Hexamer’s assurances to the contrary. Congressmen present easily could have
interpreted this passage as a threat. It could help explain objections raised later in
Congress to granting the NGAA a national charter.
Each witness from the NGAA echoed its president—that passage of the
Hepbum-Dolliver would curtail individual freedom and set a precedent for further
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government intervention in the liberties of its citizens. Some members added other
points. Edward Tamsen of New York viewed prohibition of alcohol as a matter best
left up to the individual states, and that federal government should not involve itself in
such matters. George Richter of Missouri testified that government could not legislate
the moral behavior of its citizens. Alcohol played a part in the daily lives o f a large
segment of the population and the government’s fiat that it was illegal would not cause
people to suddenly refrain from its consumption. He added that the Alliance acted
strictly out of patriotism and good sense, in no way influenced by brewers and liquor
distillers.17 Richter’s wife, Femande, also testified. Instead of helping the family, she
said, prohibition would help break it down. Adults would find themselves visiting
clubs rather than drinking at home. Children would come to view alcohol as a
forbidden fruit they would want to obtain. She agreed that consumption o f alcohol in
excess was a vice and danger to the family, but to completely outlaw it would not
solve the problem, for in the end “the public good and morality largely rests in the
hands of the citizens themselves.” 18 After other testimony Hexamer asked that the
committee meet again in one month to hear from other Alliance branches further
west.
On reconvening in March the committee heard more Alliance members repeat
the arguments put forth earlier. Reverend Carl August Voss of Pennsylvania, a nondrinker, reminded the committee of the principles for which the founders o f the United
States had fought. Wherever prohibition had been tried, he said, the result had been
increased crime and violence.19 William Vocke o f Illinois, who reiterated that private
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liquor interests had no influence on the Alliance, called upon the committee to
consider the economic hardships such a bill would cause for many average citizens
who made their living in the brewing and liquor industry, as well as farmers who
supplied the raw materials.20 At the conclusion of the session Timm submitted letters
from western branches of the NGAA protesting the Hepbum-Dolliver Bills.
During the next few years the Alliance continued to speak against any
legislation calling for prohibition. Early in 1907 Phoebe Couzins, representing the
District of Columbia branch, testified against such a measure in the District. Couzins
explained that she had been an advocate of prohibition until she moved to Kansas and
had a chance to see the policy in action. The experience left her convinced that any
attempt to regulate the manufacture and sale of alcohol in the states and large cities
was impracticable, that instead o f preventing consumption of alcohol, prohibition
encouraged it, while giving rise to seedy “speakeasies” and bootlegging operations by
organized crime.21 Besides, she concluded, German-Americans were a loyal and law
abiding component of the American population and they “ . . demand their beer, and
they demand their beer on Sunday. They feel they have a right to it.”22
Participation of the NGAA in 1906 and February 1907 in the debate over
prohibition was significant for many reasons. It demonstrated the growing strength of
the Alliance on the national scene after only four years of existence. Claiming
membership of over 1.5 million it viewed itself as a force to be reckoned with. The
fact that the Committee on the Judiciary allowed members to appear in a private
hearing is evidence of that power. The statements of Alliance members established
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unanimity in their condemnation of prohibition, indicating that the group was highly
organized at the national and state levels. Testimony by many members suggested that
at least in 1906 the NGAA reached its opposition independently, without support or
pressure from the brewing and liquor interests. Instead cultural behavior motivated
these individuals—the German Sunday beer garden and simply the traditional
attachment to beer—as well as the deep-seeded belief that laws prohibiting alcohol
would lead to greater social problems and set a precedent for further inroads by
government into private lives. The experience o f the Alliance in lobbying Congress
helped to bring it into contact with the various brewing and liquor interests since
Robert Crain, general counsel for the United States Brewing Association was present
(and testified) at the 1906 hearings.23 The Alliance, realizing that its struggle against
prohibition could be a long one, would benefit from any assistance in its lobbying
efforts, while the brewers could gain from the efforts of a well-organized coalition.
The fact that women testified on behalf of the Alliance demonstrated that they had
some influence in the organization. Finally, the experience might have attracted the
attention of some members of Congress already suspicious of the Alliance’s claim to
be solely a “patriotic and educational organization.” To them the open and vigorous
lobbying for beer and the beer garden sounded more German than American.
The seventh convention of the Zentral-Bundes of Pennsylvania in Pittsburgh on
June 23 and 24, 1906 gave surprisingly little attention to the fight against prohibition.
Instead, discussion concentrated on continuing the cultural exchanges between
Germany and the United States and the need to continue work in preservation of
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German culture in America. Hexamer in his opening speech cited the German
historian Karl Lamprecht to show that to understand the history o f a people one must
understand the culture of that people.24 He thanked those individuals who had worked
tirelessly in promoting German theater, music, and the efforts of the German Historical
Society in preserving the memory of past contributions of German-Americans.25 The
various committees also focused on the work in preserving German culture. Even the
Committee on Personal Freedom made no mention o f the prohibition question.
Secretary Henry Arnold only went so far as to say that the committee endorsed the
continued work of the NGAA in this area.26
One must wonder the reason for this attitude at a time when the national
organization was preoccupied with prohibition. The officers of the Zentral-Bundes
also served on the executive council o f the NGAA and, as with the national
organization they controlled the agenda of the state chapter. The Alliance relied on
state branches to implement the decisions of the national executive council. One can
only hypothesize that while prohibition was a major concern, the organization viewed
it as a part o f the larger goal of preserving German culture in America, and thus more
a national than a state concern.
The emphasis on culture dominated the efforts o f the NGAA throughout 1906.
In a German Day speech Hexamer extolled the contributions o f Germans during the
colonial and revolutionary eras, ranging from the establishment of the first paper mill
in the colonies by Wilhelm Ritttenhaus in 1690 to von Steuben’s training of the
Continental Army.27 One gains a sense of urgency from Hexamer’s words, a fear that
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the German contribution was in danger of being forgotten. By the end of 1906 the
NGAA had decided to take a much more aggressive stance on the national level. How
was this position received? The debates in Congress over the national charter might
give one indication. But the English language press, for the most part ignored the
organization, mentioning it only during a national convention. The New York Times
did not discuss the Alliance until it met in New York for its 1907 convention.
What did membership and organizational operations suggest about the Alliance
at this time? The group claimed to have 1.5 million dues paying members, seemingly a
strong base of support. Yet these numbers were very unreliable, and the exact number
of members was never known—with numbers ranging from 1.5 to 2.5 million by the
start of the First World War. The reason for this wide discrepancy has to do with the
organization’s structure. At the state and local levels the Alliance drew their
membership from various German-American organizations such as Turnverein and
Gesangverein. For membership purposes the NGAA counted every member of every
organization. Many individuals belonged to more than one local German-American
organization, thus they would be counted two or more times.28 Another factor
difficult to determine is how many actively participated in the organization. Ninetyfive delegates attended the 1905 convention in Indianapolis. For an organization
claiming to have over one million members at the time this number suggests that only a
hard-core few took an active part. The Alliance was an organization in which a small
group of individuals determined policy. There was little contact between national
officers and the membership at state and local levels.29 Contact with the local level
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was generally left to the officers of the state branches who communicated with the
executive council of the national organization—which, after 1909 included the
president o f each state chapter. Only at the national conventions did the elected
delegates intermingle with Alliance leaders to any meaningful degree. How large a
voice did the membership have? An examination of the convention minutes reveals
that the elected delegates voiced the concerns o f the state chapters, as well as voted
for national officers—in essence then the bi-annual conventions of the Alliance were
modeled after those of the Democrat and Republican parties.
The German-American press generally treated the Alliance favorably. The
Illinois Staats Zeitung, Cincinnati Freie Presse, St. Louis Westliche Post,
Philadelphia Tagblatt, Milwaukee Herold, and the New Yorker Staats Zeitung
covered the activities of the national organization and gave special attention when the
group was in town for a local or national meeting.30 The Westliche Post, for example,
lauded the local branch’s efforts to combat prohibition:
The State Alliance of Missouri and Southern Illinois has through its
resolutions given notice that the Germans o f the state are not willing to
let a single particle of their personal freedom be stolen away, and that
they will make every effort to win back at the very next opportunity
what has been lost.31
The NGAA also received favorable reviews from journalists in German-American
magazines. Don Mannhardt in Die Glocke offered praise for the efforts to preserve
German culture in America.32
The largest critic within the German-American community was its rival, the
Catholic Central Verein. In 1904 Hexamer had begun a custom of sending greetings
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to the Verein during its annual conventions.33 The Verein treated these messages with
caution. It welcomed attempts to preserve German language and culture, but it did
not support the Alliance’s involvement in such issues as prohibition and fostering
better relations with Germany since the Verein considered these political issues and did
not engage in political activity to any large degree. The Verein also wanted the
NGAA to respect, if not endorse, its religious activities, which included promoting the
Catholic faith in America, parochial over public education, and combating the antiCatholic tendencies of nativism. Largely a secular organization, more Protestant than
Catholic—to the extent there was any religious attitude at all—the Alliance did not
condemn the religious identification o f the Catholic organization, but it did nothing to
support the goal of promoting the Catholic faith in America.34 At its 1907 convention
the Central Verein rejected a motion to directly affiliate itself with the NGAA,
although it did create a committee to look into cooperation on specific projects of
mutual concern. The committee did not even bother to make a recommendation to the
leadership of the Verein.35
While the Verein disagreed with the Alliance over the liquor question, its
position on the issue was not well defined. The Verein considered alcoholism as “a
very grave danger to the welfare of our people,” and sought to use “those means for
combating this evil which our holy religion provides.”36 Despite this concern the
organization never publicly called for the complete prohibition o f alcohol, nor did it
oppose it—remaining content to help those of its members with alcohol problems
through education and counseling in the church. While many in the organization were
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against prohibition, they did not share the view of the NGAA that it was a threat to
German culture or a curtailment o f civil liberties. Consequently, even those in the
organization who may have sympathized with the Alliance on the liquor issue found it
hard to accept the line of attack adopted by the NGAA.
The Verein also had little interest in Germany prior to 1914. This position had
to do, in large part, with Bismarck’s Kulturkampf in the 1870’s. Fear that Bismarck
sought to undermine the Catholic faith induced large numbers of German Catholics to
immigrate to the United States. This persecution left a bitter taste in the mouths of
many, the result being that they paid little attention to Germany’s role in international
events and did not seem to care if Germany and the United States became friends.
Only on issues involving the Catholic Center Party did German Catholics in America
pay any attention to political developments in Germany.37
The differences between the two groups made cooperation impossible. The
separation broadened more after 1907 when some pro-Catholic German-American
newspapers and journals began to openly criticize the NGAA’s efforts to prevent
prohibition. The Herold des Glaubens referred to the Alliance as “a hold-over from
the liberal German-American movements of the nineteenth century.” The CentralBlatt, the Verein’s official magazine, in 1908 criticized the NGAA for attempting to
identify anti-prohibition with German culture stating that “the two were not necessarily
connected.”38
Such comments produced little response from Alliance leaders who still desired
some degree of cooperation. In 1909 Hexamer invited the Central Verein to send a
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delegation to the NGAA convention in Cincinnati to work on issues of common
concern. This overture, coupled with the decision by the Central Verein in New York
to enter into cooperation with the New York branch of the Alliance, caused leadership
of the Verein in 1909 to call for a resolution to clarify the relationship between the two
organizations.39 The major obstacle to unity, as stated in the resolution, was a
different Weltanschauung (world view). The Central-Verein view was ChristianCatholic based, while that of the Alliance was humanistic and void o f religious
affiliation. Even in areas of mutual concern, such as preservation o f the German
language, the two groups had little common ground. The Verein sought to promote
the language through the parochial school, while the Alliance was a staunch supporter
F
I1
t

of public education and the public school system. In the end the Verein decided to
leave the issue o f cooperation up to local groups, after they had first received the

i:

r

permission of state executive committees.40
The desire for some degree of cooperation was not without its supporters in
the Central Verein. Joseph Frey, president of the New York chapter, called for the
two organizations to focus on similarities rather than differences and work together for
the good of all German-Americans.41 Such words fell on deaf ears. The hard-line
stance of the executive committee of the Catholic Central Verein, coupled with the
actions of local NGAA chapters made any hope of cooperation between the two
groups impossible. Even Frey’s ascension to the presidency of the Central Verein in
1911 could not overturn the policy. Only with the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914
did the Verein and the Alliance begin to cooperate at any meaningful level. Until thac
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time the relationship between the two largest German-American organizations
remained distant with little significant interaction at the national level.42
Hexamer, speaking on behalf of the Alliance’s executive committee, denied
that the organization was anti-religious. He argued that the NGAA, as an ethnic
organization, welcomed the participation of all German-Americans43 He wanted a
broad base of support for the campaign against prohibition and the program to
preserve German culture in the United States. Hexamer was also correct in denying
accusations that the Alliance was anti-religious. While certain incidents had occurred
at the local level, the executive committee of the NGAA never condemned the
religious orientation of the Central Verein. The Alliance’s constitution only prevented
it from entertaining matters of religion; it did not reject religion or groups of a
religious nature.44 In the end however it would be the religious question, and to a
lesser extent other issues, that kept the two largest German-American organizations
from cooperating prior to the war.
Another organization that attracted the interest of the Alliance in 1907 was the
Ancient Order of Hiberians (hereafter referred to as Hiberians or AOH), the largest
Irish organization in the United States. Hexamer had proposed a meeting of the two
groups to Matthew Cummings, AOH president in October 1906. Hexamer had voiced
concern over an immigration bill in Congress and a possible alliance between the
United States and Great Britain.45 In a meeting in January, 1907, Hexamer,
Cummings and other representatives of the two groups pledged themselves to the
following resolutions:
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Resolved. That the joint conference committee of the Ancient Order of
Hiberians in America, and of the National German-American Alliance
unanimously declare an alliance between the people of both
organizations for the good of this Republic, on the following basis:
1. Any measure of mutual interest passed by the executive committee
or by a national convention of either organization shall be
transmitted by its national officers to the national officers of the
allied associations for approval and action.
2. To oppose an alliance of any kind, secret or otherwise, with any
foreign power on the part of the Government of the United States.
3. To oppose the enactment, by the Congress of the United States or
the legislatures of the various States, of any sumptuary or any other
law or laws abridging the personal liberties of citizens.
4. To oppose any and every restriction of immigration o f healthy
persons from Europe, exclusive of convicted criminals, anarchists,
and those of immoral character.
5. To recommend a systematic investigation of the share all races have
had in the development of our country, in war and in peace, from
the earliest days, as the basis for the founding and continuance of
unprejudiced and unbiased American history.
6. This agreement to be effective immediately upon the ratification of
the same by the executive boards of both organizations, and to
continue in force until abrogated by a majority vote of a national
convention of either organization.46
The alliance between the two groups thus focused on a wide variety of
diplomatic, political, and cultural issues. The second resolution obviously was aimed
primarily at Great Britain, the most likely ally o f the United States. Both the AOH and
NGAA viewed England as a common enemy. For the former it was for long-standing
historical reasons, especially British subjugation of Ireland and the Irish people - a
hotly contested issue at the time. For the latter it came from the belief that England
would attempt to utilize America as a counter-weight to Germany in the event of
war.47 Item three was an indirect reference to the prohibition of alcohol which both
groups opposed. Number five had to do with preserving the memory of not only the
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German and Irish contributions, but all races, to the development of the United States.
In tune with linguistic usage of the time, the reference to race most likely meant
European ethnic groups, not African-Americans, Native Americans, and Asians. The
Alliance of course opposed immigrant restriction as it applied to Europeans. It
remained silent on restriction of immigration from Asia. It is highly doubtful that the
Alliance, and Hiberians, desired to see the contributions of all races (as opposed to
ethnic groups) included in American history textbooks. The resolutions were passed
by both organizations at their national conventions of 1907 and 1908.48
It is difficult to assess the extent of cooperation between organizations from
the nation’s two largest ethnic groups prior to World War One. The Hiberians were
not present when Alliance leaders testified before Congress between 1908 and 1914
about prohibition and immigration restriction. Mention of either group rarely
appeared in the other’s convention minutes. At the Hiberian convention of 1912
President James Regan did mention in passing that the organizations had maintained
friendly relations and that Hexamer had invited him on many occasions to assist in
German Day celebrations.49 One can only surmise that the two groups went about
their business independent o f each other, while maintaining channels o f
communication.
On eve of the NGAA’s fourth convention in 1907 the leadership could look
back on the past two years with a high degree of satisfaction. They had received a
national charter, testified at Congressional hearings on prohibition, and allied
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themselves with the AOH. The only failure had been the inability to come to an
agreement with the Central Verein.
The convention of 1907 in New York City in October brought together
delegates representing state chapters and affiliated groups in forty states and the
District o f Columbia. In his opening address Hexamer spoke on familiar issues:
continued growth of the NGAA, the teaching of the German language in public
schools, expanding interest in German theater, music and literature and relations with
Germany, and the collection of funds for a monument to Francis Daniel Pastorious,
founder of Germantown, Pennsylvania.50 The remarks differed little from past
conventions with the exception of reference to a letter from publisher William
Randolph Hearst. Hearst, an ardent Anglophobe, advocated the creation of an
international society of Germans and Americans for the purpose of fostering better
relations between the two countries. He suggested exchange programs between
universities in both nations and other forms of cooperation. He congratulated the
Alliance for its efforts in this area and stated that the organization could be a catalyst
in a stronger relationship between Americans and Germans. He also offered to pay the
expenses of ten delegates to the convention o f 1909. The delegates received Hearst’s
remarks with satisfaction and applause. They accepted the offer to pay the expenses
of ten delegates.51
Other speakers discussed relations between the United States and Germany.
Joseph Keller of Indiana, Dr. Julius Goebel o f Harvard University, and Professor Leo
Stem all stressed the involvement of Germans in the growth of the United States and
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the need to work towards strengthening ties between Germany and America.52 The
German ambassador, Baron Speck von Sternberg, sent a telegram expressing his good
wishes for continued success o f the Alliance. Kaiser Wilhelm even sent a message
personally thanking Hexamer and the NGAA for helping to establish the German
Museum at Harvard University.53
The Alliance voted to endorse immigration laws that targeted (by forbidding
entry of) undesirables such as anarchists, convicted felons, and individuals possessing
an immoral character, in essence a restatement of the principles in the organization’s
constitution. Specifically, the NGAA supported the Immigration Bill of 1907, a law
that gave the federal government the right to deny entry to anarchists and deport
people who displayed anarchist tendencies within three years of arrival.
Another matter of importance was the state o f German-American studies. The
Committee on Historical Research, led by Dr. Albert Kem, recommended that each
delegate help create historical societies at the state, county and city levels to research
the influence of German-Americans. The committee proposed that the NGAA fund
the publication of a history that examined the role o f Germans, as compared to other
ethnic groups, in the development of America. The Alliance should then work to place
the book in the public schools as a supplement in American history classes. The final
recommendation called for Richard E. Helbig of the New York Public Library to serve
as a collector o f Alliance-related materials.54
The recommendations passed unanimously. The call for a multiethnic history
of the United States coincided with the agreement with the Hiberians in January, and
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of course enhanced a long-standing goal of the Alliance. Finally, the convention again
turned to the effect that waning German immigration would have on maintaining
German culture in America, but the delegates could see that there was not much they
could do about the problem. They could work to head off restriction on a mere
quantitative basis on the American side, but over the reasons Germans were declining
to leave—attitude of the German government, a strong German economy and growing
nationalism—they had no control.
As a part of a report of the Committee on Personal Liberty, the delegates
received the following resolution:
Our position toward the movement for prohibitive and improperly
restricted legislation, and our standpoint o f opposition to every
infringement o f the personal liberty of the citizens of this Republic and
all attempts to enforce not universally recognized moral maxims by the
force o f law, are so well known that repetition is perfectly
needless... We recommend to ail state and local organizations to cause
the German-American citizens of their respective States and
communities to oppose legislation violating the principle o f personal
liberty, in a proper manner and in accordance with local conditions, on
the field of party politics.55
This resolution stemmed from an appeal by the Governor of Indiana to the Methodist
Conference to help bring about passage of temperance legislation and to protest VicePresident Charles W. Fairbanks’ (himself a Hoosier) serving liquor during a dinner for
President Theodore Roosevelt.56 The Alliance passed the resolution, roundly
condemned the actions as a violation of separation of church and state, and warned
that the state can never “form any kind of an alliance with the Church without
endangering civil liberty.”57 In doing so the Alliance departed from a past policy of
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phrasing positions on social issues in constitutional and ideological terms. The fact
that it had condemned both an elected high official and major established Church
demonstrated the extent to which it would go to prevent passage of a prohibition
amendment.
In fact, the Alliance had reason for concern. The temperance forces had
picked up strength in the preceding years. Fueled by the progressives seeking to cure
the nation’s social ills, and various other objectives, prohibition became the rallying cry
for a wide range of groups in the United States. American Protestantism by this time
was firmly committed to temperance.58 Besides the traditional argument based upon
moral reform, religious leaders in America looked upon alcohol in a manner similar to
many progressives - that it was the source o f many social ills, primarily domestic
violence and the breakdown of family life.59
The Anti-Saloon League and Women’s Christian Temperance Union had
joined forces in an effort to bring about the prohibition of liquor. Ending the social ills
o f society was the prime motivating factor for these groups. Like the NGAA, these
organizations understood that the issue had become a part of politics and so they
worked within the political realm to achieve their goals. They also utilized tactics
similar to the Alliance by creating lists o f candidates for public office based upon their
position on the issue. They then distributed the information to voters in hopes that
they would vote for dry candidates.60 From 1907 to 1908 the League and the WCTU
battled with the Ohio Alliance over local option laws which gave towns and cities the
right to decide the issue for themselves.61 The contest produced no clear cut winner as
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both sides claimed victories and suffered defeats. The activities of the Ohio Alliance,
coupled with similar actions by chapters in Iowa and Nebraska, gained the ire of dry
organizations, but also attracted the attention of local brewers, which indeed did have
a vested interest in the outcome.
The Alliance also found an adversary in modem science that increasingly
pointed to alcohol as the root of many diseases. By the end o f the nineteenth century
researchers had determined that alcohol, at one time thought to be a stimulant, was in
actuality a depressant that paralyzed the nerves controlling the flow of blood through
the body.62 Excessive use o f alcohol not only damaged the liver, but also was
suspected to cause heart disease. One study, done in early 1908 at Long Island
asylum, even linked alcoholism to insanity.
By 1907 the NGAA found itself in a battle that in many ways it was not
prepared to fight. Its traditional argument against prohibition as an attack on personal
liberties and German culture needed modification to counter an opposition argument
increasingly grounded in moral, social, economic, and scientific factors. The NGAA
needed to find allies, both philosophically and financially, in order to combat such
organizations as the Anti-Saloon League and the WCTU and their attempt to elect
candidates favoring prohibition.
The delegates concluded their business by choosing officers; not surprisingly
they reelected Hexamer and Timm. To adjust for the organization’s growth three new
members joined the executive committee, bringing the total to twelve directors along
with six officers. The Alliance voted to hold the 1909 meeting in Cincinnati. Actions
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taken at the New York gathering demonstrated that the organization continued to be a
centralized group that allowed for autonomous action on the part of the state
branches. The executive committee under the direction of Hexamer controlled the
agenda and protocol. Twenty-two subcommittees, each concerned with a specific
issue, existed under the executive council. These committees, in consultation with the
national officers, decided policy, strategy, and the issues of concern over the next two
years. The job of the state and local branches was to carry out the decisions of the
national committees in their respective communities—though they were still free to
propose legislation to the national leadership, and they were free to pursue a localized
agenda on their own.63
The convention of 1907 had made strikingly clear how much the organization
had grown, its interests expanded, in recent years. It was not a single-issue group, but
an organization involved in many projects, ostensibly concerned with German culture,
many of which affected broader segments of the population in controversial ways.
The expansion of activities brought the Alliance into contact with individuals and
organizations that viewed the NGAA’s actions as threatening. With each passing year
it seemed that the list of enemies, or potential enemies, grew longer.
Nonetheless, first things came first, and so the year 1908 saw the Alliance
refocus its efforts on the fight against the movement against alcoholic beverages.
Between January and February nine Alliance members, including Hexamer, other
members of the executive committee, and leaders the state branches, testified on
various prohibition bills under review of the Senate Judiciary Committee.64 Hexamer
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presented resolutions adopted by the national executive committee and endorsed by
the various state committees that viewed any attempt at prohibition to be a violation of
any “sane” person’s personal liberty granted by the Constitution. They called upon the
Congress to not adopt any prohibition legislation, and committed the Alliance to do all
in its power to prevent such action.65
The Alliance agreed that abuse of alcohol was a problem, but did not agree
that prohibition was the way to stop that abuse. The solution could come only
through education. Hexamer again warned about letting the voices of a few affect the
lives of the many and reminded the body of what happened at Salem, Massachusetts in
the late seventeenth century when a community fell prey to accusations of a small
group of attention-seeking individuals wishing to promote a private agenda.66
Following Hexamer, Ernest Stahl, third vice-president o f the NGAA, told the
committee of his experiences in Germany prior to unification, how the various
kingdoms and principalities with their own laws made it difficult for Germans to move
from place to place, how at each border they were searched for items that might be
illegal in a different land. Passage of a measure, such as the Hepbum-Dolliver Bill,
that allowed states to prevent the importation of a legal product would place the
United States in the same “ridiculous condition which existed in the old country years
ago in feudal times.”67 Curiously, the group was against giving the states power to
restrict interstate commerce in liquor, but supported letting the states decide—through
local option laws—whether or not alcohol could be legally consumed. This argument
suggests that the NGAA felt more confident in defeating local prohibition ordinances
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as opposed to a national law. Such a conclusion supports the fact that, other than
testimony at Congressional hearings, the bulk o f the Alliance’s efforts in this area
occurred at state and local levels.
The most forceful arguments of other Alliance members came from P. A.
Wildermuth, who reminded the committee that only the federal government had the
right to regulate interstate commerce and that it did not possess the right to transfer
that power to the states.68 If the states received such power they could confiscate
liquor at the border, thus breaking a legally-binding contract between individuals from
two states. In so doing Congress will have annulled or regulated private contracts
beyond the scope o f the Constitution.69 Wildermuth’s complicated and technical
argument suggested that the Alliance would use any part of the Constitution or any
other device to attack what it clearly had identified as a dangerous beast.
While many members of the Alliance lobbied the Senate, others worked against
similar measures in the House. In February, 1908 representatives from the NGAA
testified at a House hearing on the Littlefield Bill, which would allow states to
confiscate alcoholic beverages coming from other states. Wildermuth and Theodore
Sutro, chief legal counsel for the New York branch sharply criticized the bill as
unconstitutional and an infringement on personal liberties. Both men repeated what
had been stated before the Senate—that in passing such a measure, Congress would
assume powers not granted by the Constitution. Wildermuth, in a statement that was
more emotional than technical, warned about paid lobbyists of special interest groups
who descended on Washington with each new session of Congress bringing new bills
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to prohibit the manufacture, sale and consumption of alcohol. First it had been the
Hepbum-Dolliver Bill of 1904, now it was the Littlefield Bill. He pleaded that
Congress not heed the false doctrine of “misguided religious enthusiasts and make this
obnoxious measure a law.”70 As if to anticipate future criticism Sutro insisted that the
position o f the NGAA did not represent influence of the brewing or liquor interests.71
He then proceeded to relate the story of a recent visit to Germany, France and
England. On Sundays in Germany and France, where the sale of alcohol was allowed,
Sutro saw no examples of public drunkenness, but on Sundays in London, where the
sale of alcohol was prohibited, he saw more drunken men on the streets than he ever
had in New York City. He was against public drunkenness, said Sutro, but regulation
of such behavior should be left up to state and local government as long as they could
not seize or absolutely halt distribution of liquor. By passing any law prohibiting the
sale and consumption of alcohol, Congress would only be contributing to their
growth.72
Two months later Phoebe Couzins appeared before a House Committee to
testify again against a measure to ban the manufacture and sale of alcohol in the
District o f Columbia. Couzins condemned the hypocrisy of religious groups that
sought the prohibition of alcohol while simultaneously doing little to find solutions to
the major causes of alcohol abuse. The answer, she said, was for these groups and
Congress to work towards ending poverty—the despair of the ill-fed, ill-housed, and
ill-paid. Couzins reported that she had taken a tour of the nation and found scenes of
men out o f work and driven to despair who sought their only solace in a saloon,
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leaving their families to survive by any means possible. Young boys turned to crime,
young girls and even wives turned to prostitution.73 The way to end problems
associated with drink was for government to put an end to poverty and deprivation,
the reason most people turned to alcohol in the first place.
The NGAA’s fight was not confined to lobbying Washington. All over the
country local Alliance chapters engaged in attempts to repeal or prevent the passage of
“Blue Laws.” The origins of these laws dated back to the New Haven colony which in
1665 established the first restrictions on Sunday drinking in British North America.
New Haven posted the ordinances on blue paper.74 Sunday, o f course, was to be
devoted to the Lord and not human vices. By the end of the nineteenth century the
degree to which states enforced such laws varied. Some states, such as California, had
few laws. Other states, such as Georgia enforced a complete ban on the sale and
consumption of alcohol.75
These regulations struck directly at one of German-America’s favorite social
outlets—the Sunday “Beer Garden.” Local chapters of the Alliance took it upon
themselves to bring about repeal o f these laws. Delegates at the state convention of
the New York chapter condemned attempts by the state or federal government to
interfere in the personal liberties o f its citizens and authorized the legislative committee
to begin work to repeal the state’s blue laws.76
By the end of 1908 the Alliance had succeeded in organizing a campaign
against prohibition at the local, state and national levels. In Philadelphia, the Reverend
Georg von Bosse applauded the efforts of the state Alliance in continuing the work of
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such past German-Americans as Carl Schurz in the fight to preserve the personal
liberties o f all Americans.77 In a German Day speech on October 6 in Chicago,
Hexamer congratulated the Chicago branch and the entire NGAA for their continued
efforts against any legislation that restricted the rights o f law-abiding American
citizens. The fight against prohibition was not the concern of only German-Americans,
he said, but o f Americans in general.78
By the end of 1908—if not sooner—the NGAA had attracted the attention of
the brewing industry and its primary organization, the United States Brewing
Association (hereafter referred to as the USBA). The organization had been founded
on August 21, 1862 in New York City by local brewers concerned over a law that
placed a tax of one dollar on all barrels of beer sold, as well as creating—for the first
time—a license fee for individual brewers.79 From the outset the organization
lobbied extensively against any efforts on any level o f government to tax or restrict the
manufacture, sale and consumption o f alcohol. German brewers of lager beer had
founded the organization and German-Americans continued to dominate in the
twentieth century. Given these two factors one can see why an alliance between the
USBA and NGAA would be natural. Why it did not occur earlier probably was due to
the USBA’s waiting to see if the Alliance would become a force of any consequence.
During the first few years of its existence, the Alliance had spread its efforts among
several issues, although the prohibition question always remained near the forefront.
Efforts o f Alliance state chapters to elect candidates who were against
prohibition impressed USBA affiliates in Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Beginning in
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late 1908 local chapters began to receive subsidies from regional brewers—at this time
the USBA did not contribute directly to the national Alliance—to assist in petition
drives and help “get out the vote” on election days.80 In early 1909, for example, the
St. Louis branch received a portion of $300,000 set aside by the Anheuser-Busch
Brewery for promoting a pro-beer educational campaign.81 There was as yet no
evidence o f a direct link between the USBA and the NGAA at the national level. The
association had developed by 1911, but did not become public until the Senate
conducted its hearings into the brewing and liquor interests and German propaganda in
1918.82
The prohibition debate resurfaced in 1909 when a joint Congressional
committee met to consider a motion to create a Commission on the Alcoholic Liquor
Traffic which would examine all aspects of the liquor question. The body was
comprised of five House members and five Senators.83 Sutro and Timm appeared on
behalf of the NGAA.
Sutro argued that such a commission would be a waste of taxpayer funds since
Congress did not possess the power to transfer regulation o f interstate commerce to
the states. Any recommendations by the committee, or Congressional action would be
unconstitutional. In addition the Supreme Court repeatedly had ruled that liquor
traffic was a legitimate form of business enterprise.84 The debate grew heated when
Sutro accused Congress of attempting to be the moral judge o f society, seeking to tell
the population what was good for it. Congressmen Nehemiah Sperry from
Connecticut and Ezekial Chandler from Mississippi shot back that Congress had a duty
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to pass legislation that promoted the general welfare of the population. Sutro then
asked why Congress did nothing to help the poor. Timm added that the conditions
the commission proposed to investigate already were common knowledge, and that
the hearing was an example of Congress caving in to prohibition forces which sought
to revive interest in a weak cause 85
On this one aspect o f this issue at least, the NGAA could claim victory. The
House decided to forego a special liquor commission and leave all matters regarding
alcohol in the hands of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Alliance also could take
satisfaction in the fact that Congress had passed no national legislation regarding the
manufacture, sale, transportation, and consumption of alcohol. The NGAA’s main
argument continued to focus on prohibition as a violation of personal liberties. By this
time, however, the Alliance attacked the temperance movement from all angles: that it
represented a futile effort to legislate morality and that it offered a band-aid solution to
existing social problems such as poverty, want and need amongst the majority of the
population. In maintaining this line of reasoning the Alliance based its attack upon
progressive thought—a reflection of the organization’s ability to adjust its position to
the national mood.
Not surprisingly, prohibition was a major item on the agenda at the fifth annual
convention of the Alliance held at the Nord Cincinnati Tumhalle in Cincinnati from
October 2-6, 1909. Hexamer put it directly: “As free and sovereign people we believe
we have the right to regulate our lives as we see fit. The right to drink our wine and
our beer we consider an absolute attribute of human liberty as is the right to buy any
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other food.”86 He called upon the delegates to return to their states and strengthen
efforts against the prohibition of alcohol.
Hexamer also reemphasized the need to do more to promote teaching
German in public schools. He reminded his listeners of Carl Schurz’s reply to a
member of Congress who had chided him for speaking German on occasion and not
“United States.” Schurz stated that “there was no better patriotism than that which in
this land utters itself in German speech.” Hexamer also encouraged the delegates to
work on behalf of United States involvement in a world peace organization that would
assist in preventing a future conflict.87
In the coming months both of these items would become major issues on the
Alliance’s agenda. The language question reflected increasing fear that even the
German-American community did not promote the language forcefully. Dr. Julius
Goebel of Harvard reported that while the German language had a good status at the
college and university level, the Alliance needed to do more on behalf of German in
the public elementary and secondary schools.88
The concern for a world peace organization grew out of a general tension in
relations between the European powers, especially between England and Germany
which had prompted a growing Anglo-American rapprochement, and a fear within the
Alliance that in a European conflict the United States would find itself hard pressed to
maintain neutrality .89 The NGAA voted in favor o f a federation of all nations to work
for peace based upon the principle of mutual guarantee of each nation’s borders. Not
insignificant for this gathering of upper-to-middle class gentlemen was the attachment
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of a rider that called upon all nations to improve the social, economic and working
conditions of the laboring classes.90
The delegates also voted not to contribute to German private schools, the
official rationale being that the Alliance already supported the public school system
through its taxes. The vote also reflected an understanding that German schools were
probably Catholic schools, to which few members sent children and that Catholics
generally, especially the Catholic Central Verein, had shown little inclination to work
with the Alliance. Other matters of importance included the creation of a Junior Order
of the National German-American Alliance—a move partly to promote growth of the
organization in the future—but also to promote German culture and language.91 In a
mere formality, Hexamer and Timm were re-elected to new terms in office. The
executive committee of the organization now expanded to twenty-five directors and
seven officers, reflecting the continued growth of the Alliance around the country.
The reports o f all the individual states were positive, suggesting a growing
unity and sense of purpose within the organization. Each state reported continued
success at enlisting new members, as well as in their respective efforts at promoting
the agenda put forth by the national leadership. The focus remained so squarely on
prohibition that it had become a rallying point for German-Americans who by the turn
of the century had assimilated into American society and were for the most part
considered a “quiet” ethnic group. The revival o f the prohibition debate during the
Progressive era served to awaken a segment o f that quiet group which viewed
attempts at prohibition as an attack on their culture. In 1900 twenty-four percent of
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the nation’s population lived in dry regions. By 1906 this number had grown to forty
percent.

92

To fend off this trend many German-Americans turned to the NGAA and its
local affiliates to combat the efforts of such temperance organizations as the AntiSaloon League and the WCTU. It is possible to trace the growth, but not the creation,
of the Alliance during the first years of the twentieth century directly to the rising
concern regarding prohibition. The group became a last line o f defense to many
German-Americans, or as Timm called it in 1903—a Schutz und Trutz Bund
(“protective alliance in the face of adversity”).93 As Clifton Childs states in The
German-Americans in Politics one wonders if the Alliance would have been heard
outside German-speaking academic groups if it had not been for prohibition.94 After
the convention o f 1909, however, this attitude would change. Funding by brewers and
later the USB A would not only assist the NGAA in its campaign against the forces of
prohibition, but it also helped free up its own resources to pursue other facets of its
agenda during a time of increasing tensions abroad. It also presented the possibility of
the Alliance appearing to be a lobbying group for the brewers, rather than an
independent, principled organization with the welfare of society in mind, relegating its
defense of civil liberties and constitutionality to mere window-dressing.
But these problems belonged to the future, scarcely on the horizon at the
convention in 1909. The four-day meeting had carried a tone of optimism throughout
and the final session ended with a resounding “Hoch der DANB!” (“Three Cheers for
the National German-American Alliance!”)'
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CHAPTER IV

HIGH TIDE OF THE NGAA, 1910-1914

The last years of peace permitted the German-American Alliance to maintain a
focus on domestic concerns in the United States and broaden the scope of its activities
beyond the question of prohibition. During this time the group involved itself in such
familiar issues as immigration restriction, women’s suffrage, teaching of the German
language in public schools, German-American history, and world peace during a time
of increasing international tension. It was also a period in which the Alliance came
into direct contact with the brewing and liquor interests which viewed the NGAA as a
powerful ally in the attempt to prevent the prohibition of alcohol. By August 1914
funding from the brewers assisted in establishing the Alliance as one of the most visible
opponents of prohibition. This financial assistance also freed up the group’s own
funds, allowing it to target issues besides the anti-prohibition campaign—although the
main focus would remain on the liquor question.
The first issue the NGAA confronted during this period was women’s suffrage.
By 1910 women could vote in five states. While this was not a large number, the
National American Women’s Suffrage Association had given the movement new and
effective leadership. Formed in 1890 by the union of the American Woman Suffrage
Association and the National Woman Suffrage Association, the NAWSA sought out
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victories in state after state. From its inception the main goal o f the NAWSA was the
passage of an amendment giving women the right to vote.1
Not all women shared the views of the NAWSA. A majority of German and
Irish women in America viewed suffrage as a threat to their traditional customs.2 For
these women the role of the female was to bear and raise future leaders, not elect them
to office. This notion o f the female role in society was similar to the concept of
“Republican Motherhood” that existed during much of the nineteenth century. A basic
tenant of this belief was that only women could instill morality and proper virtues in
children, this unique talent coming, at least partly, from women’s remaining free from
the “evils” of the world o f business and politics.3 Giving women the right to vote
could threaten this traditional role.
If it was difficult to determine how many women thought about getting the
suffrage, the women o f the NGAA, or at least their leaders, made their position clear.
In April 1910 Phoebe Couzins, representing the Ladies Auxiliary of the NGAA,
appeared before the House Judiciary Committee to testify against women’s suffrage.
A part of the Alliance since 1905, the Auxiliary had attempted to organize GermanAmerican women in support of the goals of the NGAA.4 Although the two main
areas of concern were family issues and promotion of German culture, the Ladies
Auxiliary did play a part in the battle against prohibition and women’s suffrage.5
Despite being encouraged to participate in the NGAA’s program the Auxiliary’s actual
influence in the decision-making process at the national level is questionable. From
1905 until the Alliance disbanded in 1918 no woman sat on the executive council. The
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only mention of their work was by the Women’s Committee at the bi-annual
conferences.
The Ladies Auxiliary came out against the right of women to vote. In
testimony before the committee, Couzins repeated a familiar argument at that time.
the place of the women was in the home; participation in politics would not only
distract them from natural duties, but place women in an activity for which they were
physically unsuited 6 Couzins insisted that the harsh and corrupt political world would
harden women, destroying their natural emotions and feelings and damaging their
ability to raise children and care for the family.7 A woman’s purpose in the political
process was to bear and raise future leaders, not elect them into office. At the end of
her testimony, Couzins eloquently summarized her case for denying women the vote:
The conclusion of the whole matter is not the entrance o f woman into
the political world for the reformation of man’s methods, but the
regeneration of woman herself that those whom she sends forth into the
maelstrom of life’s greatest battle shall be so equipped mentally,
morally, physically as to require no added force from her to hold
mankind to paths o f righteousness and peace.8
Couzins’ words reflected the moral high ground on the issue—a line of attack
the Alliance had utilized in the past on the prohibition question. Yet it did not
represent the only reason why the NGAA opposed suffrage for women. Alliance
leaders—and perhaps the Auxiliary—had concluded that given the right to vote, most
women would vote for prohibition. Knowing that such a stance would produce sharp
criticism from pro-suffrage forces and prohibition people as well, the Alliance phrased
its position in terms of what later would be called “family values.” The notion of the
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“woman’s sphere” as being the home was not only commonplace, but widely accepted.
In such a role she served as an example to her children and could teach them to
become good citizens. Fart o f this task included educating them about alcohol and the
need to drink in moderation but evidently, not to abstain entirely. But the NGAA did
not pursue the suffrage issue with the same intensity as it did prohibition, instead it
remained content to work against suffrage at the local level. Even so, the fact that the
Alliance came out as it did against suffrage did not endear them to organizations such
as the National American Women’s Suffrage Association, or other women working to
get the vote.
In May 1910 the Alliance took part in hearings concerning United States
participation in a proposed International Federation for the Maintenance of Peace.
The idea originated with the World’s Federation League of the New York Peace
Society. The suggestion for American participation came from Representative Richard
Bartholdt of Missouri in a speech given to the Second National Peace Congress at
Chicago on May 4, 1909.9 Bartholdt commented that while a majority of the world’s
population desired peace, such a goal could be possible only through an organization
that had the support of the world powers—the same nations that at present seemed
more interested in increasing the size of their armies and navies to dangerous levels.
Bartholdt believed that the United States had a key, almost Messianic, role in this
mission:
In this onward march the United States should lead. It will be the
fulfillment o f our country’s sublime mission. It will lend a new

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

significance to the flag and will cause all mankind to bless the Stars
and Stripes as the emblem o f their salvation as well as ours.10
Many in the United States echoed Bartholdt’s sentiments—most notably
Andrew Carnegie who looked upon the naval arms race between Germany and Great
Britain as a threat to world peace. In a speech given in April 1909 the industrialist
commented that:
Under such a strain a mere spark will suffice. A few marines ashore
from two o f the ships, British and German, would be enough; a few
words pass between them; an encounter between two begins, both
probably under the influence o f liquor; one is wounded, blood is shed,
and the pent-up passions of the people o f both countries sweep all to
the winds. The governments are too weak to withstand the whirlwind;
or, being men of like passions with their fellows, probably are in part
swept away themselves after years o f jealous rivalry into the thirst for
revenge.11
The NGAA shared a concern about the potential for war between England and
Germany and the need for the United States to participate in a world peace federation.
Alliance leaders especially worried that a war between Britain and Germany—a
calamity in itself—would create a possibility for the United States to become involved,
probably against Germany. As a consequence the Alliance supported efforts at
preventing a conflict that could escalate into a general European war. The pact
between the Alliance and the Hiberians had called for both groups to do everything in
their power to prevent the United States from entering an alliance with any nation
(again, both groups feared an Anglo-American alliance). American participation in an
organization designed to achieve world peace hopefully could help prevent a European
war and also preclude the United States from entering into an alliance with anyone.
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To this end Erast Richards, a lecturer at Columbia University and a member of the
New York branch of the NGAA testified before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs in support o f an International Federation for the Maintenance of Peace.
Richards outlined the position of the Alliance, endorsed by the national
conventions in 1907 and 1909, as being in principle in favor of a world federation.12
The United States, he said, had an opportunity to support an organization committed
to the abolition o f war, continued progress of humanity, and promoting the principles
laid down in the Declaration of Independence.13
In the end the Federation never became a reality, of course, since neither the
United States nor any other Western nation supported the idea, but the position of the
Alliance on this issue, and on American foreign policy in general, attracted isolated
criticism. The American Review o f Reviews accused the NGAA o f attempting to
manipulate United States foreign policy in favor o f Germany. Other than fighting
prohibition, the article continued, the only reason the Alliance existed was to promote
the German cause in America.14 This criticism represented a reaction to an article
published by Dr. William Weber, a member of the Pennsylvania branch, in a leading
Berlin journal, the Preussiche Jahrbucher. Weber had warned the Republican party
that any attempt to draw the United States into the British sphere would invite quick
retribution from the NGAA in the polls:
Its two million voters, belong almost entirely to the Republican party.
Should these two million German electors, dissatisfied with the attitude
of that party toward Germany, break away from it at any time, it would
mean the defeat o f the Republican Presidential candidate. This
calculation is so clear and convincing that the dominant Republican
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party would never initiate an inimical policy to Germany to please
England—at least as long as the German-American National Alliance
remains a solidly organized body.15
These comments seem to suggest direct involvement of the NGAA in party
politics and a clear violation o f the Alliance’s charter. Weber’s statement did not
represent the official position o f the NGAA but it did suggest a sentiment within the
organization and a concern over increasing strains in Anglo-German relations and the
potential for United States involvement in a future war between the two countries.
There is a least a remote possibility that Weber’s excessively flattering assessment of
his organization could have led Germans, even people in government, to a similar
conclusion: that in the event o f war with Britain Germany could count on the NGAA
to keep the United States out o f the conflict—or even better, assist in gaining
American support. In the end Weber’s comments went virtually unnoticed by the
Alliance, which was concerned with other issues at the time—and other than the
American Review—the article provoked no reaction in the United States.
The NGAA in 1910 continued to concern itself with the promotion of German
culture in America. One year earlier Representative J. Hampton Moore of
Pennsylvania had introduced legislation on behalf of the NGAA that asked Congress to
appropriate $30,000 towards construction of a monument at Germantown,
Pennsylvania to commemorate the founding of the first German settlement in the
colonies.16 In May 1910 several Alliance leaders, including Hexamer, appeared before
the House Committee on Library to testify in favor of such a monument. Hexamer
argued that a monument at Germantown would remind citizens of the United States of
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the numerous contributions of Americans of German descent. A monument honoring
the Pilgrims in Plymouth, Massachusetts constituted a clear precedent.17 In answer to
questions, Hexamer stated that support for such a monument in the German-American
community could be seen in resolutions passed in various states.18 The Alliance had
begun the process o f raising $30,000 and Hexamer hoped Congress would match that
amount. The bill received the vigorous support of Representative Bartholdt, who had
become the group’s most ardent backer in Congress. As with past issues involving the
NGAA he viewed the organization’s efforts for the Germantown monument as an
expression of patriotism, “I am heartily in favor of this bill,” he said. “It is not a
clannish project, but an American project.” 19
The debate over the legislation did not begin until January 1911. Even though
the bill presented on the House floor called for an appropriation of $25,000 rather than
the requested $30,000, various members questioned why Congress should give out
funds commemorating the contributions o f an individual ethnic group and then
probably face similar requests from other ethnic groups. Representative J. Hampton
Moore answered that Congress had supported similar monuments in the past and that
the NGAA was not asking the govememnt to pay for the entire project, only match to
funds raised within the German-American community.20
On February 7 the amended bill came before the House. Besides reducing the
amount of funds to $25,000 the legislation contained stipulations. The Alliance had to
supply proof that it raised the matching amount before receiving the frinds. The
Secretary of War, governor of Pennsylvania, and the president of the NGAA needed to
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approve the design o f the monument. Finally, care of the monument would rest in the
hands of the city of Philadelphia, and the federal government would not be responsible
for its maintenance.21 The bill passed by a two-thirds majority.
The Senate took action the next day. The Committee on Library, which had
considered the measure, approved the bill and returned it to the Senate floor where it
passed on March 3. The next day President William Howard Taft signed the
measure—another victory in the Alliance’s campaign to preserve German culture in
America.22 The victory unfortunately was not complete. A German Memorial
Monument Commission, charged with the task of seeing the project to completion, in
1913 chose Albert Jaegers to design and build the structure.23 One year later in May
1914 Kaiser Wilhelm, in an attempt to promote continued good-will between the
United States and Germany, offered to provide funds for the project.24 The outbreak
of war of the European war in August made acceptance o f the Kaiser’s offer unwise.
Further complications, both in terms of funding and building the work, resulted in the
monument not being finished until April 1917. With American entry into the war the
mayor o f Philadelphia thought it best not to dedicate a memorial to GermanAmericans.25 In the end the monument was not unveiled until 1920, two years after
the NGAA disbanded. Officially called “The German-American National Monument,”
the monument stood in Vernon Park in the heart of Germantown, Pennsylvania. The
centerpiece o f the memorial, which is still there, is a statue depicting two German
immigrants, a man and a woman, created by Jaegers.26
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Later in 1911 another project sponsored by the Alliance came to fruition when
a statue of Baron von Steuben was unveiled in Washington D C. on December 7. On
hand at the ceremony were a number of dignitaries including President Taft,
Representative Bartholdt, Ambassador Count Johann Heinrich von Bemstorff of
Germany, and Hexamer, all of whom spoke. The United States government paid
$50,000 for the memorial that commemorated Steuben’s contributions to American
victory in the War of Independence—and, in a token of friendship, gave a copy of the
statue to Kaiser Wilhelm as a gift from the American people.27
Each speaker talked of von Steuben’s contributions to the American victory in
the Revolutionary War. Hexamer went so far as to call him the “Father of the
American Army” for his training of the Continental forces at Valley Forge.28
Ambassador Bemstorff and President Taft gave the most interesting speeches—each
speaking of the how the monument would remind both countries of their long-standing
and unbroken friendship. The President added that the statue not only represented
past United States-German cooperation, but also served as a testimonial to all
Americans of German descent for their contributions to the growth of the United
States.29
One can only imagine the sense of accomplishment Hexamer and other Alliance
officials felt at the gathering. The support of the United States government for two
monuments in the same year commemorating German contributions to America stood
as a tribute to German-Americans in general. The memorials helped signify the
traditional friendship between Germany and the United States. The presence of Taft
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and von Bemstorff gave the NGAA’s efforts prestige and a degree o f influence both
inside, and outside, the German-American community—thus fomenting the belief that
it did indeed represent the opinion of German-America .
Armed with this sense of purpose the Alliance further expanded its efforts
outside the realm of cultural preservation. In May 1911 it resumed its campaign
against restrictive immigration laws when Alliance members appeared before
Congressional hearings investigating the practices of immigration commissioners at the
various points of entry into the United States.30 The NGAA questioned whether the
commissioners were following Congressional guidelines in determining which
immigrants should be admitted and which sent back. Ernest Stahl, a vice-president of
the NGAA, charged that port commissioners were “randomly” enforcing the 1907
Immigration Act, causing in some cases, divided families. Stahl cited the case of a
German family, a member of which was refused admission by Commissioner William
Williams on Ellis Island because the boy stuttered and was deemed a potential ward of
the state.31 Stahl claimed that the clause which called for a four dollar head tax would
result in the rejection of many people who could have become good citizens.32 He
cited his own experience of coming to America fifty-one years earlier with only
seventy-five cents in his pocket. If such a law had been in force then he never would
have been admitted. The Alliance was not asking Congress to change the immigration
laws, he insisted, but to enforce them in a more consistent and humane manner, taking
each individual case into consideration.
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Additional hearings in July produced more testimony from Alliance members.
Alphonse Koeble of the New York branch asked for a commission to look into current
immigration policies for being too nativist—a sentiment which focused, in terms of
European immigration, on Italian and Eastern Europeans who constituted sixty-nine
percent of immigrants between 1900 and 1909 and at whom the head tax and
education clauses were targeted/3 Theodore Sutro, also from the New York branch,
reminded the committee that the nation was built upon immigrants and their
contributions and that restricting their influx could damage the nation’s vitality.34
As with the argument against prohibition, the Alliance cloaked its case against
restrictive immigration laws in the flag of patriotism. It is highly doubtful that the
NGAA had much interest in the admission of Italians and Russians into the United
States, yet the testimony of Alliance members suggested at least indirect concern
about their treatment. Stahl and Sutro admitted that German immigration had
dwindled to almost nothing by 1911. Between 1900 and 1909 German immigrants
accounted for only four percent o f the total.35 The objections of the Alliance, thus,
represented a point of principle— restriction of one ethnic group meant the restriction
o f all. Their objections to a policy that had little impact on German-Americans served
as yet another example of the Alliance’s willingness to involve itself in national issues.
Delegates representing chapters in forty states gathered in Washington D C. at
the Willard Hotel from October 6-9, 1911 for the sixth national conference. The body
focused on familiar issues: prohibition, immigration, foreign affairs, the alliance with
the AOH, and German culture and education. Hexamer congratulated the group for
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its efforts in upholding German ideals, but said that they needed to do more work to
“rescue the memory o f illustrious German-Americans everywhere.”36 He called upon
parents to assure that their children grew up learning the German language and
emphasized the need to do more to promote such other cultural issues as German
theater, music, and history. The aim of the Alliance, he concluded, should be to
maintain the highest standards of culture and ideals.37
Other speakers echoed the same sentiments. Professor Marion Dexter Learned
o f the University of Pennsylvania suggested that German values, after all, were
superior to American:
You come from the greatest stock on earth. The American people
would make much greater progress were they to imitate your mode and
manner of life. The Germans know how to get all there is out of life.
They know how to give face value for money received, and that is what
is lacking in this country. Take our American restaurants. One of the
abominations o f the country is the restaurant. Here you cannot get a
decent meal for a decent price. Over in Germany, what a difference!38
Learned went on to criticize the United States economy, its poetry, and other aspects
o f American culture. Such harsh criticism of American culture is difficult to
understand; it suggests considerable ethnic chauvinism, if not an organization that felt
itself immune from retribution. The enthusiasm with which delegates received the
remarks indicated that Learned was not alone in his opinion. Needless to say, the
speech did not receive the same response from the outside. The Washington Post
called the Alliance “America’s Critic” and suggested that the group not only wanted to
preserve German institutions, but thrust them upon the rest of the nation.39 The Post
stopped short of condemning the gathering, passing off Leamed’s comments as
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unrepresentative of the Alliance and German-Americans in general. The New Yorker
Staats-Zeitung chose not to mention Learned’s speech at all—a further indication that
it did not reflect the opinion of the German-American community.
The critical tone visible at the start carried over to the second and third days of
the gathering. Hexamer and other speakers roundly attacked recent arbitration treaties
signed by Great Britain and the United States as well as a pro-British bias in the
American press.40 Speakers charged that the English press was altering news from
Germany before it reached the American people. They denounced American ties with
Russia because of Russia’s treatment of Jews. Simon Wolf, president of B ’nai Brith,
addressed the group about the difficulty Jews with United States passports had while
traveling in Russia—a violation of the treaty between the two nations. The Alliance
unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the United States to abrogate its treaty
with Russia and insist upon Russia’s improving its treatment of Jews inside the nation
and those wishing to visit the country.41 The speakers then called upon the United
States to work with Germany in helping to reduce expenditures on armaments and
settling disputes through international courts o f arbitration.42
The convention also sharply criticized Secretary of Commerce and Labor
Charles Nagel regarding the behavior of Commissioner Williams on Ellis Island.
Henry Weismann, president of the Brooklyn NGAA called upon Nagel to remove
Williams for his arbitrary deportation of German immigrants.43 Weismann said that he
would never vote for a Republican president until Williams was removed, and that the
Alliance should act to see that the removal took place immediately.
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Prohibition came up in a resolution condemning societies which sought an
amendment outlawing the manufacture, sale, and consumption o f alcohol, and in a
demand that Congress not cave in to special interest groups that wanted to impose
their will upon the nation.44 The fact that the prohibition question did not appear until
the second day indicated not that the issue was less important than it had been, but that
the group wished to present itself as a political force concerned with more than one
issue. On other issues, however, the NGAA would be content to pass resolutions and
publicize its position without pursuing them with the same intensity as it did the
prohibition of alcohol.
The delegates also handled other matters of concern. They agreed to promote
German Day (October 6) at the local, state and national levels so that all Americans
would become aware of the contributions of German Americans. They listened to
Patrick Moran, a national director o f the AOH, who congratulated the Alliance on its
efforts to stem the tide of nativism, and advocated continued cooperation between the
two organizations. During a visit of delegates to Mount Vernon, Ernest Stahl of New
Jersey spoke of George Washington’s shining example of patriotism and Mount
Vernon as a Mecca for every patriotic citizen.45 The convention concluded on an
upbeat tone with the re-election of all national officers.
The positive tone at the end could not hide the fact that some dissent did exist
within the organization over policy matters. The attacks on Anglo-American
cooperation, United States-Russian cooperation, resolutions on immigration policy
and prohibition had provoked opposition from the floor. Several delegates objected to
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the call for a peace pact between the United States and Germany on grounds that the
convention should not interfere in diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Theodore Sutro attempted to stop the resolution condemning all prohibition societies.
Such an action was too harsh, he claimed, and could cast a negative light on the
Alliance throughout the country. Sutro suggested that the convention ignore
individual agitators while continuing to lobby Congress. He pointed out that direct
entry into politics violated the Alliance’s constitution and advised keeping the focus on
good feelings and promoting German culture.46 Sutro’s position suggested the
existence of a faction that had become uncomfortable the Alliance’s increased
involvement in political issues and its implications for the original mission of
preserving the heritage of German-Americans.
The gathering also provoked criticism outside the convention. The
Washington Post accused the Alliance o f trying to foment a split in United StatesBritish relations that would favor Germany. The Post twisted Hexamer’s reference to
United States-German cooperation for world peace into an assertion that under the
leadership of the Teutons the world would abolish war. The New York Times
characterized the stand against Secretary Nagel regarding the situation on Ellis Island
as a “severe chastisement of the Secretary’s career,” and twisted Weismann’s remark
about voting into a pledge that the Alliance would never support a Republican
president until Williams was removed.47 Such comments constituted a veiled
accusation that the Alliance was in violation of its charter.
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The Washington meeting had left its mark. It revealed an organization that had
enlarged its scope. The harsh tone of many o f the speeches suggested confidence that
it safely could be disagreeable, and that it was prepared to take a more activist
position on controversial issues. Such activity had produced division within the group,
criticism in the non-German press and possibly led interested observers to wonder
about the NGAA’s true motives. The delegates left for home on October 9 feeling
good about what they accomplished, perhaps unaware that they also had laid
groundwork for future troubles.
The NGAA resumed its lobbying against prohibition in January 1912 when
representatives testified at two hearings in Congress. By this time the group was
receiving contributions from the United States Brewing Association (hereafter known
as the USBA). In the late summer of 1911 members of the USBA had approached
John Tjarks, NGAA second-vice president, to offer help in the fight against
prohibition. In September Tjarks received the first quarterly payment of $2500 and
payments would continue until 1913 when the USBA began funneling fUnds through a
group called the National Association of Commerce and Labor.48 The brewers’
decision to support the NGAA seemed wise and altogether logical. GermanAmericans dominated the brewing industry and many of them were either members of
or sympathetic to the Alliance’s programs. The USBA preferred to have other groups
do their lobbying for them while they remained a “silent partner.” The NGAA already
had established itself as an enemy o f prohibition at the local, state, and national level
for reasons other than financial profit. It was a natural and valuable ally.
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Between January and March 1912 Hexamer, Timm, E.J. Domhoefer (president
of the Ladies Auxiliaries), and various other members testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee against a bill that focused on interstate shipment of alcoholic
beverages into dry territories. While claiming to be in support of temperance,
Domhoefer viewed absolute prohibition as all but impossible. Such laws would do
nothing more than shift the consumption o f alcohol to speakeasies and other illegal
places. They would take away a freedom from the majority of people who practiced
moderation in their drinking. Domhoefer insisted that her position, and that of the
Ladies Auxiliaries, was based upon their loyalty to the country and its principles: all
were of German descent, but they were first and foremost citizens of the United
States.49 Hexamer’s testimony varied little from past appearances. He presented a
copy of the resolutions passed during the 1911 convention in Washington, placing the
NGAA solidly against any legislation that stopped the use of alcohol.50
In February members testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Except for Hexamer, they were the same people who had testified before the Senate
and the arguments were identical. The women emphasized patriotism and love of the
family, agreed that alcohol posed a threat to the family, and insisted that the threat
could not be removed by legislation, but through education, a proper home
environment, and individual voluntary abstinence.51
What was unique about these two hearings was the degree of involvement by
women. Of the seventeen witnesses appearing on behalf of the Alliance, twelve were
women—in sharp contrast to past appearances at Congressional hearings when the
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Alliance was represented almost exclusively by men. One might explain this change in
strategy as a reaction to the fact that women had been the most vocal supporters of
prohibition, perhaps lending the movement a tone of moral supremacy. The leadership
o f the NGAA hoped to demonstrate that not all women viewed prohibition as good,
thereby offering a counterweight to the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and
other women’s groups.52
The Alliance was also active in battles at the state and local levels. In
Colorado, Missouri, and Massachusetts local branches passed resolutions condemning
local blue laws and efforts by Congress and state legislatures to vote prohibition
legislation into law. The Missouri branch condemned such legislation as destructive of
personal property and individual liberties. The Colorado chapter was even harsher in
its criticism of Congress:
... we condemn these attempts to hamper freedom as undemocratic,
tyrannous, and fraught with the direct consequences; ... any law of this
nature, like every other sumptuary law, lacking the support of public
option leads inevitably to a disregard of all laws, in consequence of
which a state of conditions is created which can only be deplored by all
sincere adherents of law and order.53
A state convention in New York passed a resolution condemning the pending
legislation in Congress as well as antiquated local blue laws.54 The branch in Nebraska
campaigned heavily against “dry” forces under the leadership o f Governor Chester
Aldrich whom the Alliance viewed as leader of the fanatical faction of the Republican
party.55 Nebraska’s Alliance applauded the election of John Morehead, a Democrat
and a “wet,” as governor and rejoiced when both houses of the legislature fell into the
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hands of “friends of personal liberty .” In all cases the state branches actively pursued
the agenda of the national organization.
In 1912 the Alliance again turned its attention to immigration. Several
members testified at hearings on Senator William P. Dillingham’s immigration bill that
called for a literacy test as the best way to restrict undesirable immigration. The
literacy test, which required immigrants to demonstrate the ability to read and write
their native language, and first introduced in 1887, was a response to the shift in
immigration patterns from northern and western to southern and eastern Europe.56
The Dillingham Bill also represented the first attempt to base immigration restriction
upon a percentage plan. It limited the number of immigrants o f each race—that is, a
recognized ethnic group—to a percentage of numbers of that race arriving during a
given period.57
Speaking for the Alliance Alphonse Koelble did not object to the literacy
requirement or the percentage plan. He opposed the provision that gave an
immigration commissioner discriminatory powers to detain whomever they pleased for
whatever reason. Consistent with past NGAA witnesses, he labeled the bill restrictive,
an effort to deny fair treatment to people attempting to enter the United States.58
Otherwise, the New York state branch came out against the literacy portion o f the bill.
Weisman argued that even though the literacy portion did not affect Germans— the
overwhelming majority could read and write German— it would keep out “vigorous
and healthy immigrants” from other nations.59 The New York Alliance then called for
all branches to condemn the bill.
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The bill passed both the House and Senate, but President Taft vetoed it
because of the literacy clause. The Senate then re-passed it by a vote of 72-18, but
the override vote in the House of 213-114, stopped five votes short of the necessary
two-thirds majority. When the bill passed again a year later, President Woodrow
Wilson vetoed it on grounds that the literacy provision violated America’s tradition of
being an asylum to people seeking refuge from other countries—essentially, it would
seem, a restatement of the Alliance’s position. The attempt to override the veto met
the same fate as in the previous year; the House failed to override Wilson’s veto by
four votes.60 It would take almost ten years for the nation to accept a law that used
percentages imposing quantitative restrictions—the quota system—as a basis for
immigration when in May 1922 Congress finally passed the Dillingham Bill.61
While prohibition and immigration occupied the largest efforts in the first years
of the new decade the Alliance did have time for other issues. In 1913 the NGAA
sponsored publication of Marion Dexter Learned’s German in the Public Schools as
part of the campaign to support teaching German in the public schools. Learned’s
pamphlet identified language instruction as the cornerstone of education. It
condemned the dismal teaching of English in public schools and sought to elevate
German to the level of Latin and Greek.62 Learned pointed to German as the
preeminent language o f literature and the sciences after English. He argued that
knowledge of not only German, but also other foreign languages could best equip the
student to succeed in the modem world and encouraged public school systems around
the country to begin foreign language education at the elementary level.
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By 1913 Alliance efforts in this area met with some success. There existed
already German language instruction at the elementary level in Philadelphia,
Cincinnati, St. Louis and Milwaukee, cities with a sizable German population. The
state chapter in Nebraska succeeded in getting the Mockett Law passed on July 17,
1913. Similar to measures passed in Kansas, Indiana and other states, it required
public schools to inaugurate foreign language instruction on an elective basis beginning
in the fourth grade if the parents of fifty or more pupils requested it.63 With GermanAmericans constituting the single largest ethnic group in the state the law resulted in
German becoming the unofficial second language in Nebraska. Similar developments
took place in other states with large German populations, and on the eve of World
War I German was one of the most popular foreign languages taught at the
elementary, secondary, and higher education levels.
In October, 1913 delegates gathered at the Planters Hotel in St. Louis for the
NGAA’s seventh convention. Hexamer’s introductory remarks focused on German
ideals and culture. He praised the work of local chapters for their efforts at teaching
German in the public schools, stating that a knowledge of German was indispensable
in the modem world, but reminded listeners that the Alliance also encouraged
instruction in French, Italian, Spanish and Swedish.64
The business of the convention included old issues and some new ones. The
body passed a resolution calling for an eight hour work day. Up until this time the
Alliance had not involved itself in issues concerning organized labor. By its stand the
group might have been seeking support from working-class German-Americans. The
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group also hoped to demonstrate that in some areas it was in line with progressive
reform. In other areas however, one is not so sure. In a remarkable, but perhaps
revealing, move the convention rejected by only a single vote (17 states to 16) a
motion to require all women members of the Alliance in states that had woman
suffrage to vote according to the NGAA’s principles. Several women from the Ladies
Auxiliaries argued vehemently that such a stand would violate the Alliance’s own
position on protection of personal liberties.65 The closeness o f the vote suggested
either that many believed that personal freedom of the vote should take a back seat
when it came to promoting organizational goals, or that the NGAA had a very
traditional view when it came to relations between the sexes. Previous testimony at
Congressional hearings on woman suffrage had revealed a conservative interpretation
o f the woman’s role. It seems that in the area of politics, at least, in which women
were new, the wife’s opinion should remain in line with the husband’s or put more
bluntly: women should do as they were told and not voice their own feelings.
Other resolutions condemned the mainstream press for distorting Germany’s
image in the public eye. The resolution accused American newspapers of being
Anglophile, of seeking to enhance the image o f England at the expense of Germany.
The prohibition question inevitably came up as the delegates called upon Congress to
ignore the voices of “dry” America who encouraged the government to pass narrow
minded and dangerous laws. As in previous instances they encouraged treating the
alcohol problem through moderation, education, and raising the standard of living for
all Americans.66
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The last day of the convention culminated in a torch light parade in which
fifteen thousand marchers, including the German and Austrian counsuls, paraded
through the streets of St. Louis to the courthouse to hear the speeches of various
dignitaries. The purpose was to demonstrate the unity of the Alliance, as well express
satisfaction from achieving its goals and confidence for the future. Charles
Weinsberg, president of the Missouri chapter, summed up the mood of the assembled
body:
It is a special honor for me to be able to greet here today the
representatives of the German Vereine in Missouri: people for whom
the preservation o f German customs and use in the new homeland is a
solemn goal, men who with all their strength stood up for personal
freedom and the rights granted by the Constitution.
What German power, energy, knowledge, and sacrifice has
accomplished for this land, our current Fatherland, is engraved with the
iron stylus o f history for eternity.
Even though often nativism seeks to minimize and cover up the
deeds of our fellow immigrants, the German pioneers of past times and
the present, we are not only proud o f their deeds and service, we know
that we must assure recognition for those deeds.
This last point was the cause and purpose of the founding of the
DANB. Through the closing of ranks o f all citizens of German origin
in this land, regardless of where one’s cradle stood, it will be possible,
and it is already possible, for us to earn respect and recognition in the
widest circles of the land.
Even if the National Alliance has accomplished much in the
short time since its creation, there is still much, very much, to
accomplish, and therefore we should not slacken our efforts, but on the
contrary, true to the principles o f the National Alliance, we should
work further, with the exclusions of all party politics and respecting the
religious tendencies of every person.67
Weinsberg’s tone suggested that the Alliance was unified and that it had united
German-Americans behind the goal o f preserving their culture and heritage. Yet
disputes over policy issues at the St. Louis convention, such as the close vote on
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women’s vote, and Sutro’s protest regarding the group’s position on prohibition at the
1911 convention suggest differently. While the national leadership continued to
promote the organization’s agenda, it seemed in some cases to disregard feelings of
the local chapters—adding to dissension within the body. The North Carolina chapter
felt that the position on women’s suffrage was too harsh and New York had criticized
an earlier resolution condemning radical temperance organizations. Many people in
the organization had begun to feel that the Alliance had become too involved in party
politics.
Critics also existed within the German-American community, especially those
people who viewed the Alliance as an organization controlled by a middle class elite
that extolled liberal and secular values, thus alienating Catholic Germans, as well as
many in the working class. By 1913 chapters of the CCV in many states were warning
German-Americans to avoid the NGAA, since it did not support the values of the
Verein.68 German-Americans in St. Louis criticized the local chapter for being
aggressive in attempting to control affairs within the community.69
A growing criticism within the German community was the charge that the
Alliance had become more an organization that battled prohibition rather than one
intent on preserving German culture—in doing so labeling the group as the ring-leader
of the anti-temperance forces. Hugo Muensterberg, a professor at Harvard, had the
Alliance in mind as he summed up the opinion o f many within the German-American
community:
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The battle against temperance, which could be important to all classes
of society, has become almost exclusively a concern of Germans, and
what is much more lamentable, the concern of the Germans became
almost exclusively the battle against the temperance movement.70
This accusation was grounded somewhat in fact, for the Alliance had long been
preoccupied with prohibition and the association with the brewers made the
connection stronger. As early as 1908 brewing companies recognized the potential
power of the Alliance and starting donating to local chapters. By 1911 the group’s
efforts had attracted the attention of the USBA, which subsequently provided
quarterly subsidies to support the NGAA’s efforts against prohibition. Beginning in
1913 the brewers’ support of Alliance activities—in combination with the heightened
campaign on all fronts to prevent prohibition—increased beyond the previous
quarterly subsidies of $2500.
In order to distance itself from direct contact with the Alliance, and other anti
prohibition groups, the USBA found it necessary to create a separate organization
through which it could funnel funds to these groups. The result was the creation in
1913 of the National Association of Commerce and Labor (hereafter known as the
NACL) under the direction of Percy Andreae. One o f his first tasks was to contact the
leadership of the Alliance. In late 1913 Andreae met with Hexamer, John Tjarks,
second vice-president; Joseph Keller, first vice president, and president of the Indiana
NGAA, Adolph Timm, and Julius Moersch, third vice-president, regarding the
possibility of his organization’s funding the NGAA’s fight against prohibition.71 At the
meeting Hexamer stated that he did not want anything to do with the funding of such a
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project and that any such matters should be taken up with Keller72 The vicepresident told Andreae that any donations to the NGAA would have to be made
through a private fund, not through the organization’s treasury, due in part to the
charter that prevented an active role in party politics. Knowledge that the group was
openly accepting funds from a special interest group would open the Alliance up to the
charge of violating its charter. Andrea and Keller then arranged to direct money to a
“separate” fund under Tjarks, chairman of the finance committee, who would disperse
the money to local chapters to use in their campaign against prohibition. The funds
would also be used to create a special group, the task of which would be to lobby
Congress. Under the direction of Simon Wolf, this organization was to focus on
efforts by “dry” forces to secure a prohibition amendment.73 Between August and
December 1913 Andreae corresponded with both Hexamer and Keller regarding the
project. In January 1914 Andreae began payments of fifty dollars a month to Wolf.
He also forwarded $5000, to Tjarks as the first of what would be many payments to
assist in the battle against prohibition.
By the end of the year the total disbursement had reached $20,000. Andreae
continued to supply funds to the NGAA through 1916, at which time he stepped down
as president o f the NACL.74 Senate investigation in 1918-1919 into the brewing and
liquor interests and German propaganda produced a series of letters between Andreae,
Keller, and Hexamer that revealed the close cooperation that existed between the
NGAA and Andreae. The Alliance used the funds in its lobbying efforts, and also
distributed money to state branches for use in their campaigns. In many states the
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local chapters took an active role in elections. A letter from Andreae to Keller in May
1914 suggested that one o f the local chapters used funds to help pay the poll tax for
some voters.75 This direct involvement in politics was perhaps a violation of the
Alliance’s charter, although the Alliance always took the position that the charter
affected only the national organization, and in several cases the local chapters did
operate independently. On such issues as prohibition, the national leadership often
turned a blind eye to how local chapters went about their business.
The letters also revealed how the money came to the NGAA and its state
affiliates. In most instances Tjarks made a payment from the separate fund to a local
chapter. Andreae would then reimburse the national organization after receiving an
itemized account o f the expenditures. These stipends including printing costs, and
monetary reimbursement for individuals in states with prohibition whose task it was to
gauge public opinion, rally the local German-American population, and help influence
the outcome of local elections. Thus Andrea’s funds made it possible for the Alliance
to intensify its campaign at both the state and national level to a degree unreachable
prior to 1914.76 One could say that the Alliance “used” the brewers by accepting
funds that allowed them to free up organizational money for other purposes—a
situation that helped the group continue its efforts on behalf o f German culture, but in
the long-run would have much greater implications.
In April and May 1914 five members of the Alliance testified at Senate
hearings regarding a prohibition amendment to the Constitution. Arno Mowitz,
chairman o f the NGAA’s national legislative committee, headed the delegation. In his
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opening statement Mowitz repeated familiar charges. An amendment prohibiting
manufacture, sale and consumption of alcohol would outlaw a business that had
always been recognized as legal, substantially altering the federal system of
government. Prohibition at the state and local level had been a dismal failure. People
who wanted to drink still managed to find sources. How then could the government
expect to enforce such a measure on the national level? Prohibition would destroy a
multi-million dollar industry and force many people out of work.77
Morwitz focused primarily on the fundamental question that had perplexed
framers of the Constitution: how much power should they grant to the federal
government? He took the side of the old Republican party under Thomas Jefferson
who had believed that too much power could curtail the rights of both the states and
the individual. This argument was based upon the Bill of Rights which limited national
power and especially Article Ten which granted the states and the people all powers
otherwise not granted to the Congress, or prohibited to them, by the Constitution.
The great fear of the Alliance was that the federal government would undermine the
efforts at the local level where the NGAA had a much better chance of defeating
prohibition measures. This line of argument drew a fine line between the inability of
states to regulate interstate commerce—a task granted solely to the federal
government by the Constitution—and the federal government allowing voters in
individual states to decide the prohibition question for themselves. For the Alliance
then, the right to drink was a state concern—best left to the voters, while the right to
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regulate the liquor traffic between states was a federal prerogative. In neither case,
however, could alcohol be forbidden absolutely.
Simon Wolf, who headed the lobbying organization created from Andrea’s
funds, argued that the best solution was the “local option” favored by President
Wilson. Congress should not legislate on an issue that provoked such strong feelings
and diverse opinions across the nation, and was clearly a state and local matter.78
Timm, the last to speak, submitted the official position the NGAA delegates
passed at the convention in St. Louis:
Resolved. That the constitutional right of the individual citizen of this
country to freedom from this tyranny of sumptuary legislation and
temporary majorities is the most precious characteristic of our liberty
and that we most emphatically condemn any attack upon it, especially
through the Federal Government.
That we denounce as utterly unworthy o f the proud title “American
citizen” those who are attempting to coerce the Members o f the Senate
and House o f Representatives o f the United States into lending their
sanction to any scheme of pseudoreligious bigots and zealots to control
the personal sanction of law abiding citizens.
That we respectfully petition the Members of Congress to consider
no proposed legislation tending to refrain from adopting any national
prohibition measure, being warned by the increasing use of strong,
adulterated, and inferior liquors and deadly drug, cotemporaneous with
the adoption of so-called prohibition statutes by several states in the
Union.79
This strongly worded summation of previous arguments targeted a small minority of
individuals and religious groups that sought to impose their will upon the nation. By
contrast, the NGAA claimed to represent the interests of all patriotic citizens, not only
German-Americans, who opposed the measure.
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Interestingly, two of the Alliance’s witnesses, Wolf and Albert Fankhanel,
testified that they did not represent brewing or liquor interests at a time when WolF s
lobbying efforts were being funded by Andreae’s NACL. Fankhanel, president of the
Maryland branch o f the NGAA and a member of the national executive council,
represented an organization that was accepting funds from the brewing and liquor
interests. His statement probably could be blamed on ignorance. The correspondence
between Andreae, Hexamer, Keller, and Tjarks that took place between December
1913 and May 1914 made no mention of Fankhanel and everyone present agreed to
keep the issue of funding as secret as possible. For a chapter president to not be
aware of this issue, if indeed he was, suggests that there either was a lack of
coordination between the national officers and the state officials or that the national
organization truly kept this issue quiet for as long as possible. Given the close
cooperation between the officers and state officials on past issues it is doubtful that the
first option is the answer. Thus the desire for secrecy seems the likely answer, given
that the Alliance had been accepting money from the NACL for only four months. Of
course a third option is that Fankhanel lied.80
With the backing of brewing and liquor interests, the Alliance continued its
campaign against prohibition through 1916. The Senate hearings in April and May
1914, however, would be the last time the group testified before Congress. After that
time the NGAA confined its efforts to speeches by national officers and the continued
campaign at local and state levels.
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After the May hearings the connection between the Alliance and the NACL
grew even stronger. Both groups feared that the federal government was moving
closer to national prohibition. Correspondence between Andreae, Keller, and
Hexamer during the rest o f 1914 show a rapid expansion o f activities at the local
level—examples being chapters in Iowa, Texas, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri,
Maryland and Ohio which fought prohibition and received subsidies from the NACL
fUnd. By the end of the year Tjarks had dispersed $17,500 o f the $20,000 the NACL
had contributed, most of the funds going to campaigns against blue laws in those
states. In all instances this support assisted the Alliance in defeating these measures.81
On the national level prohibition went down to defeat on December 22 when the
House voted 197-189 in favor of the Hobson resolution, a measure calling for the
absolute prohibition o f alcohol. The legislation won a majority, but it failed to muster
the two-thirds support needed to submit it to the states for ratification.82 This victory
encouraged the Alliance to continue its campaign, and of course continuing to accept
funding from the brewing and liquor interests helped make the program possible.
In 1915 Andreae sent more than $14,000 to the NGAA and again Keller
distributed most of the money to the states. The states targeted in 1915 were Iowa,
Illinois, Ohio, and Texas with the largest amount going to Ohio for state and local
elections.83 The efforts met with limited success; the number of “wet” counties in
Ohio increased by only eight over the 1914 elections.84 The Ohio experience suggests
that the Alliance could do little to sway popular opinion regarding the liquor question.
In other states with active Alliance chapters a similar story unfolded. Two factors
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probably account for this lack o f success. First, the NGAA selected as its targets
states which already had blue laws. From the beginning they found themselves in an
uphill battle with little chance of winning. Voting patterns within these states indicates
that the influence of the organization remained mostly within the German-American
community.85 Second, at a time when the NGAA was poised to launch an even
stronger fight against prohibition other issues came to the forefront which would
distract the organization.
During 1913-1914 the NACL and the Alliance worked together to prevent
prohibition—with mixed results. Nonetheless both sides benefited from the effort.
The NACL obtained the support of an organization that was well established
throughout the nation, even though the Alliance’s influence was not as great as the
brewers hoped it would be. The NGAA claimed victory in preventing the passage of
the Hobson resolution, yet it is highly doubtful that the group had much influence over
Congress. The funding the Alliance received for its most persistent and important
campaign freed up the group’s own funds for other projects. One could surmise then
that each group attempted to utilize the other to achieve its own goals. In the end the
relationship was a losing proposition for both organizations. The brewing and liquor
interests gained little for the amount of money spent. The NGAA—while gaining
financially—gained little materially, but more importantly the publicity brought about
by the association damaged the Alliance’s image as an “educational and patriotic
organization” as called for in its charter. But at the time the relationship seemed to be
working and so the organizations continued to work with each other through 1916. In
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the end, of course, both sides would lose during a time when public opinion would be
swayed more by emotion than reason.
From 1910 to 1914 the NGAA enjoyed “High Tide” in its work to promote
German culture in the United States, and to preserve the memory of past contributions
by Germans in America—the issues which had brought about creation of the GermanAmerican Alliance. Unfortunately the year 1914 also would present an enormous
challenge. The start of the war in Europe created a condition far-removed from the
original purposes of the organization, with which it was ill-equipped to deal. The
World War One turned the Alliance into a full-time political interest group, aligned
with an unpopular cause.
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CHAPTER V

AMERICANS OR GERMANS? THE NGAA AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY,
1914-1917

The outbreak of the First World War touched off a period of approximately
two and one-half years during which the United States found itself a nation in the
middle. Legally neutral and a non-belligerent, rich and powerful, the nation affected—
and was affected by—the war in many important ways. During this period of
neutrality the German-American Alliance confronted as never before the dichotomy of
being American and also being German. In the shift of focus to war-related issues, the
Alliance almost invariably found itself taking the side of Germany in the war in
combating British propaganda that portrayed Germany as a threat to the civilized
world. It also involved itself in the neutrality debate, including efforts to prevent arms
shipments and loans to the Britain and France and ultimately, in keeping the United
States out of the conflict (if only because it probably would be a war with Germany).
The more the Alliance spoke on behalf of the fatherland, or attacked tactics o f its
enemies, the more it fostered an accusation of being German and not American,
especially from a populace—if not a government—that sympathized with the British
and French. Involvement in the presidential election of 1916—on the losing side, as it
turned out—worsened a rapidly deteriorating situation. The difficult period of
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American neutrality ended with the Alliance facing the worst case scenario: war
between the United States and Germany.
On June 28, 1914 Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie
were assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo, Bosnia by a Serbian nationalist. For the
next four weeks the world held its breath as the European powers drifted toward war.
On August 1 Germany declared war on Russia after that nation had refused to stop
mobilization of its armies. In less than one week the major European powers were at
war. In the United States, public sentiment was overwhelmingly against American
involvement. As United States Ambassador to England, Walter Hines Page, put it, “I
thank Heaven for many things - first the Atlantic Ocean.”1 In response to the national
mood Woodrow Wilson issued a Proclamation of Neutrality on August 4. This action
placed the United States in the role o f most powerful neutral. In a later address, the
president called upon Americans to be neutral in thought as well as action as the
nations of Europe set upon a course that would change the map of the world forever.
The war would also drastically affect the German-American community in the
United States. Even before the outbreak of the war the British began to project the
Alliance as a pro-German group. British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil
Spring Rice, wrote in January 1914:
Now at last it is clearly visible that inside the American organization
there is a foreign one, carefully & systematically organized, spreading
to every department of politics, finance, journalism, education,
administration, and business: that this has its own ends & its own
means—that it is far the best & most powerful of all the organizations
and is supported by one or two of the strongest of the others.2
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Although he does not mention the Alliance by name, one may imply—given the
growing estrangement between England and Germany—that the ambassador was
referring to the NGAA. Actions by the Alliance during the period of American
neutrality tended an air of credence to Spring Rice’s charges, primarily within circles
that would support the allied cause, and, in the end, helped create a perception that the
Alliance was a pro-German organization.
Other factors fostered this connection even before the war broke out. In the
years prior to the conflict a number of Alliance members had traveled to Germany for
personal visits and other various reasons including educational exchange programs.
The Kaiser had taken notice of the NGAA’s work in promoting German culture by
sending greetings to the 1909 convention and offering financial assistance for the
Germantown monument project. In late summer 1914, he bestowed the Order o f the
Eagle Fourth Class on Hexamer as a friend of the German people.3 This action,
seemingly innocent at the time, eventually helped foster the belief that the Alliance was
nothing less than an extension of the Pan-German movement, despite the fact that it
had refused membership in the Pan-German League at the convention o f 1909. At
that time the group proclaimed itself an American organization, concerned that
association with a movement based in Germany might hinder efforts at promoting
German culture in America.4
The Alliance responded quickly to Germany’s declaration of war against
Russia on August I . The Cincinnati chapter began its prohibition campaign with a
mass rally, during which John Schwab, president of the chapter, gave an address in
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which he portrayed Germany as the defender o f Germans around the world. He
attempted to identify prohibition as a nativist attack on German culture in America and
thus a fight against Germans. A prohibition victory would constitute a German defeat
and mark a return to American nativism. Schwab’s comments, surely expressed in the
passion of the moment, offered an extreme viewpoint since the Alliance had never
considered Germany the “defenders” of all people of German descent. News a few
moments later that Germany had declared war on Russia further heightened emotions
and caused the gathering to break out in a chorus of Die Wacht am Rhein. An
editorial in the Cincinnati Freie Presse the next day stated that it was ironic that at the
moment the Germans o f Cincinnati gathered to begin their battle against their
oppressors, the Fatherland was initiating its own.5
The New York chapter held a ceremony on August 4 to unveil a statue o f von
Steuben in Utica. Ambassador von Bemstorf and President Wilson were supposed to
attend but the European war kept them in Washington. Very little was mentioned
concerning the conflict except that all hoped it would end soon, and that the statute of
von Steuben should remind Americans o f the long standing ties between the United
States and Germany.6
German-American Catholics also voiced their support for Germany. The war
altered slightly the attitude o f the Catholic Central Verein toward the NGAA. Verein
president Joseph Frey called upon German-American Catholics to work with other
German-Americans. He announced that he had sent Hexamer a letter commending
the Alliance’s work in combating the distortions of the Anglo-American press.7
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Frey had always wished for closer cooperation between the two groups. The
problem had been that other high ranking officers, notably Joseph Matt and Frederick
Kenkel, wished to remain at a distance from “liberal” German-American organizations.
The war afforded Frey the opportunity to pursue closer relations with the NGAA on a
state and local, if not national level. Hexamer welcomed the initiative and as the war
progressed many German Catholics began to work with the local and state Alliance
chapters to combat British propaganda and prevent United States entry into the war.8
The NGAA tried to utilize this relationship to bring German-American Catholics into
the fight against prohibition and even into the Alliance. This strategy paid some small
dividends, in that local Alliance representatives were able to gain the membership of
Catholic organizations in Iowa, Illinois and Indiana by the summer of 1916.9 For the
most part, however, the two largest German-American organizations kept a distance
from each other and prohibition remained a major point of contention. As the Alliance
came under close scrutiny in the American press the Verein once again pulled away,
hoping to avoid becoming a victim o f the growing anti-German sentiment in the
United States.
Thus the Alliance and the CCV represented two distinct reactions to the
outbreak of war. The NGAA from the beginning came out in support of the German
cause—assuming a leadership role within the German-American community—while
the CCV was content to take a much more cautious, “wait and see approach.” Such
responses were not surprising given the fact that prior to the war the Alliance had been
outspoken on many national issues while the CCV usually remained subdued.
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For its part, the German-American community was divided over the issue.
One German-American, writing in the New York Times, encouraged his kinsmen to
maintain a low profile and avoid displays that could be construed as pro-German.10
Many Protestants, especially ministers, supported the German cause out of fear that a
German defeat would mean the defeat of culture and institutions to which the
Lutheran church in America was strongly attached. Other German-American
Lutherans, however, believed that Germany was receiving its due. One minister,
reacting to what he perceived as the growing arrogance of Germany, commented that
“the German people should accept the war as punishment from God, repent, and
return to God and his word.”11 German-American socialists labeled the war as the
consequence of ruling-class arrogance and greed. They held no sympathy for
Germany since they viewed it equally as guilty as France and Great Britain in
exploiting the masses. Eventually America also would be drawn into the conflict and
for the same reasons—sending its people to the slaughter in the defense of capitalism
and profits.12 Such conflicting viewpoints, which would continue throughout the
period of American neutrality, gave insight into the difficulty of the Alliance in rallying
large-scale support for its war-time agenda.
Between August and November the position of the Alliance on the war took
shape. As American neutrality policy evolved and the American press took on an
increasingly pro-British attitude, the Alliance increasingly voiced strong objections to
the actions by the American government and press—suggesting that the NGAA
viewed itself as the spokesperson for German-Americans and, to a lesser extent, other
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groups advocating absolute American neutrality. What started out as a plea for
German-Americans to contribute to German war relief rapidly became, by November,
an outright condemnation of the American press and the policy o f the United States
government regarding the war. Hexamer outlined the initial position in a letter to state
chapters and reproduced in The F atherlanda pro-German newspaper published by
George Sylvester Viereck in New York, on August 10:
At the recent serious time the duty of Germans and Americans o f
German ancestors in the United States is clearly defined. In the first
place we must stand firmly united to safeguard the good German name
against maliciousness and ignorance. I appeal to everyone o f German
birth or descent, high or low, rich or poor, capitalists, artisans, or
workingmen to take an interest in the agitation of the National German
American Alliance to create a two million dollar fund with which to aid
the wounded and suffering.13
Hexamer asked that donations be forwarded to the German Red Cross to assist in
aiding victims of the war. The letter also made reference to attempts o f British
propaganda to paint a picture of Germany as a barbarous nation out to crush tiny
Belgium and extinguish democracy from Europe. All German-Americans should work
to prevent such falsehoods from influencing public opinion in the United States.
The Alliance began raising money for German war relief in August. Every
state branch participated in the campaign that continued between 1914 and October
1917, with Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Wisconsin contributing the most. The
money was turned over on a regular basis to the German and Austrian ambassadors
for distribution to wounded, widowed and orphaned people in Germany and Austria.14
Local branches utilized various means to raise money. In larger cities such as New
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York and Philadelphia they formed “Quarter Clubs” in which an individual pledged to
donate a quarter per week. The Wisconsin chapter sold pictures of Kaiser Wilhelm
and Emperor Franz Joseph o f Austria. Units in other states sold Iron Cross
certificates. Some methods on the other hand were deceiving, such as the individual
who raised money by promising titles of nobility from the Kaiser once Germany won
the war.15 The campaigns demonstrated the strong attachment many GermanAmericans still held to Germany. By March 1917 the Alliance had raised $886,
670.18 for German war relief and had distributed all but $185. After the American
declaration of war in April the fund ceased soliciting contributions.16 No evidence
exists that the money went to anything other than humanitarian purposes. Even so,
this gesture of goodwill would come to haunt the organization when a Congressional
committee began investigating the Alliance.
By the end of August events in Europe and the United States caused the
NGAA to take a more active role regarding the war. On August 20 the British
Cabinet voted not to abide by the Declaration of London of 1909—a previous
agreement signed by the major powers giving neutral nations greater freedom of trade
during times of war, as well as exempting certain items such as copper ore and cotton
from the list of contraband goods.17 Such action ran the risk o f straining AngloAmerican relations, and proved to be a sensitive issue between the two nations during
the period of American neutrality. In November England declared the North Sea a
war zone and began to lay mines in the region. For its part, the United States issued a
protest regarding Britain’s rejection of the Declaration of London. British Foreign
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Minister Sir Edward Grey, encouraged by Ambassador Walter H. Page who informed
him that many “influential” Americans saw the British viewpoint, decided to stand firm
and by the end of October the United States seemingly dropped the matter.18 America
also failed to pursue the issue of British mining of the North Sea. This outcome left
the British encouraged that they could move aggressively—in some measure, make
their own rules—to prevent goods from reaching the enemy.
The United States was willing to trade with both sides in the conflict, but
British maritime policy, and the Royal Navy’s control of the seas, prevented such
action. Thus, from the beginning, American trade was almost exclusively with the
Allies, as producers and businessmen began to sell huge shipments of war material,
including cotton, copper ore, arms, and munitions to Britain and France. To many
people, including NGAA leaders, this one-sided trade represented a violation of
Wilson’s neutrality policy. If it was in large measure legally neutral, in the minds of
men like Hexamer it had a decidedly unneutral effect. If the United States was not
free to trade with the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) it should not
trade with the Entente Powers, especially not in arms and munitions. In essence
America had become an unneutral neutral.
The Alliance responded quickly to what it viewed as a rapidly developing proBritish policy in Washington. On August 26, 1914 Hexamer forwarded a letter to
Wilson regarding arms shipments by the Colt Manufacturing Company to Canada.
The letter charged that such actions were a violation of the neutrality set down in the
President’s statement on August 20 which called for all Americans to be neutral in
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thought as well as action.19 By the autumn of 1914 the government (which included
Wilson) had based its policy upon international law. The Commerce Department
stated that international law did not prevent restrictions on the shipment o f arms to
belligerent nations under specific conditions, and that the sale o f arms to nations at war
did not constitute a violation of American neutrality.20 With the British navy in firm
control o f the seas the Alliance knew full well that such a policy favored the allies.
In an address given on October 14, later published in The Fatherland,
Hexamer attacked the American press:
Should a stranger visiting our country read some o f our AngloAmerican newspapers of the present day he would come to the
conclusion that the American nation should bum the Declaration o f
Independence, tear up its Constitution and declare its people good and
loyal subjects of King George.21
Hexamer insisted that the press did not represent the true opinion of the majority of
Americans who could see through the lies of English propaganda and who understood
that Germany was defending itself from aggression from the east and west.
Hexamer hoped to counter a British propaganda campaign that increasingly
portrayed Germany as barbaric, a threat to democracy and civilization in general.
British efforts had been bolstered by the fact that the Royal Navy cut the only transAtlantic cable linking the United States and Germany. From that point on the only
means of direct communication between the America and Germany was through a
wireless station on the northeast coast, a sporadic source at best. Hexamer realized
that the battle was uphill, that the Alliance had to deal with descriptions o f the war
which were at best one-sided and at worst sharply anti-German.
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In a speech on November 24 at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia
Hexamer adopted an even more virulent tone. He portrayed the United States as a
nation which prayed for peace on Sunday while supplying England and its allies with
every conceivable contraband of war on every other day of the week. By the end of
the speech the Alliance president was engaged in a full-scale assault on American
policy:
I must confess that as a native American who fervently loves this land
of liberty, I am nauseated by the lick-spittle policy of our country,
which allows England to pull our nose, slap our face, and then licks the
hand that smites us. English ships patrol our waters, England forbids
us to buy ships and to trade with neutral nations as we would like,
England cuts the cables leading from our shores to a friendly nation,
and England decides for our Secretary o f State what news he may
impart to us American citizens, who employ and pay him.22
Hexamer charged that if had it not been for the NGAA and the AOH lobbying
Congress, the United States already would have allied itself with Britain.
Through such speeches the Alliance announced that it had taken sides in the
war and in the debate in the United States over foreign policy. It emerged as perhaps
the leading spokesman for Germany in this country and on most issues relating to the
European war, Wilson’s sharpest critic. Reverend Newell Hillis, a prominent East
coast clergyman, said that the NGAA should utilize its influence with Germany to
assist in the peace process. The New York Times also condemned the Alliance.
Instead of wasting its efforts on combating British propaganda and criticizing the
American government, the Times insisted, the NGAA should use its influence on the
German government to end the conflict. The Alliance responded immediately. Henry
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Weismann, president of the Brooklyn branch, condemned the Times as a pro-British
organ and challenged Hillis to a debate. Weismann stated that neither the Alliance nor
German-Americans had any influence with the German government since events in
Europe had escalated beyond anyone’s control.23
In its campaign for absolute American neutrality and promoting fair-play for
Germany, the Alliance had allies in the German-American press and in GermanAmerica. Hexamer had expressed pleasure with the way German-American
newspapers such as The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung and The Fatherland were
attempting to tell Germany’s side of the story.24 The latter paper was especially
important since it was published in the English language. Reaction to the war among
those German-Americans who favored Germany became increasingly vocal—almost
to the point o f unbounded carelessness and defiance in the face o f growing pro-Allied
opinion. In St. Louis, an August rally sponsored by the local NGAA chapter drew
thousands. The Westliche-Post declared:
Who will ever forget that moment, when thousands—as if moved by a
single will—as one rose to join in singing that powerful battle song, Die
Wacht am Rhein\ It was no trained choir—it was untrained voices
which were heard over the sound of the music—but never has Die
Wacht am Rhein so deeply touched every heart as in that sacred
moment. And then when out of thousands of throats the vow
Deutschland, Deutschland uber A lies rose to the heavens—there were
only a few eyes left dry.25
The rally in St. Louis was not an isolated incident. In cities around the nation with
large German populations such as Chicago, Milwaukee, New York, and Philadelphia,
German-Americans voiced their support for the cause o f the Central Powers. For
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these people the fatherland was fighting for its survival. Simultaneously professing
their love of democracy and the United States, they chose to forget that they were
supporting two of the most autocratic regimes in Europe.
While many people in the German-American community found themselves
caught up in the “war hysteria,” others who took the opportunity to express their
patriotism, nonetheless expressed concern over the policies o f the Wilson
administration. Hugo Munsterberg, the eminent Harvard psychologist, warned the
president that the Germans and Irish were turning against him because of what they
viewed as his pro-British policies. Wilson replied that the he was surprised to learn
such information:
Certainly no administration ever tried more diligently or watchfully to
preserve an attitude and pursue a line of conduct absolutely neutral. I
would consider it a favor if you would point out to us what are
considered the un-neutral acts of which this administration is thought to
have been guilty of.26
Even so, the president in no way chastised German or Irish-Americans for their attack
on America’s neutrality policy—in fact the president would never mention the Alliance
by name. Much of the criticism leveled against the Alliance was due to its
condemnation o f United States policy, and to a belief that it was fostering a proGerman attitude within the German-American community.
In early November an event happened that would come back to haunt the
NGAA. Speaking before the Prussian Diet in Berlin, Louis Viereck, special
correspondent for The Fatherland, spoke of the support that Germany could expect
from Germans-Americans. He claimed that the NGAA was the largest German
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organization outside the fatherland and that Germany could count on it to shape
opinion within the United States. Viereck explained that an initial predisposition
towards England and France had been replaced by a decidedly neutral position and
that the NGAA would assist in the maintenance o f this sentiment .27
Viereck’s speech had three immediate consequences. First, it directly involved
the NGAA in German-American relations, if not in the larger issue of the war.
Second, it created an illusion in the minds of German leaders regarding the Alliance’s
influence on United States policy. German leaders incorrectly thought that the NGAA
could serve as a counter weight to British propaganda in America—at best able to
shift American policy toward a pro-German position and, at worst, to assist in bringing
about a policy of absolute American neutrality. In reality the majority of GermanAmericans, while possibly harboring a desire for a German victory—or at least the
avoidance of a defeat—kept quiet in regards to the actions of the United States
government. Third, the speech fueled an allied propaganda campaign to identify a proGerman conspiracy operating within the United States. Viereck’s comments attracted
little attention from the American press at the time. They later would be dredged up
as evidence of German-American disloyalty.
By December 1914 the debate over United States policy had taken shape. On
December 7 Congressmen Richard Bartholdt of Missouri and Henry Volmer of Iowa
introduced legislation calling for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition and
munitions of war from the territory or any seaport o f the United States.28 Bartholdt
had long been a supporter o f the Alliance and its efforts to combat prohibition, while
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Volmer was president of the German-American Central Verein o f Scott County, Iowa.
The resolutions themselves did not prohibit the traffic outright, but instead gave the
President the power to embargo arms and munitions if he saw fit.29
The Alliance was quick to support the measures. Besides not wishing to see
Great Britain benefit from United States exports of war material, the organization
worried that continued trade would eventually draw the United States into the war—
most likely against Germany—as a means of preserving the nation’s financial interests.
The harsh rhetoric of Hexamer—especially his speech at the Academy of Music—and
others within the German-American community, suggested that the true enemy of the
United States was England and that war with that nation was more justifiable than a
conflict with Germany. Since the latter scenario was all but impossible, the Alliance
lobbied heavily for complete American neutrality to prevent the former scenario from
occurring. To this end, local chapters passed resolutions in favor of the Bartholdt and
Volmer bills. In Missouri, at the urging of Bartholdt, the state branch joined with the
AOH to form the American Neutrality League on December 16, the purpose of which
was to gamer support for the Bartholdt-Volmer resolutions and for continued
American neutrality.30
Congressional hearings into the measures took place on January 4 and 5, 1915.
Speaking for the Alliance were Hexamer, Sutro, Fankhanel, and Charles Weinsberg
(president of the Missouri branch). Hexamer submitted a copy o f a letter forwarded—
with the endorsement o f the state affiliates—to President Wilson which asked that he
take measures to assure that the United States remain neutral in name and action.
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Hexamer charged that current policy was not only decidedly one-sided, but by selling
arms to belligerent nations the United States was prolonging the conflict and the
misery of millions of people. He also asked the president how he could watch England
violate American neutrality without taking action.31
Hexamer pointed to the contradiction that tolerated shipment of arms to the
Allies and allowed Great Britain to halt trade between the United States and the
Central Powers, even in goods that were not war material. He then presented a series
of resolutions endorsed by the national executive committee and state branches that
called upon Congress to act to ensure strict American neutrality and he called upon all
Americans, in the name of peace, to adhere to strict neutrality.32 Other Alliance
representatives argued from similar points o f view. Sutro testified that in allowing
shipment of arms to belligerent nations, the United States was running the risk of being
drawn into the war.33 Weinsberg said that the United States should set an example of
a civilized nation by adhering to principles proposed at the Hague which called for an
end to the international sale of arms and ammunition.34
Meanwhile, local and state branches had undertaken petition campaigns. By
the middle of January petitions from all over the nation began arriving in Washington.
Each document called for an end to the arms trade and the maintenance of strict
American neutrality. The majority of the signatories were German-American. Local
NGAA chapters organized mass demonstrations in favor of the embargo measures in
Los Angeles, St. Louis, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Madison (where
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan was the featured speaker).35 The
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Fatherland demanded that the power of England over the American government be
broken once and for all and that the United States should stop furthering the cause of
war.36
The activities of the Alliance reflected that it had become a highly centralized
and structured organization that was more than willing to assume a leading role in the
neutrality debate. The campaign on behalf of the Bartholdt-Volmer bills benefited
from an organizational structure at the local, state, and national level that had been put
into place for the purpose of combating prohibition. The national leadership of the
NGAA employed similar strategies in both campaigns—lobbying Congress, petition
drives, and mass demonstrations at the local and state levels, all these activities
enshrouded in the flag of patriotism. While both issues were of special concern to
German-Americans, the NGAA tried to avoid making them appear as GermanAmerican issues, but waged the battle in the name of all law-abiding, patriotic
Americans. Their efforts bore fruit as they attracted support from outside the
German-American community. The New Republic came out in favor of embargo
legislation stating that:
There is a reasonableness about the German-American argument that
our neutrality is unreal unless, we forbid the export of arms. Germany
having lost command of the sea, American traffic in war supplies helps
the Allies. Partisans aside, there is, we believe, a growing body of
pacifist opinion which insists that American manufacturers are
“capitalizing on carnage,” making profits out of murder, and that in
decency and in humanity this nation ought to have nothing to do with
the European crime.37
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There was good reason for the New Republic to accuse American manufacturers of
“capitalizing on carnage.” By the end of 1914 United States trade with the Allies
amounted to $825 million. By the end of 1916 that amount would reach 3.3 billion.
Between 1914 and 1916 United States trade with Germany and Austria only amounted
to $ 172 million.38

Representative Bartholdt invited supporters of the embargo to

meet at the New Willard Hotel in Washington D.C. on January 30, 1915. Attending
were fifty-eight representatives from major German-American groups as well as from
academia, and Congress. The list of attendees included Hexamer, Weismann,
Reverend Gottleib Berkemeier of the Lutheran Church of North America Joseph Frey
o f the Catholic Central Verein, Professor A.B. Faust of Cornell University, Bernard
Ritter of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, George Sylvester Viereck, and Congressman
Henry Volmer.39 Besides promoting embargo legislation, the group met to create an
organization that would promote and secure absolute American neutrality as they
defined it. The one-day meeting resulted in the passage of a series of resolutions:
1. In order to assume the possession o f an independent news service
we favor an American cable, controlled by the Government of the
United States.
2. We demand a free and open sea for the commerce o f the United
States, and unrestricted traffic in non-contraband goods as defined
by international law.
3. We favor as a strictly American policy the immediate enactment of
legislation prohibiting the export of arms, ammunition, and
munitions of war.
4. We favor the establishment of an American merchant marine, and:
5. We pledge ourselves individually and collectively to support only
such candidates for public office, irrespective o f party, who will
place American interests above those of any other country and who
will aid in eliminating all undue foreign influence from American
life.40
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In drafting these resolutions the delegates believed that they were adhering to
Wilson’s neutrality proclamation of August 20, 1914. The fact that the majority of the
delegates at the meeting were German-American coupled with the veiled threat o f only
backing “true American” candidates produced an immediate reaction. Instead o f being
viewed as a body with the interests of the United States in mind, the New Willard
gathering came to be viewed as a tool of German interests in America.
The American press led the reaction. The Literary Digest accused the
gathering of using patriotism to hide its true purpose: to coerce the American
government into a pro-German stand.41 The Washington Herald exclaimed that the
meeting was, “a Teutonic gathering.”42 Newspapers such as the New York Herald,
Philadelphia Public Ledger and New York Times condemned the meeting as a pawn of
German propaganda efforts.43 The Times went so far as to accuse the delegates of
attempting to embroil the United States in the conflict on the side of Germany.
Suspicion grew even more when local NGAA chapters sponsored petition drives and
mass rallies in support of the resolutions in major cities throughout the United States.
Also labeling the gathering “ a meeting of Teutons,” the Washington Post accused the
New Willard Hotel gathering of acting in Germany’s cause while hiding under the
cover of patriotism.44
Predictably, the German-American press rallied behind the New Willard
conference. The St. Louis Westliche-Post, Illinois Staats-Zeitung, New Yorker StaatsZeitung, and The Fatherland all denounced the English language press as proponents
of British propaganda in the United States. The The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung
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insisted that the New Willard proposals represented an attempt to keep the United
States out of the war, free the press from foreign control, and end British interference
with the commerce of the United States. In The Fatherland Viereck argued that such
newspapers as The New York Times demonstrated the extent to which the allies
controlled the popular press in America. The foreign policy of the United States, he
charged, was being held hostage by the British navy.45
On February 3 Hexamer sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee an
open letter which focused on the Royal Navy’s controls on American shipping. He
railed against an American press that was referring to Germany as the “War-Lord,”
while ignoring the fact that there was a “Sea-Lord” that dictated when, where, and
with whom the United States could trade. He called upon the Senate to support the
embargo legislation, thus freeing America from the yoke of British tyranny while also
taking a step towards finding an end to a conflict that was causing millions to suffer.46
German-Americans were not alone in their condemnation of United States
policy. An editorial published in the Open Court, a quarterly journal of the day,
denounced the neutrality policy of the American government, supported the embargo
proposals, and commended the loyalty o f German-Americans, stating that they could
not be expected to sit by while their nation became the pawn of Great Britain.47
With the nation so divided on the issue the fate of the embargo measures
rested, to a large degree, upon the actions of the president. As his biographer Arthur
S. Link pointed out, “Wilson struggled hard, one might even say prayerfully, during
the late autumn o f 1914 for the right answer.”48 Even by December he had still not
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fully reconciled the issue in his own mind. In a letter to Jacob Schiff, head o f the
investment firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company, Wilson outlined his dilemma regarding
one aspect of his neutrality policy:
The law standing as it does, the most I can do is to exercise influence,
and in the case o f lending money I was directly applied to for advice
and approval. Here my duty is clear. It was my duty to discourage
loans to belligerents.49
The president was attempting to maintain the moral high-ground while simultaneously
adhering to the law and the wishes of American business. In early 1915 he turned to
Robert Lansing, a renowned expert on international law, for advice on whether or not
an embargo would be a violation of neutrality. Lansing concurred with Secretary of
State William Jennings Bryan that to deny the Allies the right to purchase arms would
be looked upon as an unneutral act, especially since, in their minds, the Bartholdt and
Volmer bills were designed to favor one side over the other.50 Consequently, Wilson
took the position that while the government must not be involved the president had no
right to interfere with the sale by private companies of munitions to belligerents. With
the Wilson now firmly against embargo legislation, the measures had little chance of
becoming law.
Despite what seemed to be a losing cause, Bartholdt spoke on behalf of the
legislation he sponsored on February 15, 1915. He reminded the House that the
United States was a composite nation, not made up of only people of English ancestry.
In fact Americans of German descent made up the single largest ethnic group. He
accused the British and French of trying to turn American opinion against Germany
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through the use o f the English language press in America. He applauded such groups
as the NGAA which attempted to combat lies spread by the pro-British press.51
German-American activity on behalf of Germany was designed to preserve the good
name of a people that had contributed much to the growth of the United States. These
actions grew out of a sense of national pride and a desire that the United States not
become involved in the conflict. Bartholdt concluded by chastising the American
government for a neutrality that was overtly unneutral—in favor of Great Britain at
the expense of Germany.52
Shortly after this address Bartholdt retired from Congress, thus abandoning
plans to run for the Senate. He explained the reason in his memoirs:
Alas, this bud of an idea was killed by European cannon. The war
caused so sharp a division among our people that, as I saw it, a man of
German blood would have had about as much chance as a grasshopper
in a coop of hungry turkeys. At least for the Senate.53
Thus ended the career of perhaps the most influential German-American congressman.
He had originally been elected to the House in 1892. Ever since the founding of the
Alliance in 1901 he had been a strong advocate for the organization’s efforts at being
granted a national charter, its combating prohibition and maintaining German culture
in America. His retirement was not only a blow to securing passage of embargo
legislation, but also a setback for the Alliance which lost its greatest spokesman in
Congress. The NGAA, in Mitteilungen, commended Bartholdt as being not only a
friend of German-Americans, but also an individual who always placed the interests of
the United States above everything else.54
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Another pressing issue in the United States during the period o f neutrality was
Germany’s submarine policy. Early successes by U-boats in sinking British warships
encouraged Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, head o f the German navy, to expand the
campaign to include enemy commerce. From September 1914 to January 1915 a
debate raged amongst German naval leaders over Tirpitz’s proposal. In the end his
view won out and on February 4 the Kaiser declared the waters around Britain to be a
“war-zone” in which all military and commercial shipping would be subject to
submarine attack. The United States government responded by warning Germany of “
the very serious possibilities of the course of action apparently contemplated,” and that
the German government would be held strictly accountable for its actions.55
Quick to materialize, these consequences placed the NGAA in an unenviable
position of attempting to defend a government that appeared to be making war on
civilians. The sinking by a German submarine of the British passenger liner Lusitania
on May 7, 1915 produced the high-water mark o f Alliance activities on behalf of an
embargo as well as a wide-spread backlash against Germany in the United States since
128 Americans were among the 1,198 killed in the attack. Instead of following public
sentiment, which branded the U-boat’s actions as a barbaric attack on civilians, The
Fatherland and Mitteilungen unwisely chose to blame United States policy of
allowing arms shipments to belligerents as reason for the incident. The main blame,
however, was placed squarely on British maritime policy and an English government
that failed to warn passengers of munitions in the ship’s hold. An editorial in
Mitteilungen even went so far as to accuse the British of “letting the vessel go to her
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doom, in the hopes of drawing the United States into the war.”56 The Alliance also
charged that had the Bartholdt-Volmer Bills been law, the munitions in the ship’s hold
that caused the explosion would not have been there and 128 Americans would still be
alive.57 Finally, the group pointed out that the German embassy had posted warning
notices next to the Cunard Line advertisements advising passengers that by sailing into
British waters they were at risk, since those waters constituted a war zone. The
British, for their part, chose not to tell passengers about the arms in the cargo hold.58
The timing o f the Alliance was less than wise, for even though it reasserted loyalty to
the United States, the sinking of the Lusitania produced the first wave of anti-German
sentiment that carried over to all German-American organizations.59 Hexamer even
began to receive threatening letters.60
The sinking, coupled with Wilson’s sharply-worded notes to the German
government, threw the Alliance on the defensive. In hindsight it would have been well
advised to either support American policy or keep quiet until the storm blew over.
More important was the fact that the Alliance never did take a definitive position on
the submarine question. Its indecision led Americans supporting the Allied cause—
which constituted a majority—to become convinced that the NGAA considered
sinking passenger liners in war zones justifiable. No matter what the Alliance did, or
how it responded in the future, that position would be irrevocably linked to the
Alliance and its purported campaign for absolute American neutrality. As it continued
to pledge loyalty to the United States, the Alliance chastised Wilson for placing blame
on Germany, insisting that the actions of the United States and Great Britain had led to
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the sinking. Instead o f sending harshly worded statements to the German government,
the United States should be investigating a charge that munitions were in the
Lusitania’s hold and taking steps to end the arms trade which had caused the incident
in the first place.61
On June 24 a demonstration was held at Madison Square Garden in support of
keeping America out o f the war. The Alliance helped to organize the gathering which
featured William Jennings Bryan as the keynote speaker. Bryan had recently resigned
his post as Secretary o f State in protest over Wilson’s notes to the German
government regarding the Lusitania incident. He deemed the harsh tone of the second
note—which demanded an end to Germany’s submarine policy— as exceptionally
dangerous. This incident persuaded Bryan that Wilson had set America on a collision
course with Germany. He spoke of patriotism and honor to one’s country, and the
need to stay out of the war at all costs. He also condemned those who sought profit in
carnage and who desired American entry into the conflict:
This is war as we now have it, and yet these of our countrymen who
see in force the only arbitrator of international disputes, revel in the
daily account o f carnage in the name of national honor, and call upon
this nation to prepare itself to enter the contest .62
Bryan’s speech met with spontaneous cheers from a gathering made up of
primarily German and Irish-Americans. They responded by waving American flags
and calling for an end to a policy that could bring America into the war. The body
passed a resolution calling for passage of the Bartholdt-Volmer Bills, stronger
measures by government to protect its citizens abroad, and freeing America from the
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yoke of foreign tyranny and the money interests. The last statement was a reference to
Britain’s blacklisting of American business and those American munitions firms doing
business with the Central Powers63 Another outcome o f the gathering was the
creation of a body called The Friends o f Peace, a joint German-Irish American effort
sponsored by the NGAA and AOH designed to keep the United States from going to
war on the side of Great Britain.64
The NGAA viewed the Madison Square Garden demonstration as a great
success, a reinforcement of its belief that the nation did not wish to go to war with
Germany and a mandate for continuing criticism o f administration policy. The New
York branch’s convention in July produced a scathing attack on the president by
Henry Weismann, who accused Wilson of grasping at powers not granted in the
Constitution, of one-sided neutrality that had drawn the United States dangerously
close to war with Germany. He finished with a remark that Wilson was a bankrupt
politician and should not be re-elected.65
The Alliance continued to work for embargo legislation. The Chicago chapter
helped organize the American Embargo Conference on August 1 and for the next five
and a half months it worked at organizing similar committees across the nation. By
February 1916 it claimed to have over 2500 branches.66 This organization, created
and dominated by German-Americans, sponsored petition drives and letter writing
campaigns aimed at influencing Congress and the president on issues involving
neutrality.
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In the meantime the NGAA met in San Francisco in August 1915 for its eighth
and, unknown to anyone at this time, last national convention. This gathering was
larger and more extravagant than the previous seven; more than six hundred delegates
representing forty-five states attended the meeting. The group had decided to switch
the meeting time from October to August in order to coincide with the San Francisco
Exposition.
Agitation of the past few months over Wilson’s neutrality policy, and demands
by the German-American press that the NGAA clarify its stand on German-American
relations produced anticipation for lively sessions. Even before the convention formally
met, Hexamer again sharply rebuked the government for allowing for arms shipments
to England while claiming to be neutral.67 In most of its sessions the conference
devoted itself to resisting an anti-German bias in the nation’s newspapers and
clarifying the Alliance’s position on the embargo and other war-related questions.
Convinced that British interests controlled the English language press, the delegates
called upon the Associated Press and the United Press to correct themselves and
report the war in an unbiased fashion.68
This accusation brought a sharp reply from Arthur Copp, Superintendent of the
Western Division o f the A. P. Copp admitted that many newspapers exhibited a proBritish bias, but insisted that the Associated Press had nothing to do with the editorial
policies of these papers. He strongly condemned the charge that his organization was
controlled by English capital and chastised the convention for making such an unjust
accusation.69
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The action on the convention floor heated up on the third day when a
resolution submitted by Henry Bloedel provoked the delegates into angered debate.
The resolution called for a letter for President Wilson which condemned his conduct
of foreign policy and hypocritical stance on neutrality and placed blame for the
continuing controversy over submarine warfare squarely on the American government
for trying to play both ends against the middle. Bloedel’s letter ended with the
rhetorical assertion that the United States stood convicted before the tribunal of
history.70
The harshness o f the letter surprised many of the delegates, and produced a
debate so intense that several delegates and national officers threatened to resign if the
letter was sent. In the end Hexamer, who might have inspired the letter with his
denunciation of Wilson, stepped in and worked toward a compromise. An amended
letter, accepted by the delegates, called upon the government to act in the name of
humanity and help bring about the war’s end, rather than assisting in its continuation
through supplying arms to the belligerents. In this time of darkness, the letter
concluded, America should be a moral light.71
The debate over the Bloedel resolution had exposed the stress that the world
war had produced for the German-American Alliance, if not for the German-American
population. The resolution had divided the organization as never before and a small
faction was prepared to challenge the administration outright, even to the point of
personal attacks on the president. As demonstrated in his preliminary talk, Hexamer
was prepared to go to this extreme. The majority of delegates, realizing that such
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actions would only serve to antagonize the president and public opinion in the United
States, counseled moderation. In the end their views won out as the Alliance focused
on trying to maintain peace between Germany and the United States.
The damage had already been done. The debate in San Francisco also divided
the German-American press. Such papers as the Milwaukee Germania-Herold and
The New Yorker-Staals Zeitung applauded the delegate’s decision to take a more
moderate stance. On the other hand the Cincinnati Freie Presse and The Fatherland
chastised the convention for not being willing to utilize the strong language necessary
on the issue.72 The Fatherland accused the Alliance of “retreating into typical
German-American conservatism at a time that when stronger language regarding
United States policy needed to be employed.”73 The New York Times, on the other
hand, admonished the gathering for its denunciation of Wilson and its continued
criticism of American policy.74
Needless to say, the convention had attracted the attention of the president and
people around him. Wilson chose not to respond to the accusations, saying privately
that to respond to accusations of men like Weismann and Hexamer would give the
impression that he was paying them deference. Some of his aides, however, were
hard-pressed to keep silent on the issue. Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson’s secretary, said
that the attitude of such men was growing increasingly intolerable to Americans not in
the hyphen class.75 The fact that the president and his staff even paid attention to the
proceedings indicated that they viewed the Alliance as a force to be considered. To
openly criticize the organization, however, would run the risk of drawing the ire of the
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German-American community—something the president was not willing to do so
close to an election year.
A new situation arose in late summer 1915 that again caused the Alliance to
attack administration policy. In an attempt to bolster the purchasing power of Great
Britain, American exporters urged the president to reverse the government’s position
on granting loans to the Allies. On August 21 Wilson gave the go ahead for loans to
be granted to the Allies so that they could continue to purchase goods, including
munitions in the United States.76 In reaching his decision the president was influenced
by his earlier stand on the embargo question—the belief that the American government
could not truly be neutral if it prevented belligerent nations from borrowing money.
He was also influenced by a renewed strain in United States-German relations due to
the sinking o f the British liner Arabic by a German U-boat on August 19. The ship
could not have possibly been hauling contraband since it was traveling westward from
Liverpool, England.77 Wilson informed the German ambassador that Germany must
yield on this question or suffer a break in diplomatic relations. In response the German
government offered its “Arabic Pledge”—a promise to not attack passenger ships
without warning, and a substantial concession to the United States. Even before the
German concession the president had decided to lift the ban on loans to belligerents.
The response of the NGAA was swift. On September 15 Hexamer denounced
the actions in a memorandum to all Alliance chapters. In a speech on that same day he
charged that “in combination the money trusts and the Anglo-American finance
campaign control the press and are trying to draw a friendly nation into the conflict.”78
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He called upon all German-Americans to protest by withdrawing funds from any banks
that granted loans to the Allies.79 The German-American press responded with the
greatest outcry coming from the East and Midwest. The Germania-HeroldIllinois
Staats-Zeitung, Pittsburgh Volksblatt und Freiheits-Freund, and The New Yorker
Staats-Zeitung accused the United States of being dominated by the money trust .80
The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung sarcastically asked why should Americans buy British
bonds when one could purchase Confederate bonds cheaper and they would be just as
good. Local Alliance chapters, especially in the Midwest and East organized protest
meetings and petition drives. The New York chapter went so far as to suggest that
German-Americans pool their money and create a new banking system.81
Speaking in November in Milwaukee on the tenth anniversary of the founding
of the Wisconsin branch, Hexamer praised past efforts by the group in promoting
German culture and ideals. He spoke of patriotism, love of country and insisted that
the NGAA sought, not a pro-German policy, but a pro-American policy based upon
strict neutrality. He again condemned loans to the Allies as a waste of money that
Americans could use helping people at home.82 In his discussion of German culture
he revealed a side previously not visible—at least to the extreme exhibited in
Milwaukee:
No people is so modest and no people is so ready to recognize the
good in others as the Germans. But we will not permit our kultur of
two thousand years to be trodden down in this land. We can give our
German kultur only to America if we stand together and conquer that
dark spirit of muckerdom and prohibition just as Siegfried once slew
the dragon.83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217

What prompted Hexamer to speak in such a way is not known. His overt praise of
German culture during a time of serious strain in relations between the United States
and Germany was ill-timed. He evidently attempted to revive a campaign against
temperance that had become secondary to war-related issues.
By the end of the year the efforts at combating the loan program had proved
moderately successful. In cities with large German-American populations, such as
New York and Chicago, many bankers refused to participate, fearing a run on their
institutions.
But the campaign for passage of the Bartholdt-Volmer Bills ended in failure.
In the face of growing pro-Allied sentiment and pressure from American business
engaged in overseas trade. Chairman Henry Flood of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee pigeon-holed the bills and by early 1916 embargo legislation seemed all
but dead. American producers and manufacturers went on to fill an estimated 3.3
billion dollars worth of orders for the Allies during 1916.84 Yet the Alliance could not
view this setback as a final defeat. Public opinion, while pro-Ally, did not desire to see
the United States become directly involved in the conflict. The NGAA could claim a
degree of satisfaction for this attitude, but the events of the past year hardened
Hexamer and other members towards what it perceived as a nation falling victim to
special interest groups that placed monetary gain over the morality of supplying war
material that prolonged the suffering of millions, and an administration that was proBritish and unwilling to support legitimate trade with the Central Powers.
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The NGAA faced other consequences o f the events of 1915. Various actions,
coupled with statements by the national leadership, had begun to tarnish the Alliance
in the eyes of the public and the government. While many sympathized with the effort
to keep America out of the war they could not condone the public condemnation of
the president and his policies, not from what appeared to be if not a foreign, at least a
foreign-oriented—a pro-German—organization. Even the attempts to explain their
position in terms of patriotism failed. Many Americans viewed the actions as an effort
to influence United States foreign policy in favor of Germany. The embargo and loan
debates brought out sharp division within the Alliance itself. Up until this time such
differences had not been a matter of public record. The controversy at the San
Francisco convention changed that situation. It remained to be seen if these divisions
were permanent or only spontaneous reactions to emotional issues.
The events of 1915 produced the greatest fear of all: that financial ties to the
Allies would eventually result in America being drawn into the war in order to protect
its investment, or simply that war would be the final result of events as they transpired.
To avoid that catastrophe, the NGAA felt that the United States needed to have a
government that would enforce a policy of absolute neutrality. Thus the primary
objective in 1916 was the defeat o f Woodrow Wilson in his effort at reelection.
O f course the election was not the only issue of concern. In January 1916
Senator Thomas Gore introduced two resolutions designed to keep American citizens
from traveling on the vessels of belligerent nations. The first resolution called for the
refusal to grant a passport to any American seeking passage on a belligerent vessel.
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The second resolution, more strongly worded, prohibited the transportation of United
States citizens on vessels of belligerent nations.85 In February Representative Jeff
McLemore of Texas introduced legislation that authorized the president to warn all
Americans to not travel on armed merchant vessels.86 Through keeping Americans out
of danger on the high seas, both pieces of legislation were aimed at ending the
continuing controversy—or at least the worst features of it—between the United
States and Germany over submarine policy. Wilson objected to principles in the
legislation and to having policy dictated to him and his opposition caused both
resolutions to go down to defeat, Gore’s on March 3 and McLemore’s on March 7.87
For the NGAA, the Gore-McLemore resolutions took on an ominous tone.
Beginning on March 7 the New York World published a series of articles which
attempted to link the NGAA to the Gore-McLemore resolutions, thus accusing it of
interfering in politics at the national level. In his book The German-Americans in
Politics Clifton Childs argued that this information had, at least, the flavor of a plot for
anyone who had a little knowledge of the Alliance and its activities.88
The World accused the NGAA of being nothing more than a “German Lobby”
in disguise that had as its goal the defeat of Wilson and manipulation of American
foreign policy.89 It charged that through the hiring o f lobbyist T.L. Marsalis the
Alliance became the sponsor of the two bills in Congress. The paper claimed to have
obtained letters between Alphonse Koelble, president o f the United German Societies
of New York, and Henry Weismann that dealt with plans to create a lobby for the
German government in Washington. The World failed to indicate how it obtained the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

220

correspondence. The State Department and White House viewed the revelations as
significant. Wilson was said to have stated that the articles were proof of an organized
German plot in America.90 The New York Times chastised the Alliance for attempting
to violate its charter by “trying to influence the presidential election.”91
The Alliance reaction indicates that it was caught off guard. Hexamer flatly
denied that the NGAA had prompted the Gore-McLemore resolutions. He admitted
that he supported any measure that would either warn or prohibit American citizens
from traveling on vessels of belligerent nations, but denied that his organization was
attempting to influence the upcoming Republican convention in hope of defeating
Wilson.
In a seemingly contradictory statement, Albert Godsho, Hexamer’s secretary,
stated that the Alliance intended to work to secure the president’s re-election if the
Republicans nominated Elihu Root or Theodore Roosevelt, candidates considered
even more Anglophile than Wilson. The Times article promptly utilized this statement
to charge that the NGAA was prepared to involve itself in national politics, in violation
of its national charter 92 Godsho, fully aware of restrictions on the national
organization, probably meant that the local and state chapters would work to influence
the election’s outcome. Local chapters possessed no national charter, and thus faced
no legal constraints similar to the national organization.
Adding to the confusion, Koeble admitted that the letters were genuine, and
that they had been stolen from his office. He insisted that while the Alliance
supported the Gore-McLemore resolutions, it had nothing to do with their drafting
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and flatly denied the participation of Marsalis.93 Several Senators and Congressmen,
including Gore and McLemore, Speaker Champ Clark and Senator William Borah
supported Koelble’s accounts. Each stated that while they might have met Marsalis,
he was not a pro-German lobbyist. Other Congressmen accused the World of
publishing a story that was nothing more than a deliberant, malignant, and malicious
lie.94 Eventually the controversy surrounding the World expose died down.
The World article, however, had added to the growing suspicion o f the
Alliance and many people joined in the attack. In late 1915 the group had found itself
under criticism from various individuals and groups around the nation. The most
vocal critic had been former president Theodore Roosevelt, who condemned the
NGAA for retarding the assimilation of German-Americans into American society. In
reply, the Alliance chastised Roosevelt for condemning German-Americans, “for not
blowing into the British horn.”95 Mitteilungen accused him of accepting British
money for Outlook, a publication he edited.96 Ironically, when Roosevelt was
president he had applauded the work of the Alliance and the contributions of GermanAmericans. While probably an attempt to bolster his presidential ambitions,
Roosevelt’s charges identified—or reconfirmed—him as an extreme Anglophile and a
threat to all aspects of the Alliance’s program.
This early criticism formed the cornerstone for an “anti-German” campaign
that would begin to escalate in early spring 1916. In March the World again went on
the attack—branding the NGAA as an agent of the Kaiser and demanding that it be
disbanded. It insisted that the Alliance sought the defeat of Wilson because he would
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not ally the United States with the Teutonic powers.97 As in the previous expose the
World had little concrete evidence to back its statements. It was simply following an
old practice o f producing sensational literature to sell newspapers. For its part, while
the Alliance had always professed its loyalty to the United States, and never given any
indication that it was a pan-German movement, it had taken positions, including one
on submarine warfare that were similar to positions o f the German government.
Together with attacks on Great Britain and American neutrality policy, these positions
left it vulnerable to—even invited—criticism, including the charge that it acted as an
agent for German interests.
And the charges continued to come. Gustavus Ohlinger, president of the
Toledo Chamber of Commerce, later a star witness in Senate hearings to revoke the
charter o f the Alliance, published an article in the April edition of the Atlantic Monthly
entitled, “German Propaganda in the United States,” which accused the Alliance of
being nothing more than a separatist organization designed to promote German
interests in America98 Ohlinger in 1916 also published a book entitled Their True
Faith and Allegiance, in which he viewed the Alliance as a component of the
“Teutonic battle line in the struggle against Anglo-Saxon leadership.”99 Outlining
activities o f the NGAA since its inception, he concluded that the organization
promoted only German interests in America. He warned that in seeking to place
German ideals above the duties of American citizenship the Alliance acted as an agent
of disunion.100
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As with the articles in the World, Ohlinger’s statements represented not fact,
but slanted interpretations and no small measure o f sensationalism. They also reflected
a continuing belief in the nation of some sort of “Pan-German” plot to undermine
American institutions and values. While impossible to prove, these accusations laid a
foundation o f suspicion in regards to the Alliance and other pro-German organizations.
The NGAA must share part of the blame for the criticism it received. In following an
agenda that was openly pro-German the Alliance went against a national mood that
was primarily pro-British and was having serious problems with German actions on the
high-seas.
The incident that brought about a new crisis in German-American relations was
the torpedoing of the channel steamer Sussex by a German U-boat in the English
Channel on March 24, 1916— seemingly a violation of the Arabic pledge. Wilson
responded by forwarding a harshly-worded note to the German government
demanding an end to all attacks on passenger ships and merchant vessels or face a
break in relations. Not wishing to antagonize the United States, the German
government, after debating the issue, surrendered to American demands a second time.
The Sussex incident ended in a victory for American diplomacy, but it had produced a
new strain in relations with Germany and again placed the Alliance under a microscope
as the nation prepared for the upcoming presidential election.
Much has been written regarding the activities of the Alliance and GermanAmericans in general during the election of 1916.101 In the case of the NGAA the
election served as the “high-water” mark for its activities on the national level. Both
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the Alliance and the German-American community regarded it as the most important
election since I860.102 Each prospective candidate possessed some measure of threat
in the eyes of many German-Americans. Roosevelt’s violent anti-German and anti
hyphen rhetoric of the past few months had left him absolutely discredited. Wilson’s
one-sided neutrality underscored his Anglophile tendencies and the potential for him
drawing the United States into the war against Germany. For the Alliance the
election nonetheless became a matter o f honor and survival, and the group had no
choice but to get involved. It had long ago committed itself to involvement in issues
beyond the realm of German culture and history. Older issues of German language
instruction, theater, music, and other cultural enterprises, while still important, now
took a back seat to politics and the war.
Even the prohibition question had become a issue of secondary importance—
partly due to the fact that the Alliance was no longer receiving funds from the NACL,
which had been disbanded in March 1916. As the Alliance grew more controversial at
the national level, the brewers began to distance themselves from the organization.
Though funding would continue to a degree at the local level, support for the national
organization would never again reach the levels of 1914-1915. Without this funding
the NGAA was hard-pressed to continue its campaign against the “wets” while
pursuing its main goal, now defined as keeping America out o f the war. Given the
commercial and financial connections between the United States and the Allies, an
absolute impartial American neutrality no longer seemed possible.
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By taking part in the election the Alliance was taking a gamble. If its candidate
were to lose it would find itself discredited while possibly attracting the ire of the new
president and his government. For this reason Alliance members disagreed on how far
it should go in national politics. Weismann warned against any involvement at all.
Elected president of the New York branch at the state convention in July, he advised
staying out of politics.103
Nonetheless, a majority of state chapters began to organize against Wilson
(almost certain to be renominated by the Democrats) and in opposition to Roosevelt’s
becoming the Republican candidate. The Illinois Alliance adopted as its slogan Alle
gegen Roosevelt und Wilson, and called for help from all chapters in Illinois and other
states.104 Other state branches passed similar resolutions. The Central Alliance of
Pennsylvania met in special session in April to consider the question of participation in
the national election. Officers in attendance agreed that while its charter prohibited the
national organization from taking part in national politics, it did not prevent state
branches from doing so. The Central Alliance devised a plan for coordinating the
individual state organizations. Timm, an officer in the state Alliance and also the
secretary of the national organization, became head of the commitee.105 It was
decided that a meeting of branch leaders should take place early in the near future to
discuss the election.
The German-American position had improved somewhat in the summer due to
a reprieve in German-American relations brought about by the Sussex concession and
by a strain in Anglo-American relations caused by British seizure of mail ships on the
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Atlantic, its blacklisting of many American companies and unwillingness of the Allies
to enter into peace negotiations as proposed by President Wilson. The blacklisting of
eighty-seven American companies suspected of dealing with the Central Powers
brought Wilson almost to the breaking point. In a letter to Colonel Edward House the
president wrote that, “This black list business is the last straw, I am seriously
considering asking Congress to authorize me to prohibit loans and restrict exportations
to the Allies.”106 Ambassador Page, upon returning from London, attempted to plead
Great Britain’s case and was, in turn, treated “like the plague.”107 In the end however
other factors prevailed: Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed the British
ambassador that the president would use retaliatory legislation only as a last resort.
It was under these circumstances that delegates from twenty-eight states
gathered at the Hotel Kaiserhof in Chicago from May 28-29. The timing of this
special gathering, shortly before the Republican convention in the same city,
represented an effort to influence the nominating procedure. The main task of the
meeting was to coordinate the position of the local Alliance chapters, the GermanAmerican press, and leaders within the German-American community. On the second
day the collective body agreed to eight resolutions:
1. We demand a neutrality in strict accordance with the advice
contained in George Washington’s address to the American people.
2. We urge a foreign policy which protects America lives and
American interests with equal firmness and justice.
3. We condemn every official act and policy which shows passionate
attachment for one belligerent nation or inveterate antipathy for
another.
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4. We deplore those utterances, voiced by officials, ex-officials, and
others designed to create a division along racial lines among our
people.
5. We hope that no party will nominate for the Presidency a candidate
whose views tend to establish such division.
6. We trust that the Republican Convention will unite all the elements
in the party upon a candidate whose views are in harmony with
those hereinbefore expressed.
7. We trust the Democratic Convention will nominate for the
Presidency one who subscribes to the views expressed hereinbefore.
8. We assert that any candidate for the Presidency who is not in
accord with the views expressed hereinbefore is unworthy the
support of a free and independent electorate.108
While not endorsing any candidate the delegates gave obvious hints as to whom not to
support. Item four was directed at Roosevelt and Wilson, both of whom had been
voicing objections to the activities of the Alliance and the German-American press.
Although they mentioned no names, the resolutions represented an effort to encourage
the Republicans to select a candidate acceptable to the Alliance. Immediately after the
meeting a delegation arrived at the hotel of Charles Hillis, chairman of the Republican
National Committee. The delegation told Hillis that German-Americans would gladly
vote for Charles Evans Hughes, but in no way would they support the candidacy of
Theodore Roosevelt or Elihu Root.109
The English language press responded critically to the resolutions, which some
deemed an ultimatum. Calling the assembled body “apologists for murder,” the New
York Times observed that “the only interests that interest them are German.” 110 The
St. Louis Post-Dispatch accused the conference of “attempting to create a GermanAmerican block in order to control the nation’s foreign policy.”111 Critics were not
confined to the press. Roosevelt commented that the leaders of the German-American
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Alliance should be reminded that the nation elects an American President, not a
Viceroy of the German Emperor in America.112 In a Memorial Day address at
Arlington National Cemetery, Wilson warned the nation against hyphens who allowed
the love of their old country to supersede their ardor for America.113
These and other public and private remarks suggested that the Kaiserhof
gathering only served to further alienate a segment of the German-American
community in the eyes of the nation. The situation did not improve when such leading
German-American papers as the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, Illinois Staats-Zeitung,
Herold-Germania, Pittsburgh Volksblatt und Freiheits-Freund came out in favor of
the resolutions. The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung went so far as to say that the actions
stemmed from a “healthy Americanism.”114
The National Alliance neither sponsored nor officially participated in the
gathering. A number of national officers, including Timm and John B. Mayer,
participated on the committee charged with rallying the vote in the German-American
community. Hexamer was careful to keep a distance from the gathering. In the end
the conference only succeeded in further isolating leaders o f the German-American
community from large segments of the American populace, which viewed them as
individuals who promoted German interests in America. The Chicago meeting helped
remove the shroud of patriotism from the German-American Alliance. Many
Americans began to see in its place an iron cross.
By late summer, with the campaign in full swing, the press bureau o f the
NGAA came out in favor of the resolutions passed at the Kaiserhof. Pleased that the
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Republicans had nominated Charles Evans Hughes, local and state chapters went to
work. In a speech on August 2, Hexamer boasted that “at the polls GermanAmericans will show what they are worth.”115 Hughes found German-American
support to be at best a mixed blessing. While he welcomed the vote, he did not
welcome overt efforts on his behalf that might project him as the “German candidate.”
He tried to keep his distance. Wilson on the other hand utilized criticism by the
NGAA to his benefit. In accepting the nomination he delivered a veiled slap at the
Alliance by stating that he neither sought the favor of nor feared that small alien
element which placed loyalty to a foreign power above the United States.116 In his
campaign Wilson succeeded in portraying the Alliance, while never mentioning it by
name, as an organization that rejected true Americanism, while being careful to not
alienate the German-American vote. In a letter to William Hutting dated September
20, 1916, Wilson indicated that he did not believe that the majority of GermanAmericans were against him and that, “with some exceptions the majority were
patriots like himself.” 117
In its efforts to defeat Wilson, the Alliance played into his hands. On October
12 Hexamer issued a memo on his private stationary to all Alliance chapters which
called upon members to do whatever they could to promote the election of Hughes.
The memo insisted that reelection of Wilson would render the Alliance politically
impotent for a long time.118 The details of this note did not become public knowledge
until a Senate committee began an investigation into the Alliance in 1918.
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Hexamer’s appeal carried a clear sense of urgency, an impression that he had
begun to see the writing on the wall and was calling for one last stand. With his
organization fully committed to Wilson’s defeat he realized the consequences of a
different outcome, that Wilson’s reelection probably would result in the United States
entering the war against Germany, the consequences of which would be devasting to
the NGAA, if not to the German-American community.119 These fears came to
fruition when the nation narrowly reelected Wilson in November—ironically, partly
because of the slogan: “he kept us out of war.” The Alliance had focused all its
energies on his defeat and lost the gamble. It was now faced with a potentially hostile
administration at a time when the group was increasingly finding itself under a cloud of
suspicion.
The participation of the Alliance in the election of 1916 was the high point in
the group’s efforts at influencing policy regarding the war. What had started out in
August 1914 as a program for collecting war-relief for Germany led to efforts at
keeping America out of the conflict and preventing arms shipments to the Allies,
culminating in an attempt to remove the president from office. Except for the first
program, the Alliance was ill-suited for these tasks. By taking part in foreign and
domestic politics it entered into a realm that was beyond the scope o f its purpose.
Founded as an organization of intellectuals and professionals whose goal it was to
preserve and promote German culture in America, it entered uncharted waters with
little preparation, obliged—or so it thought—to take positions on issues that were
contrary to popular opinion. Their overt Germanness made them easy targets for the
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press and the Democrat party which labeled them out of touch with mainstream
America, if not apologists for an unpopular belligerent. By the beginning o f 1917 the
NGAA found itself on the defensive. In the eyes of many Americans the shroud had
vanished and what one could see emerging from Alliance headquarters at 419 Walnut
Street, Philadelphia, was an iron cross.
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CHAPTER VI

THE TWILIGHT AND THE END, 1917-1918

The fate of the German-American Alliance would be bound up in a series of
events set in motion in early 1917. On January 31 Germany announced that it would
resume unrestricted submarine warfare—a move that canceled all previous
concessions to the United States and openly threatened American ships. On February
3 Wilson responded by severing diplomatic relations and giving Ambassador
Bemstorffhis passport. The initial reaction within the German-American community
was panic, as many people thought that the United States and Germany were on the
verge of war. In cities across the nation resident aliens rushed to get their citizenship
papers; in Chicago, ninety percent were of German and Austrian birth.1 This panic
also generated a run on the banks by German-Americans who feared that they would
lose their money in such a conflict. The German-American press attempted to calm
this fear. The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung asked that German-Americans “Be calm.
Whatever may happen your money is safe, and no American government, least o f all
the present one would think of touching it.”2
Many local and state chapters of the Alliance were quick to praise Wilson’s
decision and pledge their loyalty.3 Their actions, seemingly contradictory to previous
agitation that had sought to keep America neutral, were based upon the harsh reality
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that condemnation o f the president’s decision would further label the group as antiAmerican.
The national organization acted differently. Instead of quickly pledging its
loyalty it continued to lobby for continued neutrality at a time when war between the
United States and Germany looked more and more likely. On February 5 Hexamer
wired presidents of the state chapters calling upon them to organize peace meetings
and adopt resolutions requesting that Congress submit the question o f declaring war to
a referendum. He also called for a meeting o f national officers to discuss the growing
crisis between the United States and Germany.4 Not all chapter presidents agreed with
this strategy. Many viewed Hexamer’s suggestion as a move that would further
discredit the organization. In calling for a national referendum, the Alliance would
give the impression that it sought to influence United States foreign policy. Paul
Meerscheidt, vice-president of the Texas chapter, cabled Hexamer that the Texas
Alliance opposed any attempts to influence national policy on the war. He strongly
urged Hexamer to drop the matter.5 Other state chapters gave similar advice and
Hexamer had to abandon the idea o f a national referendum.
Several NGAA officers did respond to the request for a meeting to discuss the
break in relations with Germany. On February 7 representatives from twenty-eight
states gathered in Philadelphia for a closed-door session of the executive council.
What happened behind those doors is a matter o f dispute. In three separate articles
published after the meeting the New York Times quoted Hexamer as saying that the
gathering passed a series of resolutions supporting Wilson’s actions and pledging that
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in case of hostilities between the two nations the Alliance would organize regiments of
German-Americans to fight under Wilson’s command. The NGAA also would
immediately turn over all funds gathered for war relief in Germany to the American
Red Cross.6
Past scholarship accepted the Times stories as true.7 Yet the articles are
inconsistent. The first two, appearing on February 8 and 9, indicate that the meeting
took place over a two day period when in fact the session lasted only one day. The
story that appeared on February 10 contradicted the first two regarding the use o f war
relief funds. The last article stated that in event o f war the Alliance would stop
collecting for German war relief and begin a collection for the American Red Cross.
The first two stories claimed that the NGAA would turn over all its war relief funds to
the American Red Cross.
The national leadership of the NGAA flatly denied that Hexamer had said what
was quoted in the Times. The NGAA said that Hexamer would never have offered to
turn over funds collected for a specific purpose without first consulting those who
donated the money. It did agree that the Alliance pledged its loyalty to the United
States in the event of war. In the March edition o f Mitteilungen, Joseph Keller
denounced the continued distortions in the American press concerning Alliance
activities. Keller repudiated the charge that the Alliance would organize battalions of
German-Americans and in passing remarked that, “unlike Colonel Roosevelt, Charles
Hexamer was not a world-conqueror”.8
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John Tjarks, who was at the Philadelphia meeting, also flatly rejected
statements the Times attributed to Hexamer. As treasurer of the national relief fund he
denied that the Alliance intended to give money contributed for German war relief to
the American Red Cross. If war broke out between the United States and Germany,
the funds would be held until the end of hostilities and then sent to Germany. Tjarks
did not say if the Alliance would support a fund to assist the American Red Cross.9
Three interpretations of the conflicting stories are possible. One was that
Hexamer did indeed say what the Times said—a doubtful proposition considering that
he earlier had issued a memorandum calling upon the state chapters to organize peace
demonstrations and petition Congress for a national referendum on declaring war.
Statements attributed to him by the Times contradicted these moves. A second
version is that Keller and Tjarks’ remarks denying Hexamer’s statements were true—a
more likely scenario given the Alliance’s actions after the United States did declare
war on Germany with respect to recruitment of German-Americans, and disposition of
funds for German war relief.
A final version, one meant for conspiracy buffs, could be that the Times article
was actually a plant by the Alliance to promote itself as a patriotic organization willing
to do anything for love of country. Considering that the organization was under a
microscope, such statements, it was hoped, would help portray the organization in a
more positive light. In order to placate the membership as well as those GermanAmericans who contributed to the relief fund the NGAA released a scathing rebuttal of
the Times articles in order to quickly crush any doubts about its actual stance.
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The question as to what Hexamer really said is still open for debate. In their
testimony before the Senate committee investigating the Alliance in early 1918 neither
Tjarks nor Keller made any mention of the incident. Tjarks did testify that all but $188
o f the relief fund had been sent to Germany and Austria prior to the outbreak of
hostilities in April 1917. After April the remaining funds remained in the bank. Local
Alliance chapters then began to collect money for the American Red Cross to assist in
their relief efforts overseas.10
Whatever Hexamer said or did not say, the fact that such a meeting took place
at all during a very sensitive time cast further doubt on the Alliance and its motives. In
this instance, the national organization should have followed the lead of the state
chapters and immediately pledged loyalty to the United States. It had always claimed
to be a “patriotic American organization,” and an excellent way o f proving it would
have been to come out in support of Wilson’s decision to break relations and wait.
The national leadership chose not to do so, continuing instead, for the next month,
with its program of attempting to influence United States policy regarding the war,
albeit in a more subdued manner. It declined to condemn Germany’s declaration of
unrestricted submarine warfare, preferring to call upon the president to “warn all
Americans off ships bound for the war zone.” 11 Even the publication of the
Zimmerman telegram in late February did not move the NGAA from its course of
action, despite the fact that it now found itself clearly out of the mainstream of a
nation that more and more saw war as the only solution to the problems with
Germany. Instead of attacking the German government for sending the telegram—
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which had sought to incite war between the United States and Mexico—the Alliance
chose to further attack Great Britain for its actions. The April issue of Mitteilungen
issued a strong warning at a time when war between Germany and the United States
was fast becoming a certainty:
Americans should remain cool and not rock the boat. They should
weigh carefully every statement that comes from abroad. They should
most important of all, recollect that British publicists are in control of
our newspapers and their press associations. We are nourished with a
flood of mendacity that comes here in endless streams. The truth will
be told some day, but not until the world is relieved from the malign
clutches of the British empire. We are at the mercy of the most
powerful and arrogant government which assumes, not only to
dominate the seas, but actually controls our intelligence and is
dangerously near in complete possession o f our government.12
The NGAA had saved its most vehement attack against Britain for the end. It also
directly accused both the nation’s press and government of being dominated by
England. While the majority of the nation’s papers and the federal government,
including Wilson, had Anglophile tendencies they certainly could not be labeled as
pawns of Great Britain.
Instead of assisting the effort to keep America out of the conflict, brash
statements like the one above only served to heighten suspicion of the organization.
George Creel, soon to be named head of the Committee on Public Information—
America’s “propaganda ministry” during the war—charged that even before the war
the Alliance had been creating a network of agents to operate in the United States in
the event of war with Germany.13 According to Creel these agents already were
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operating within the public school system at the secondary and college level. Another
group had infiltrated the press in order to promote pro-German propaganda.
Creel’s statements, of course, had no factual basis. Nonetheless, his committee
launched a propaganda campaign that portrayed the NGAA as an organization that
continued to promote German nationalism. Earlier attempts at preserving German
culture and contributions, viewed in a positive fashion before 1917, now became a
threat to America. The Alliance thus became the latest in a long line of GermanAmerican groups charged with carving out distinct German colonies in the United
States to preserve the “culture of mind and heart gained in the old fatherland.” 14 A
writer from Nebraska worried that Germans were replacing the Anglo-Saxons who
had built the state and that eventually there no longer would be any “American”
communities.15
To be sure, some publications had attempted to restrain anti-German
sentiment. In February 1917 the Literary Digest called upon America to recognize
that the majority of German-Americans were good citizens and that if war did come, it
would not be with these people.15 The New Republic also reminded the nation that
most German-Americans were patriotic and loyal, not to be blamed for the actions of
“certain” groups which claimed to represent the German-American community but in
reality were nothing more than “haters and baiters who sought to poison the nation’s
energy.” 17
Walter Woehlke, a former member o f the Alliance, commented in Century
Magazine on the situation facing the NGAA and German-Americans in general. He
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explained that because of the psychological pressure brought upon by
Americanization, few hyphenated citizens would be disloyal to America if their
homeland engaged in armed conflict with the United States. Nonetheless, the
“hyphenated American” would always be looked upon as an outsider and a potential
threat in times of crisis.18
Woehlke’s analysis brings up a significant point regarding the mentality of
America on the eve o f war. The United States had always been a nation of many
nationalities governed by a Anglo-Saxon majority. Waves o f nativism had swept the
nation during times o f crisis—at times targeting specific groups, and during other
times attacking immigrants in general. The reasons for this nativism are complex. In
some instances, as in the early 1890’s they were economic— based on the fear that
immigrants would take away jobs from native-born Americans. In other circumstances
they reflected a belief that certain races, such as eastern Europeans, were intellectually
and morally inferior to the Anglo-Saxon majority. A final reason, especially in the case
of the Irish, was the fear of Catholicism and its influence in Protestant America. For
the most part German-Americans had remained free from the nativist attacks
experienced by other ethnic groups. With the United States on the verge of war with
Germany, however, they would feel the wrath of the nation on a level never before
experienced, as the United States again would demonstrate that it had too little in the
way of democratic tolerance during times of trouble.
For his part Wilson tried in vain to avoid war with Germany. On February 26
he asked Congress for permission to arm merchant ships, hoping that such a move
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would deter German U-boats from sinking American vessels—an action which the
Alliance viewed as drawing the nation closer to war.19 It proved to be a futile gesture.
On March 18 the president learned that German U-boats had sunk three American
vessels. Despite this fact, Wilson was still hesitant. Even during a cabinet meeting on
March 20, after his advisors informed him that the United States had no alternative to
war, the president did not reveal his thoughts.20
In the end he decided that the German government had forced the decision
upon him. On April 2, 1917 he addressed a special session of Congress to ask for war
and explain factors that brought it about. But he offered a world of caution. Such a
conflict would be a war against the German government not the German people, he
said, and Americans should demonstrate their friendship toward German-Americans:
We shall, happily still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in
our daily attitude and actions toward the millions of men and women of
German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our
life, and we shall be proud to prove it toward all who are, in fact, loyal
to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are,
most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known
any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in
rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and
purpose.21
The “few” was a reference to the Alliance and various elements of the GermanAmerican press which Wilson viewed as not representative o f the feelings of GermanAmerica, and which had turned many people against German-Americans. Four days
later Congress voted to declare war on Germany.
Branches of the NGAA quickly declared their loyalty and support for the
American war effort, one example being the New York chapter—traditionally one of
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the most vocal—which called for an immediate demonstration o f loyalty. The
Fatherland, a paper that at one time had supported the Alliance, but now chose to
champion the war effort for reasons of literary survival, conceded that it had lost its
battle to keep the United States out of the war, and reminded its readers that while
their hearts may go out to Germany, they were first and foremost American citizens; a
cowardly act in view of past editorials.22
At the national level the Alliance also expressed its loyalty, although
grudgingly and with no sense of satisfaction. There were no memorandums from the
national officers to the local organizations, no calls for mass displays of loyalty. A
number of factors may account for this attitude. First, on the eve of Wilson’s speech,
the NGAA still refused to believe that war between the United States and Germany
was evident. Second, the national leadership waited for the reaction of the state
chapters before making any public statements. Third, the national leadership might
have wanted to wait for the initial excitement to die down before formulating a
cohesive stand on the issue. Finally, division within the organization prevented it from
taking a unified stand.
It was the last scenario that accounted for the group’s indecision. With
Hexamer at the helm, compromise on past positions was impossible. In the May
edition of Mitteilungen, he asked that all German-Americans keep a cool head and not
involve themselves in any activities which could be interpreted as pro-German—a
lukewarm response at best. Further indications of his ethnic chauvinism appeared in a
general warning that he issued to German-Americans to be on guard since the Justice
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Department was watching for any sign of disloyalty. Any American o f German
descent found to be a threat to national security would be prosecuted.23 While
Hexamer’s statement stopped short o f clearly defining the position of the national
leadership, it did indicate that, as its leader, he had revealed his response to American
entry into the war against Germany: it was an act beyond his comprehension and
belief.
Under a cloud of suspicion and facing dissension within its own ranks, the
Alliance found it difficult to formulate a cohesive policy. Many of the western
branches, which had been less vocal in their support of Germany and less critical of
United States neutrality policy, found it easier to adjust to war. Other state and local
chapters which had spent the past two and one-half years supporting Germany,
working to keep America out o f the war, found it difficult to let go of their anger
towards Great Britain and the American government which they felt had allowed itself
to be drawn into the conflict. The Cleveland Alliance refused to take part in the war
movement because it would only serve to aid the cause of Great Britain. The Illinois
Alliance, while declaring its loyalty, also stated that it would not become part of the
mob that was condemning Germany and its allies.24 The St. Louis branch found itself
divided on the issue. When Alliance member Kurt von Reppert came out against the
declaration of war and chastised Wilson, other members of the chapter resigned in
protest.25
The NGAA did not help matters when it printed comments from the extreme
pro-German wing of the organization, which could not reconcile itself to American
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involvement in the conflict. In the June edition of Mitteilungen, Edward von Mach, a
professor at Harvard, condemned the German-American press and elements within the
NGAA which swiftly had done an about face when the United States entered the war.
His article extolled German virtues, stating that all Americans of German descent
should be proud to claim Germany as their fatherland, encouraged German-Americans
to not involve themselves in a conflict brought upon them by lies of the Allies and the
American government.26
The disunity within the organization was a major reason why the national
executive council decided not to hold a biennial convention in 1917. Hexamer wanted
to go ahead with the gathering but met opposition from Joseph Keller and Leo Stem
of Wisconsin, who argued that a convention now would further cast suspicion on the
organization. They cautioned patience until time would allow the Alliance to continue
with its work again. Hexamer argued that a convention would demonstrate that the
organization was still functioning at the national level.27 In the end the executive
council decided by a vote o f 26 to 11 that while no convention would be held in 1917,
a council meeting in November would take up the matter of holding one in 1918. The
fact that an overwhelming majority of the council opposed a convention demonstrated
the depth of division within the organization brought about by the war and the antiGerman hysteria that was engulfing the nation.
The inability to clearly define a position regarding the war also was evident in
the monthly publication of Mitteilungen. After the May issue the bulletin published
very few reports from the state branches—and very few articles about the war.
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Complicating matters for the national leadership was the fact that a vast majority of
the western and eastern chapters were in favor of American involvement whereas
branches in the Midwest called for the NGAA to stand up for its rights and continue
with its work—a further explanation of why the NGAA never openly declared its
support for the war effort thus making it difficult to convince the nation of its loyalty.
Instead Furor Americamis (“American fury”) grew as the United States prepared to
send its soldiers overseas.
The battle would be waged on the cultural, social and human battleffont. The
nation’s largest ethnic component found itself under attack within a nation that it had
contributed so much to help build and the NGAA became the lightening rod for this
campaign. Roosevelt commented that the Alliance, “has tried to be both German and
American but are traitors against America... we must see that the melting pot really
does melt. There should be but one language—English.”28
In two short years the efforts at promoting German culture in the United States
were all but eradicated. German Sangerbundes and Tumvereins, as well as other
German-American cultural organizations, closed their doors forever. German
churches closed; those remaining open held services in English. The German language,
formerly viewed as an agent of scholarly study, came under attack as a hindrance to
the Americanization process and a sign of continued loyalty the fatherland.29 The
teaching of German in primary and secondary schools stopped. German names
became Americanized: sauerkraut, for example, became liberty cabbage. “Patriotic”
Americans toppled statues o f Baron von Steuben. In less than two years the nation
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attempted to eradicate over three hundred years of German culture in America and
force assimilation of the nation’s largest ethnic group.
The German language press came under attack as a source of pro-German
propaganda, spewing out a steady diet of anti-government lies in an effort to hinder
the American war effort while attempting to divide the nation in an effort to secure a
German victory. An article in the September 1917 issue of Current Opinion wondered
how the editors of German-American newspapers, who had been so loyal to the
German cause and so critical o f United States policy before April 1917, could
suddenly voice their patriotism and have people believe them.30 In defense of the
German language press, the vast majority supported the American war effort. Yet
such actions did not erase what many believed to be past sins and by the war’s end
only 278 German language papers remained in the United States—down sixty percent
from pre-war totals/1
The Catholic Central Verein also came under attack—although not nearly on
the level the Alliance faced. The Verein also had supported the Central Powers during
American neutrality but in a far more subtle manner, choosing to not lobby Congress
or make public pronouncements on the issue. Nonetheless the organization came
under a degree of criticism, the worst case scenario being a death threat mailed to
president Frederick Kenkel shortly after America’s declaration of war.32 The Verein
was able to survive during 1917-1918 because it kept its distance from the Alliance
and actively supported the war effort by supplying chaplain’s materials and reading
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material for servicemen, as well as taking an active part in Liberty Bond drives.3j To
the end of the conflict it remained intact, although a weakened organization.
The government also joined in a propaganda campaign aimed at GermanAmerican organizations outside the mainstream of society. In August 1917 the
Committee on Public Information, a new government organization established by
executive order on April 4, published American Loyalty by Citizens o f German
Descent. The pamphlet, which contained short articles focusing on the
accomplishments of German-Americans, reported that only a small percentage of the
ethnic group was disloyal to the United States. It identified factions within the
German-American community which were “disloyal and outside the mainstream of
American values and as a consequence should be disbanded,” and praised those loyal
German-Americans who saw themselves only as Americans34
The forces in favor of prohibition took the opportunity to further discredit the
NGAA, in effect, to use the war to foster their campaign. The Anti-Saloon League
attempted to tie the Alliance to the United States Brewers Association through the
funding program (which had become public) during the years 1911-1916. The League
attempted to make it appear that the entire brewing industry was disloyal. Wayne B.
Wheeler, counsel for the Anti-Saloon League, charged that “the liquor traffic aids
those forces in our country whose loyalty is called into question at this hour.”35 The
League accused the NGAA of promoting German culture in the United States at the
expense of American culture, and of being tied to the German government.36 In fact
the League was turning the Alliance’s constitution—the charge to promote German
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culture—against it, by dredging up the old accusation of the NGAA being involved in
the Pan-German movement. These efforts contributed to the Senate’s decision to hold
hearings about the activities of the Alliance. Beginning in February 1918 and later in
September the Senate engaged in full scale investigations into the brewing and liquor
interests and German propaganda which, needless to say, also involved the Alliance.
Wilson even entered into the debate, although with nothing resembling the
intensity of other critics. He praised German-Americans as being loyal to the ideals of
America, remarking that only a small percentage of them divided their loyalties
between the land of their ancestors and the United States.37 The President had not
forgotten the NGAA’s criticism of his policies during the neutrality debate, its
advocating fair-play for Germany, and its attempts to secure his defeat in 1916. While
never mentioning the Alliance by name, he condemned those German-American
organizations which sought to turn on their country, branding them “the evil influences
that are at work.”38
Not surprisingly, a former president joined the attack. In September 1917
Theodore Roosevelt published “The Children of the Crucible,” in which he insisted
that all immigrants must give up allegiance to their native land. If they refused they
should no longer receive the benefits of being an American. Roosevelt wrote that any
German-American who directly or indirectly acted against the interests o f the United
States should be regarded as traitors. He was direct and specific: “The GermanAmerican Alliance constitutes a grave threat to the nation. It is the duty of all
Americans to man the trenches against the enemy within our gates.”39
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The earlier positions of the NGAA had finally come back to haunt it. Besides
the group’s actions during the period of American neutrality, the pre-war attempts to
promote German culture in America, while an admirable notion during times of peace,
now resulted in a charge of attempting to supplant American culture with German
culture. Since the founding of the Alliance in 1901, the leadership, and above all
Charles Hexamer, never wavered from the original goals of promoting German culture
in America and encouraging better relations between the United States and Germany.
It never sought to replace American culture with German. In all respects the Alliance
had remained true to this task. But it took several positions during the period of
neutrality—on the submarine issue, for example, or arms shipments prior to American
involvement—which were defensible, but not exactly wise. After April 1917 the
inability (or maybe even the unwillingness) of the national leadership to clearly come
out in strong support o f the American war effort placed the group in a very tenuous
position, especially when one considers the national mood that viewed Germany as the
enemy, and a threat to the survival of democracy.
Even though the NGAA was being broken apart by internal divisions the
national leadership attempted to maintain a sense of continuity. In the June 1917 issue
of Mitteilungen Hexamer argued that despite the adversity, both internal and external,
affecting the organization, it still had many reasons to remain united and functioning.
It remained important to preserve contributions o f Americans o f German descent, even
at a time when German-American institutions in America were under assault. In a final
plea for unity, Hexamer asked that “In this dark hour for German-Americans the task
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of the NGAA must remain focused on the preservation of German culture and
institutions, a task begun by the German Society o f Pennsylvania back in 1764.”40
Hexamer thus exhibited a continued unwillingness to compromise and retreat
from the Alliance’s original mission— despite the fact that circumstances o f the time
warranted moderation in both words and actions. One wonders why he continued to
pursue such a course. One explanation is that he saw nothing wrong with pursuing
preservation o f German culture, thus taking Wilson at his word that the war was not
against the German people or German-Americans and their culture. He felt the
Alliance had already gone too far in its activities to turn back—in essence the group
should go down fighting for what it believed. A final explanation could be that
Hexamer was more German than American. In countless speeches he had praised
German culture, language, and institutions, while never giving the same adulation for
American ones. By this time he had lost respect for the United States and what it
stood for. Speaking to his friend Edwin Humes in 1916 he remarked that the
American system of government “is a failure and the only correct form o f government
is a constitutional monarchy.”41 He, o f course, was referring to Germany’s
government. This comment, not made public until the Senate hearings, reflected a
high degree of cultural chauvinism and could do much to explain Hexamer’s continued
remarkable rigidity.
The hard-line stance and refusal to support the war effort did not reflect the
opinion of the rank-and-file. By September 1917 a vast majority of the branches o f the
NGAA had ceased condemning American involvement in the war. They began to raise
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money for the American Red Cross and stopped agitation against prohibition in
reaction to the Anti-Saloon League’s efforts to portray them as a threat to the war
effort.
The activity on behalf of German culture also dwindled remarkably. As cities
and states began to cease German language instruction in public schools the local and
state branches of the Alliance for the most part stood by and watched it happen. The
campaign for German language instruction continued at the national level, but even
there it was low-key and almost defensive. In the July issue of Mitteilungen the
NGAA pointed out that students taking German classes were typically the brightest in
the school. The campaign for the teaching of German continued through October
1917, by which time it had been expanded to include German language instruction in
colleges and universities. The Alliance stressed that by not teaching German the
student would be unable to fully appreciate the great pieces of German literature,
poetry, and theater that had been taught in the nation’s institutions of higher learning
for the past one hundred years.42 For the most part efforts by the NGAA regarding
German language instruction were confined to articles in the monthly bulletin. Unlike
the pre-war years in which the group openly campaigned and lobbied for German in
the public schools, this defensive effort was relegated to the printed word. The July
1917 issue of Mitteilunger contained an article reprinted from the Cincinnati
Volksblall which sought to remind the nation that the United States was at war with
the German government, not the German language, and that the nation must “keep
alive the torch of civilization amidst the horrors of war.”43
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In its efforts to stem the tide of anti-Germanism the NGAA mostly made
pledges of loyalty, and called upon the nation to not condemn Americans of German
descent. As with the attempts at preserving the German language, this campaign
existed on paper. The Alliance called upon the citizenry to not prejudge neighbors
based upon war hysteria. It admonished the nation for allowing the popular press to
mold opinions of an ethnic group that only a short time ago it had considered to
contain some of the greatest contributors to the growth o f the United States.44 As
with their other attempts, this campaign fell upon deaf ears in a nation at war.
The stress brought about by the war against Germany began to take its toll on
the national headquarters of the NGAA. In October 1917 Hexamer announced that he
would step down as president in November. He said that ill health had forced the
decision, which was partly true, considering that he always had suffered from heart
trouble. The decision also was the result of internal divisions that he could no longer
reconcile.45 Hexamer had been the most vocal of all the Alliance officers in criticizing
Wilson’s policies during the period of American neutrality. Some of his officers,
including Stem and Sutro, believed that this attitude reduced his effectiveness as
president now that America was at war with Germany. Hexamer always had been the
main spokesman for the Alliance, his enthusiasm often approaching the point of
fanaticism. At a time when German-Americans were viewed with suspicion and their
culture being threatened in America, some members felt that he was not the right
individual to lead the organization through the storm. Conciliation was not one of his
many talents. His inability to compromise reduced his effectiveness during a time
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when the organization needed a unifying force at the helm rather than one who invited
controversy.
On November 29 the executive committee of the NGAA met in Chicago at the
Red Star Inn on North Clark Street. Few people showed up, no one from the West.
After strong debate, in which Hexamer still held out for holding a convention in 1918,
the committee voted against him. If he had any qualms about his earlier decision to
resign, this vote—in essence a rejection o f his leadership—surely removed them.
Hexamer formally stepped down from the presidency. When first vice-president
Joseph Keller declined the position the executive council appointed Sigmund von
Bosse, president of the Delaware chapter, as the new president of the NGAA.46
With Hexamer’s departure the NGAA lost not only the only president it had
known, but it also its main driving force. It was Hexamer’s dedication, organizational
ability and energy that kept the Alliance together for as long as it lasted. He had
devoted his entire adult life to maintaining and promoting German culture in America.
In the end his cultural chauvinism, the position taken by the NGAA during America’s
neutrality—including the attacks on Wilson and efforts to influence the election of
1916— and the shift in attitudes towards German-Americans brought about by
America’s belligerent status resulted in the decline of his organization and the end of
his dream.
One could easily portray Hexamer as out of the mainstream in his desire to
promote German institutions in America. But such an evaluation would be misleading.
He truly believed that what he was doing was good, not only for German-Americans,
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but for Americans in general. He had remembered the lessons of his father, a former
“48er” who instilled in him a love of democracy and liberty and a suspicion of any
government that attempted to take those rights from its citizens. Despite earlier
comments advocating a monarchy over a democracy—expressed most likely in the
heat of passion—he was a true American in the Jeffersonian sense of the word, a
believer that the power of government rested solely in the hands of the governed.
When the Senate began an investigation of the Alliance in late February 1918,
Hexamer would be too ill to appear as a witness. He lingered for almost two more
years, leading a quiet life outside the public eye. On January 8, 1920 the former
president of an organization that at one time claimed over 2.5 million members passed
away at age fifty- seven.47
Without its leader, tom by internal dissension, the Alliance was ready for the
final blow. President von Bosse tried to maintain a semblance of the national
organization in his December 1917 address published in Milteilungen. He cautioned
moderation and calm while reminding the Alliance of the aims and purposes of the
organization mentioned in the charter. Von Bosse proclaimed that at the end o f the
conflict the NGAA would resume its proper role as the educational and patriotic
organization, and at that it would be in the forefront of mending the nation’s wounds
and bringing about a reconciliation between the United States and Germany.48
Von Bosse tried in vain to rally an organization that barely existed. Besides
suffering from a reduction in membership, the Alliance found itself alone, virtually
without allies. Its association with the Ancient Order of Hiberians, which had never
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amounted to anything beyond words and friendly exchanges, was all but forgotten as
each organization became absorbed in its own problems. The AOH worried about
events in Ireland, and while sympathetic to the plight of the NGAA, could do little to
help. As mentioned earlier, the Catholic Central Verein, which had always tried to
maintain a distance from the Alliance, also had troubles. While never as vocal as the
NGAA in its assessment of United States neutrality policy, it still was not exempt from
the anti-German hysteria facing the nation. Even before America’s declaration of war
in April 1917 the organization was divided. Some chapters came out openly for
Wilson’s neutrality while others backed the cause of the Central Powers. By early
1918 the CCV had more to concern itself with than the plight o f the NGAA.49
Even the German-American press deserted the Alliance. The rift between the
two had begun back in February 1917 when the national leadership of the Alliance
began to back away from its stance on German war relief and possible United States
involvement in the conflict. A number of newspapers including the Cincinnati Freie
Presse, Illinois Staats-Zeitnng, and the Westliche Post in St. Louis denounced the
“strategic retreat” of the NGAA.50 Herman Hagedom, a prominent German-American
writer, took the opportunity to label the past utterances of the Alliance as “pompous
drivel.” An organization that had once professed to be the representative of GermanAmericans, now turned tail when it was needed the most—an unfounded accusation
since the national leadership never wavered from its goals and objectives. George
Sylvester Viereck, who had changed the name of the Fatherland to Viereck's
American Monthly, attempted to distance himself from the organization. In what was
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probably an effort to save his own “hide” he said that, in reality, the NGAA had never
really been important on the national scene in politics—another unfounded
statement.51
While some within the German-American community accused the Alliance of
selling out, the exact opposite feeling existed within the rest o f the nation. Beginning
in early 1918 it was possible to hear calls for the revocation o f the Alliance’s charter
across the nation. Ironically the most vocal cries came from the Midwest where the
Alliance was at one time firmly entrenched.52 On January 16, 1918 Senator William
King of Utah introduced a bill that would revoke the Alliance’s charter. Specifically
the bill ordained that:
the Act approved February twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and seven,
entitled “An Act to incorporate the National German-American
Alliance,” be, and the same is hereby, repealed.
Sec. 2. That the Attorney General is directed to bring an action in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction o f the property of
said corporation to have a receiver appointed to take charge of such
property, pay the debts, and wind up the affairs o f said corporation.5j
King accused the NGAA o f being an organization more German than American, a
threat to the nation’s welfare, and as a consequence should not benefit from a
Congressional charter.54
At first the Alliance chose to take this threat lightly. The executive council
stated that the group had nothing to fear since the organization had done nothing that
could be considered disloyal or a threat to the nation. With an air of naivete it
announced that the Congress would not revoke a charter granted to an organization
merely because it had the word “German” in front of it, that once the facts were out in
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the open the Senator from Utah would quickly withdraw his resolution.55 This
position appeared in the February 1918 issue of Mitteilungen, ironically the last to be
published.
The Senate began investigations into the group’s activities on February 23.
Chaired by Senator King, they would last until April 13, 1918. The government
focused on the activities of the Alliance in the areas of national politics, attempts to
promote German culture, and the prohibition question. The main argument concerned
involvement in national politics from 1914-1917, something that the charter had
forbidden. King’s committee targeted political activities by local Alliance chapters,
specifically in Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, and Kansas. The chief counsel for the
NGAA, Karl Scholtz, countered that the restriction on political activities referred only
to the national organization, not the state and local branches. It was a fine line of
defense, one that the government could easily cross given the national mood at the
time.
For its star witness the government summoned Gustavus Ohlinger, president of
the Toledo Chamber of Commerce. A vigorous opponent of the NGAA during the
past three years, Ohlinger had soundly denounced the organization in an article “To
Our Citizens of German Descent,” and in the book Their True Faith and Allegiance.
Ohlinger considered himself an expert on the Alliance and its activities, but in reality
he knew little of the organization’s scope and purpose, basing his knowledge primarily
on the activities after August 1914. He demonstrated this ignorance early in his
testimony when he attempted to connect the NGAA to the Pan-German League, not
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knowing that the Alliance had rejected any affiliation with the organization back in
1909.56
Even so, the government relied heavily on Ohlinger’s testimony. His
distortions set the tone for the way the Senate conducted the hearings over the next
two months. With little regard to what the NGAA had done prior to the war, the
Senate committee accepted as truth the distortions o f the Alliance’s activities during
the war. Press coverage helped further the idea that the Alliance was part o f a proGerman network seeking to undermine America’s war effort. So ridiculous and
unfounded were the charges leveled against the NGAA that today one can look upon
them with contempt. Yet given the mood of the nation in 1918 it did not take much to
convince Americans that the Alliance was indeed in league with the Kaiser and his
minions.
Ohlinger charged that the Alliance sought to unify the German-American
element in a united block, retard the assimilation process, openly campaign for the
German cause, oppose the policies of the United States government regarding the
war, and strongly oppose the prohibition of alcohol.57 His charges, exaggerations of
the truth in most cases, made good headlines in The New York Times which was quick
to run a story labeling the Alliance as, “an agent of sedition.”58 While it was true that
the Alliance opposed prohibition, it did so in a peaceful, democratic way. During 1914
to 1917 it had opposed United States policies regarding the war, and campaigned for
fair treatment o f Germany. In its opposition to potential American military
involvement during this period the NGAA was not alone, but echoed the opinion of
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the vast majority o f Americans who shared similar views. William Jennings Bryan had
summed up their feelings when he stated that, “the United States should stand firmly in
favor of peace and not allow itself to be drawn into war with any of the belligerents.”59
Ohlinger also attacked the Alliance as an un-American organization, citing the
group’s efforts to promote and maintain German culture in America. His testimony
focused on the charge that the NGAA had violated its charter by promoting, not
American but German interests in America, the latter accusation based upon the
efforts at promoting German language instruction, German-American history, and
other areas of German-American culture. Ohlinger also mentioned the Kaiser’s
awarding Hexamer the Order of the Eagle in 1914 .60
Ohlinger freely admitted that the NGAA never put up candidates for election,
but he insisted that the Alliance had become involved in politics in other ways: rallying
the German-American vote and protesting the government’s neutrality policies. His
main evidence came from articles published in the Mitteilungen during the time when
the leadership attempted to rally German-American opinion to its position on the war.
He pointed to efforts at undermining United States policy, such as the New Willard
Hotel conference o f January 1915, as proof of the Alliance’s disloyalty. Ohlinger
admonished the group for never supporting the government’s actions during 19141917; it was more German than American.61
While one could accuse the Alliance of being somewhat foolish in the positions
taken from 1914-1917, it acted in neither the fashion nor to the extreme suggested by
Ohlinger. In accusing the group of being politically active he walked a fine line. While
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it was true that the NGAA did lobby the government on issues o f concern to the group
such as prohibition and American neutrality policy, its work was in that respect no
different from groups like the Anti-Saloon League, and pro-Allied organizations which
had lobbied the government on behalf o f their causes. The only difference, and for the
NGAA the most damaging, was that none of these other organizations possessed a
Congressional charter, nor did they vocalize their discontent with United States policy
as vehemently as the Alliance. Yet the NGAA never violated its charter at the national
level since it did not openly come out in favor of one political party over the other.
Despite being politically active before the war, the stance taken by the Alliance in the
neutrality debate, its efforts during the election of 1916, coupled with United States
military involvement helped bring about the viewpoint that the Alliance had always
been anti-American in its political stances. Wartime hysteria caused the nation to
quickly forget that Presidents Roosevelt and Taft had earlier praised the group for its
work.
Ohlinger’s accusations gave the press more issues on which to feed. The New
York Times again distorted the information to read that Hexamer had been the Kaiser’s
deputy and ruler of the German people in America.62 Such fallacious accusations even
caused the German press to rally behind the Alliance. The New Yorker-Staats Zeitung,
which recently had chastised the group, ridiculed both Ohlinger’s testimony and the
exaggerations of the Times by saying that, as an educational and cultural organization,
the NGAA did not attempt to retard the assimilation process but instead encouraged
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The government also relied upon the testimony o f Henry Campbell, assistant
editor of the Milwaukee Journal, who repeated the charge that the NGAA had
promoted Pan-Germanism by retarding, instead o f assisting, the assimilation of
German immigrants in America.64 He further contended that the group sought to
speed up the citizenship process, not for the purpose o f turning immigrants into
Americans, but so they could vote on issues o f concern for the Alliance.
Campbell’s testimony concerning United States neutrality policy largely
repeated Ohlinger’s accusations, reinforcing an image o f the Alliance as supporting
Germany, embarrassing the United States, and generally promoting policy favorable
to the Central Powers.65 He pointed to the Chicago conference of 1916 and the effort
to influence the selection of the Republican candidate and of course the attempt to
defeat Wilson as evidence of involvement in partisan politics. Campbell correctly
reported that a large number of the state and local branches took an active role in
trying to unseat the incumbent president. What he failed to mention was that while
some members of the national executive council were present at the meeting, the
national leaders, including Charles Hexamer, kept their distance for fear of connecting
the organization to direct political involvement.
The testimony of Ohlinger and Campbell formed the basis for the government’s
case against the NGAA. The principle accusation was that the Alliance had violated
its national charter by directly participating in politics. Yet the charter itself did not
directly forbid the group from doing so as long as it did not openly favor one party
over the other. The organization’s charter, while stating that the group would refrain

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

266

from participation in party politics, also stipulated that it would reserve the right to
defend and maintain its principles in the political field should it feel attacked.66
The Alliance’s accusers felt that the group had overstepped its bounds by
attempting to influence neutrality policy and the outcome of the 1916 election. They
attempted to link the NGAA with the Pan-German League in an effort to demonstrate
that even as early as 1907 the Alliance had strayed from its intended purpose as a
cultural organization and became a political entity with the interests of Germany in
mind. The national leadership had utilized state and local chapters to promote the
group’s goals while stating that the purposes were purely patriotic and American.
Afforded the opportunity to speak, the leaders of the Alliance completely
denied the charges o f political activity and pro-Germanism. Chief counsel Karl
Scholtz submitted a paper which outlined the group’s position. The document
contended that Senator King had no right to preside over hearings on a bill that he
introduced and that the Senate had no right to act as prosecutor, judge and jury in this
matter. The Senate had based its case on testimony with little foundation and no
merit. If the government saw fit to prosecute the Alliance it should do so in a court of
law.67 This protest, while placed in the record, fell upon deaf ears as subcommittee
contended that these hearings did not constitute a court of law and that they were
following proper procedure.
Sutro denounced the treatment afforded to German-Americans and the
Alliance since the beginning of the war:
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For three and a half years not only we, the members of our great
National German-American Alliance, but all the American citizens of
German origin or even of German names, have been the targets for
insult and vilification on the part of these people and now also
Congress is asked to stamp its seal of approval upon this unreasonable
and contemptible persecution.68
He complained that an ethnic group that had been looked upon with respect only a few
years earlier was now being condemned as unpatriotic. Such a shift in opinion not
only reflected wartime hysteria but also a complete misunderstanding o f GermanAmericans and their culture.
Sutro argued that the government, and to some extent, the general population,
had determined that any attempt by German-Americans to promote German culture in
America was a sign of loyalty to the German government. He pointed out that the
Alliance had always rejected the aims o f the Pan-German movement. The Alliance
was always careful to tie efforts to promote German culture in with the contributions
of German-Americans to the United States. The involvement in politics was not for
the sake of promoting German issues but to induce German-Americans to exercise
their duties as citizens.69 German-Americans, no less than any citizen, had a
fundamental right to voice concerns over government policies or support or oppose an
individual seeking office. Sutro thus argued that the Alliance had done nothing that
other groups in the past or present had not done to influence the government’s
policies. A major difference, of course, was that other groups had not been
connected—either in fact or in public perception—to a nation with which the United
States was at war.
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Five more witnesses, four of them officers of the national organization,
attempted to deflect the main charge o f improper political activity. At this time the
government raised the prohibition issue as evidence of the Alliance’s political activity
in concert with brewing and liquor interests. It was during these hearings that the
connection between the two became public. Percy Andreae testified that he had
supplied the Alliance with funds to combat prohibition from 1914-1916, and traced the
route of distribution. He also acknowledged that local brewers and the brewers
association had contributed money before that time.70
The government attempted to use Andreae’s testimony to tie the Alliance and
brewing and liquor interests into German propaganda efforts in the United States. The
Senators did not succeed. Andreae, Tjarks, and Keller all testified that the Alliance
used funds given it strictly for the anti-prohibition campaign. They supplied
documentation to support the testimony and proved that the funding had stopped even
before the United States had declared war on Germany in April 1917.71 At the end of
the first round o f testimony Senator King curiously admitted that it was not within the
realm of this hearing to investigate the ties between the NGAA and the liquor interests
in America.72
This issue would be taken up in September 1918 when the Senate launched
another investigation—this time focusing on the brewing and liquor interests and
German propaganda. By this time the Alliance had ceased to exist as an organization.
The purpose of the hearings was to investigate charges that a conspiracy existed in the
United States in which German-Americans in the brewing industry had worked hand-
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in-hand with the German government to influence America’s foreign policy. The
Senate attempted to link the NGAA directly with German propaganda efforts in
America. The committee charged that the Alliance had been working for years to
organize the German-American population into a separate community in America.
Allegedly, the Alliance and the liquor industry joined forces after the start o f war in
Europe to promote German interests and undermine United States policy both prior to
and after America’s entrance into the war.73 These hearings, which established further
connections between the NGAA and the USBA were important in keeping alive the air
of suspicion concerning anti-government and anti-American plots. The hearings also
touched on Bolshevik propaganda in the United States. Prompted by the anti-German
hysteria, they also helped fuel the flames of an anti-Communist hysteria that would
manifest itself in the Red Scare of 1919-1920.
During April 1918 the anti-German hysteria reached its peak with the lynching
of a German-American named Paul Robert Praeger in Collinsville, Illinois by a band of
“patriotic” Americans who had accused him of spreading Socialist doctrine and being a
German spy. The participants were lauded for their actions by a jury that found them
innocent o f murder after only five minutes of deliberation.74 This activity took place at
a time when the outcome o f the war was still in doubt and American soldiers were
being rushed to the front lines to help turn back a German offensive. Within weeks the
“doughboys” would find themselves involved in the bloody battles of Chateau Thierry
and Belleau Wood—their presence doing much to end the last German offensive in
France and turn the tide o f the war.
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Thus, as an anxious nation watched events in Europe, a war at home against
German-Americans escalated. The governor of Ohio demanded that “firing squads be
used to deal with traitors.” In Chicago, four German-Americans who refused to kiss
the flag were tarred and feathered, while the local Germania Club had to change its
name to the Lincoln Club. The Chicago Tribune called for the internment of GermanAmerican women suspected of being spies. The mayor of Michigan City, Indiana was
arrested and accused of being a German spy. Meanwhile all around the nation German
books were being removed from libraries and burned.75 Even the government was not
exempt from this mood. Congress passed the Espionage and Sedition Acts, looselyworded restrictions on free speech that targeted the war’s critics and purported
German espionage activity in the United States.
Amidst this backdrop the hearings into the Alliance resumed on March 9 with
testimony by high-ranking officials in the organization. The first to testify was John
Tjarks, former chairman of the finance committee, who revealed that the NGAA had
raised over $886,000 to assist individuals in Germany and Austria-Hungary who were
suffering due to the conflict. People receiving the funds, which the Alliance had given
to the German and Austrian ambassadors in the United States, included the wounded,
prisoners of war, the widowed and orphans.76
The testimony further revealed that shortly before United States entry into the
war Tjarks had sent a letter to all chapters announcing that funds would no longer be
collected for German war relief. When America entered the war the NGAA made
little effort to raise funds for the American Red Cross, choosing instead to allow local
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chapters to decide what they wanted to do. Many selected to continue fund raising;
but the attitude of the national leadership (it did not assist an American cause as it
once supported the Germans) again brought up the loyalty question. Tjarks’ testimony
was made to appear as if the NGAA had been aiding the German war effort.
The appearance of Joseph Keller produced the same line of questioning. The
Senators asked Keller to discuss his involvement with German language instruction
and the selection of textbooks in the Indianapolis public schools. The Senators
evidently hoped to link the NGAA with promoting German ideas and values in the
public school system prior to 1917. As with many other lines o f attack the committee
was not able to make a direct connection between the Alliance and the selection of
textbooks in the public schools. In this case book selection was made by the Indiana
board of education, of which Keller was not a member and thus had no voice in what
was used in the schools.77 Keller’s statements had little effect on the committee. The
mere fact that the NGAA promoted the German language was enough for the Senators
to believe that it was more German than American.
Testimony regarding anti-prohibition activity, raising funds for German war
relief, and promotion of the German language and values did much to cast suspicion
upon the Alliance. The most damaging connection, however, was the state branches’
direct involvement in politics. It was on this issue that the committee sought
revocation of the group’s charter. Edwin Humes, United States District Attorney for
Western Pennsylvania, made the connection. His investigations of the Allegheny
branch revealed it had been organized expressly for political involvement.78 As
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evidence he cited minutes from the organization’s business meetings during the period
from April 1914 to December 1917 that revealed attempts at influencing neutrality
policy through direct involvement in state and national elections and in raising money
for German war relief. The minutes also disclosed that the Allegheny branch openly
campaigned against Wilson.79 None of these practices were illegal, and they did not
technically violate the national charter, but coupled with earlier statements, Humes’
disclosures convinced the Senate committee that the NGAA was un-American—a
threat to national security which needed to be disbanded.
The task of trying to change the minds of the committee now fell in the hands
of Sigmund von Bosse, the new Alliance president, and Timm, the national secretary.
Von Bosse read from a prepared statement which denied all charges against the
Alliance. The NGAA had never wavered from its original mission as an educational
and patriotic organization and had never participated in activities that could be viewed
as un-American.80 Von Bosse was merely stating what had been said many times in
the past.
But the young president was ill-prepared to deal with the rigorous questioning
he received. He contradicted himself, tripped over his own words concerning the
Alliance’s stance on German invasion of Belgium (to which the Alliance did not even
respond), the submarine campaign (which the NGAA viewed as self-defense on
Germany’s part), and the question of war guilt: the Alliance blamed the Allies for
seeking to surround and suffocate Germany through the Triple Entente. This line of
questioning made it look as if the Alliance had supported the German invasion of
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neutral Belgium, justified the sinking of the Lusitania, and clung to the notion that
Germany had no responsibility for the outbreak o f the war.81 The press was quick to
pick up on this. Under the headlines “Asserts Lusitania Was Legally Sunk, ” the New
York Times charged that the Alliance condoned German aggression against innocent
civilians.

While the article did state that the NGAA had claimed to be completely

loyal since United States entry into the conflict, the Times questioned sincerity of the
statement given the group’s actions from 1914-1917. 82
Von Bosse’s lengthy testimony did little to dissuade the Senators, and neither
did Timm. Questioned about the election of 1916, Timm said that the national
organization did not endorse any single candidate and did not come out openly against
one. Politics was left in the hands of the local and state branches; the national
organization acted in the areas only listed in the NGAA’s constitution.83 When it
asked about the objective o f promoting German kultur in America, the committee
reminded Timm of Hexamer’s use of that term in a speech delivered in Milwaukee in
1916. Timm explained that kultur was a term that the group as a rule did not use
because o f its possible implications. He had counseled Hexamer against its use.84
Events outside the hearings also played against the Alliance. Weinsberg,
president of the Missouri chapter, was accused of sedition after the St. Louis PostDispatch published an interview in which he allegedly stated that Germany would win
the war in six months.85 Eventually brought to trial on sedition charges, Weinsberg
would be found innocent after a lengthy trial—the only officer in the NGAA to be
tried for disloyalty under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. 86
•
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Leaders of the Alliance knew that their appearance before the Senate had been
futile. On March 22 the The New York Times published an interview in which von
Bosse admitted that the group expected have its charter revoked. He also pointed out
the danger of such actions to the nation:
Our only regret is that the manner of revoking our charter has been
made the vehicle for stirring up the feeling of bitterness between the
racial integers in this country. The loss of the charter does not in itself
mean much to us under the circumstances. As members of the Alliance
we realize that we have perhaps done many things we should not have
done and have left undone things we should have done. As loyal
Americans there is nothing for us to do now but to put every effort into
the prosecution of the war to an early and successful conclusion.87
In a special meeting on April 11, 1918 the executive council voted to disband rather
than wait for the federal government to do the job for them. In its last official, and
ironic act, the council voted to turn over the $30,000 remaining in its treasury to the
American Red Cross to aid American soldiers fighting against Germany.88
The Senate finished its hearings, and as expected, recommended that Congress
take immediate action to revoke the group’s charter. The committee came to the
conclusion that the NGAA had purposely set out to perpetuate the division of America
along ethnic lines both prior to and after the outbreak of war in Europe. The Alliance
repeatedly demonstrated its preference for German institutions over American. The
committee did not condemn all German-Americans, only those in the NGAA who
throughout its entire “disloyal and disgraceful career sought to place a cloud of
suspicion over law-abiding Americans of German descent.”89
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The Senate approved the bill on July 2 and the House on July 29. President
Wilson signed the measure into law on August 31, 1918. Even though the NGAA had
not functioned as an organization for more than four months, the Senate could not
resist firing yet another shot. Senator William Borah said that activities of the Alliance
demonstrated the need for all ethnic groups to become completely Americanized and
that there was no room for divisions along ethnic and cultural lines in America. In
closing he emphasized that the United States should never allow such an ethnic
•

•

*

* 9 0

organization to rise again.

Borah’s statement revealed much regarding the mood of the United States in
the late summer of 1918. Wartime hysteria prompted a backlash against all things
German. The Alliance, being the most visible German-American organization, became
a natural target. The group had supported an unpopular belligerent from 1914-1917,
and could not remove itself from that connection in the minds of Americans who
demanded “one-hundred percent Americanism,” even after the United States entered
the war against Germany. Von Bosse viewed this attitude and the treatment of the
National German-American Alliance in general as an example of the ethnic and racial
divisions that existed in the nation. The war did bring about an attack on all things
German, but this was an isolated case confined to a short time period. Prior to 1917
German-Americans were the most respected ethnic group in the United States, and the
Alliance itself was even praised for many of its activities. Even more than the question
o f ethnic division the war raised sharp questions concerning tolerance, civil rights, and
diversity within the nation. In the end then, the story of the National German-
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American Alliance is one of an ethnic group that believed deeply in what it was doing
but fell victim to its own passion, and to the passions of the time.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: ETHNICITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

In writing the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson incorporated
Enlightenment thought concerning the relationship between government and citizens.
Jefferson took those ideas one step further, creating a treatise that included democratic
values and the idea that all people should benefit from the fullness of American life.
Over the years Jefferson’s dream of “universal democracy” underwent many tests—
chief amongst them the Civil War which, in part, was fought to make all men equal.
The millions of immigrants who came to America from foreign lands between 1820
and 1920 also believed in Jefferson’s words—so much so that many fought and died to
preserve the Union. Yet upon arrival immigrants often faced hardship and sometimes
persecution similar to that which they left behind. The promise of American
democracy was not necessarily there for the taking, especially during times of
economic and political unrest.
It was the second and third generations of these immigrant families that began
to enjoy the fruits o f their parents’ labors. Citizens by birth, they looked upon the
United States as a land of endless opportunity, and for many this vision became a
reality. This progress was especially true for the members of the National German-
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American Alliance, the majority of whom were from the middle and upper-middle
classes—people who had "‘made it” in terms of economics, education and status.
Opportunity, however, had its price as the nation underwent a transition from
an Anglo-agrarian society to a multi-ethnic industrial one that sought to cast all people
within its “melting pot.” Yet many believed that the freedom promised in America
included the right to preserve distinct and different ways of life— so long as one
obeyed the law and acted in a responsible manner. Unfortunately, such an exercise o f
freedom at times ran into trouble. At the dawn of the twentieth century a number o f
factors—large-scale immigration from Europe and an increase from Asia, stresses
brought on by industrialization, the rise to world power status, and the Progressive
movement—helped to create a situation in which conformity to a “perceived”
American ideal began to displace the right o f the individual to practice a distinct way
of life. Theodore Roosevelt summed up this national mood by stating that there were
no English-Americans, or Irish-Americans, or Italian-Americans; there are only
Americans. His words bespoke the feelings of many in the United States who, on the
eve of World War One, had become “one-hundred percenters.” Yet the question was
asked even then: what is an American? For some it was an individual who fully
supported the nation’s values and mores—discarding those of his or her heritage.
Many, however, believed that it was possible to be an American, yet maintain ties to
one’s past. Such people were labeled “hyphenates” and were tolerated during times o f
peace. But hard times created pressures and prejudices, although they varied in
accordance with different groups.
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Such was the story of the National German-American Alliance. There can be
no doubt that the members of the organization were Americans in every sense of the
word; one cannot question their love of liberty and democratic ideals. More so than
most “super patriots,” they believed in Jefferson’s words that, “governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”
They also believed in the Constitution that promised all Americans the blessings of
liberty. To promote those ideals they labeled themselves an “educational and
patriotic” society. They also recognized that the blessings of liberty had a price. To
that end they included in the preamble to their constitution a statement that they were
willing to risk everything for the welfare of the United States and that, above all, the
individual must exercise good citizenship and obey the law.
Within these parameters the members of the Alliance strongly believed that it
was possible to be both American and German-American. They saw nothing wrong
with promoting one’s ethnic diversity—a precursor of a trend that would become
powerful later in the twentieth century. To them, the United States was a nation o f
diverse cultures, and it was this diversity that made the nation what it was. For the
first seven years of its existence the Alliance remained true to its objectives by
promoting German culture in America and preserving the memory of contributions by
German-Americans. In its efforts the organization received praise from both the
public and private sector.
After 1909 the group began to stray from that original mission. Perhaps it was
that pursuing its objectives, and broadening the definition, inevitably led the
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organization into sensitive territory. Involvement in politics at the national level—
especially the debate over prohibition—began to tarnish the image of the organization.
The Alliance fought hard to prevent establishment of prohibition, arguing that it was
an infringement on personal liberty and would, in the end, cause more problems than
create solutions. In that respect the NGAA accurately predicted the trials and
tribulations of the “Roaring Twenties,” as the group’s warning that making alcohol
illegal would make it a “forbidden fruit,” even more desirable than before, became a
reality, as did the prediction concerning the rise of organized crime and violence to
levels never seen before by the nation. The extent to which the Alliance anticipated
virtually every problem to be associated with prohibition was truly remarkable. As the
organization grew in size and became a force in the prohibition debate it was inevitable
that the brewing and liquor interests would take notice. Accepting funds from the
USBA, while freeing up the Alliance’s own assets for other projects, became a
“Pandora’s Box” in that once opened it could not easily be closed, the result being that
the NGAA was drawn deeper into the political arena—a place it said it would never
go, and where it was ill-equipped to operate . Unified in as long as it maintained its
emphasis on cultural preservation, the organization’s increased political involvement
inevitably produced internal tension as many key officers—even as early as 1911—
objected strongly to the Alliance’s increasing commitment to the prohibition debate.
Such activities also did not go unnoticed outside Alliance circles. The German
identification, previously welcomed and honored, now began to take on a different
coloring. On the eve of the World War One the Alliance had become more a political
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lobbying organization than one dedicated to the promotion of culture and memory,
although to be sure, there was some legitimate blending of the two. Alcohol
represented both a political issue and an agent of culture. It was during the period of
United States neutrality that the Alliance finally broke away from the ideals by which it
was founded. In its attempts to secure complete American neutrality and—by its
definition—fair play for Germany it became an organization labeled as being more
German than American. For many it had become the National German Alliance.
The choice o f politics over culture and ethnicity proved to be fatal, as the
NGAA failed to achieve its goals between August 1914 and April 1918. More
important, it lost much of what it had achieved during the first thirteen years of its
existence, while contributing heavily to the anti-German hysteria of 1917-1918 which
all but eradicated the culture that the Alliance so passionately sought to preserve. Its
vehement stance on the neutrality question and its promotion o f the German cause,
while not illegal and in some measure understandable, was certainly unwise and did
much to paint the Alliance as a German organization, leaving many Americans hardpressed to believe that the motives were “educational and patriotic.” With United
States entry into the conflict previous attempts at maintaining German culture became
signs of overt cultural chauvinism and evidence that the Alliance was indeed still
wedded to the fatherland. In combination with the organization’s unwillingness to
support wholeheartedly the American war effort, repeated attempts at promoting
German culture seemed to prove the case—the iron cross flew proudly over 416
Walnut Street. During its last year of existence, torn by internal dissent which cost the
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group its president and main driving force, the NGAA became an easy target for a
public and government eagerly searching for “the secret enemy within.” In the end the
NGAA, which did indeed do much to bring about its own demise, became a victim of
war-hysteria and an example of what can happen to those who seek to maintain a
sense o f ethnicity—at least the wrong kind—during times that demand conformity.
The story of the Alliance during 1914-1918, and throughout its entire
existence, demonstrates the difficulty ethnic organizations faced in seeking to preserve
their culture and maintain a sense o f ethnicity in times of peace and war. One cannot
condemn the work of the Alliance both during the pre-war and neutrality years. As an
organization bom in a desire to preserve German culture in the United States it
seemed logical that the NGAA would wish to see the birthplace of that culture survive
the war intact, although certainly not to the extent that it would support a German
victory over America. As with its pre-war endeavors, the Alliance defended its
wartime behavior—unconvincingly, as it turned out—as an expression of patriotism.
In truth, the Alliance was neither disloyal nor subversive during its existence.
Its actions in the political realm, while never illegal, were ill-advised and contributed
much to the group’s downfall and to the anti-German hysteria of 1917-1918. It never
deliberately promoted disunity or disloyalty but plowed persistently ahead with its
ethnic agenda, seemingly unaware of, or oblivious to, the ramifications for a greater
American society. Its fate would be determined in the volatile environment that was
American democracy during the first years of the twentieth century and in the end of
course, by the shifting fortunes of war.
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